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Abstract
As with many collapsed fisheries worldwide, the rebuilding of Newfoundland's Northern Gulfcod
fishery has been a huge challenge to coastal communities, resource users, scientists, and policy
makers. Almost twenty years after a moratorium was declared in the early 1990s, the cod stocks are
below conservation limit reference points; only small quotas are available for commercial and
recreational fisheries, and a strong possibility exists that the stocks will be listed as endangered.
Not only have these and other regional Atlantic cod stocks been slow to rebuild, the cod fishing
industry also faces challenges along the production chain, from harvesting to processing, and
marketing. While the fishing industry has been restructured from reliance on groundfisheries
towards an emphasis on shellfisheries, challenges persist and fishing dependent communities in
regions such as the Great Northern Peninsula are struggling to survive.
A review of global experience with rebuilding collapsed fisheries demonstrate that
rebuilding is a 'wicked' problem; meaning that the challenges go beyond scientific and technical
solutions, to socioeconomic and sociopolitical concerns. Rebuilding differs from recovery in that it
perceives fisheries as coupled social-ecological entities connected to larger societies and the global
economy. Rebuilding also takes into account both current and future generations and related equity
issues including who pays for the costs of rebuilding and who benefits in the long term. The
imperatives for rebuilding fisheries are multidimensional and include food security, livelihoods,
revenue, cultural heritage, and ecosystem services. Using a case study of Newfoundland's Northern
Gulf cod fisheries, the thesis examines the reasons why rebuilding collapsed fisheries is a wicked
problem, and explores governance options for dealing with such multifaceted problems. It employs
a 'fish chain' approach (that entails three production stages - the pre-harvest, harvest, and post-
harvest stages) in order to generate insights into why the stocks collapsed in the early 1990s,
identify reasons for the stalled rebuilding, as well as seek opportunities for collaborative rebuilding
efforts. The analysis relies on existing statistical data, peer-reviewed literature, taskforce and policy
documents, and findings from key informant interviews conducted along the fish chain for the pre-
and post-collapse era.
The case study findings suggest that ecosystem changes, fishing patterns, transitional
livelihood options, changing global seafood markets, consumer preferences for certified seafood,
power relations, and policy instruments at different stages in the fish chain have contributed to stall
rebuilding. These factors illustrate how and why rebuilding collapsed stocks is a wicked problem.
Findings along the fish chain also indicate that rebuilding could be facilitated using multispecies
and ecosystem-based approaches that pay attention to by-catch and discards; incorporating
effective gear use policies, stewardship incentives, integrated livelihood programs, seafood value-
addition, and bridging scale-mismatches between ecosystems, fishing activities, and institutions.
Addressing distributional and intergenerational equity concerns, community capacity building,
along with changes in power relationships between stakeholders are central to successful rebuilding
in the longer term. Related to this, the analysis suggests that 'clumsy' governance options that
bring together insights from diverse perspectives from multiple stakeholders could playa key role
in creating more institutional spaces towards rebuilding. Some of these clumsy options include
stronger support for bottom-up initiatives that respond to regional economic development needs;
the development of effective co-governance arrangements with stakeholder and community groups;
marketing initiatives that take advantage of local, regional and global consumer choices; and
meeting local food security needs and stewardship concerns. Finally, institutional partnerships
across different levels of government, in addition to industry and civil society inputs, are critical to
rebuilding collapsed groundfisheries in Newfoundland and could provide lessons for efforts to
rebuild fisheries worldwide.
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Chapter I: Introduction and Overview
Introduction
Seafood is currently the most traded commodity internationally, with global exports exceeding
100 billion USD in 2008 (FAO, 20 lOa). Fish landings and seafood trade have increased
tremendously in the past few decades and approximately 80% of wild fish stocks are fully
exploited or overexploited (FAO, 2010b). There is growing evidence worldwide that commercial
wild capture fisheries are in a state of decline and there is an urgent need for policy and
institutional reform to address this situation (OECD, 2007; Worm et al., 2009; World Bank
2008; UNEP, 2009; Hammer et aI., 2010). This status of global commercial overfishing raises
concerns about biodiversity conservation, the capacity to sustain seafood trade, and food security
(Pauly et al., 2005; Smith et aI., 2010; Srinivasa et al., 2010). According to Worm et al. (2009),
around 67% of the world's commercial fish stocks require rebuilding. These include, amongst
others, the Atlantic blue fin tuna (Thunnus thynnus), Southern blue whiting (Micromesistius
australis), tropical groupers (Epinephelus spp.), Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua), European eel
(Anguilla anguilla), Northern and Southern hake (Mer/uccius mer/uccius), Patagonian tooth fish
(Dissostichus e/eginoides) and orange roughy (Hop/ostethis at/anticus), as detailed in Caddy and
Agnew (2005); FAO (2010b); and Wakeford et al. (2009).
Fisheries contribute tremendously not only to world trade, but also to regional and
community well-being. They provide livelihoods for nearly half a billion people worldwide and
are a source of affordable protein for a global population, with average per capita fish
consumption reaching a record high in 2008 (FAO, 2010b). Revenue from seafood trade is
necessary for sustaining the global economy and particularly important for developing countries'
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foreign exchange (Dyck and Sumaila, 2010). The current state of the world's capture fisheries is
threatening the nutritional well-being of fishing dependent communities, economic
sustainability, and the preservation of traditional cultural practices (Chuenpagdee et al., 2005). It
also generates concerns and disputes amongst policy makers in terms of effective strategies, the
scientific community regarding methodological approaches, and changing lifestyles for fishing
people and coastal communities.
The imperative to rebuild collapsed fisheries is multidimensional and includes food
security, employment, revenue, cultural heritage, empowerment, equity, and ecosystem services.
Researchers concerned about this rebuilding imperative endeavor to understand the inter-
linkages and interactions across the entire production chain at multiple spatial and temporal
scales. The rebuilding imperative differs from the recovery imperative in that it treats fisheries as
coupled social-ecological entities connected to larger societies and the global economy. It also
incorporates attention to intergenerational concerns (Sumaila, 2004), issues of equity and power
(Sinclair and Ommer, 2006), transitional governance, scale mismatches (Crowder et aI., 2006),
and institutional feedback mechanisms (Osterblom et aI., 20 II). Institutions are central to the
rebuilding imperative as they provide the mechanism and process for policy change and shape
the social-cultural meaning that fisheries generate (Jentoft et al., 1998; McGoodwin, 200 I;
McCay, 2002; Ommer et al., 2007; Armitage et aI., 2007; Lowe and Caruthers, 2008).
To date, most institutional responses to collapsed stocks have focllsed on the resource and
the fishing end of the production chain, through reduction in fishing capacity and related efforts
to restructure fisheries through rationalization and downsizing the fishing industry. This
approach has paid little attention to sllch issues as equity between fishing sectors and regions and
between generations, power dynamics, or to factors further along the fish chain including
processing, fishing dependent communities, market dynamics, consumer choices, and regional
economic development, which could influence the potential for rebuilding. The lack of attention
to scale issues and other organizational and governance complexities has also constrained the
opportunities for rebuilding and sustaining fishery ecosystems (Crowder et aI., 2006; Ommer et
aI., 2007; Armitage, 2008; Ekstrom and Young, 2009). Furthermore, thinking in terms of the
rebuilding imperative draws attention to the cost of 'doing nothing'; including degraded
ecosystems, lost revenue, threats to sustainable livelihoods, conflicts, and food security.
The support for a holistic rebuilding rather than a narrow recovery imperative highlights
broader sets of challenges that need to be acknowledged and resolved. These include issues
related to compliance with rules, transaction costs associated with control and surveillance,
provision of ecosystem services, transitional livelihood options, integrated coastal planning, and
pluralism in decision-making. These coastal and governance challenges have been referred to as
'wicked problems' by Jentoft and Chuenpagdee (2009), as originally conceptualized by Rittel
and Weber (1973). Wicked problems are complex issues that transcend scientific and technical
management and extend to socioeconomic and institutional concerns (Rittel and Weber, 1973).
Fisheries governance is particularly wicked due to challenges associated with ecosystem
complexity, stakeholder dynamics, governing scales and their overall interactions (Jentoft and
Chuenpagdee, 2009). Too often, decision-making arenas related to rebuilding collapsed fisheries
are dominated by the perspectives of a limited number of stakeholders concentrated at one end of
the production chain, resulting in the marginalization of other viewpoints that are necessary to
achieve the rebuilding imperative in fisheries. To achieve the rebuilding imperative, 'clumsy
solutions' (Verweij and Thompson, 2006) that incorporate multiple viewpoints and strategies to
address environmental, sociopolitical, and socioeconomic concerns could be more effective in
addressing the particularly wicked rebuilding problems than simply relying on management
panaceas (see Ludwig, 200 I; Ostrom et aI., 2007).
A growing body of literature points to effective governance as vital for sustaining
fisheries that are profitable, equitable, and socially just (Charles, 2001; Gray, 2005; Schechter et
at., 2006; Grafton, 2007; Lowe and Carothers, 2008; World Bank, 2008). Thus, governance is
also an essential prerequisite for achieving the rebuilding imperative (Kooiman et aI., 2005;
Ommer et aI., 2007). Although there are many definitions of governance in the social and policy
sciences (Ostrom, 1990; Peters, 200 I; Rhodes, 2007), it generally implies going beyond
governments and state management, to include contributions from civil society and the private
sector (Kooiman, 2003; Kjaer, 2004).
According to the interactive governance theory (Kooiman et at., 2005), fisheries
governance is understood as "the whole of public as well as private interactions taken to solve
societal problems and create societal opportunities. It includes the formulation and application of
principles guiding those interactions and care for institutions that enable them" (Kooiman et aI.,
2005: 17). Fisheries governance is multidimensional and underscores the importance of
interactions among ecological, social, economic, cultural, legal, and political processes (FAO,
2001; Gray, 2005). It involves understanding issues of problem identification, agenda setting,
institutional design, policy instrument choice, as well as the relevance of these considerations for
successful governing outcomes (Bavinck et at., 2005).
The above argument for a rebuilding imperative offers an opportunity to understand how
governance and institutional mechanisms can both facilitate fisheries rebuilding and sustain
fisheries once rebuilt. Power is central to rebuilding; as noted by John Gaventa, "simply creating
new institutional arrangements will not necessarily result in greater inclusion or pro-poor policy
changes. Rather, much depends on the nature of the power relations which surround and imbue
these new, potentially more democratic spaces" (Gaventa, 2006: 23). The remainder of this
introductory chapter is arranged in two parts starting with a problem statement and general
discussion of the research design, followed by an overview of the manuscript chapters.
Problem statement and research design
A 'fish chain' approach to the problem of rebuilding collapsed fisheries suggests that instead of
relying on management panaceas, we need to see collapsed fisheries as complex and dynamic
social-ecological entities characterized by processes that operate at multiple scales and by
various stakeholder groups and governing actors across numerous institutions and jurisdictional
boundaries. The fish chain is a governance perspective and an analytical approach that looks at
the interaction between the various production stages, stakeholder groups, and policy instruments
(Bavinck el aI., 2005). The production stages include the pre-harvest stage (marine ecosystems),
harvesting stage (fishing activities embedded in coastal communities), and the post-harvest stage
(processing, marketing, and consumption). Given the wicked governance challenges associated
with rebuilding collapsed fisheries, more research is needed to better understand the
opportunities, constraints and options for effective rebuilding in different context and to identify
potential ways to tackle this 'wickedness'.
More specifically, what is lacking in the current literature is a holistic understanding of
how multi-scale fish chains, diverse governing actors, dynamic policy processes, and various
institutions interact with ecological processes to constrain rebuilding. Additionally, there is little
research on how the nature of these interactions could potentially be adapted or changed to
promote more effective and holistic rebuilding efforts. In these contexts, the overarching
research question addressed in this thesis is: what are the challenges associated with rebuilding
collapsed fisheries and what strategies might be effective in achieving the rebuilding imperative?
Drawing on the interactive governance theory (Kooiman et al., 2005), this thesis argues
for holistic approaches that consider ecological, socioeconomic and sociopolitical concerns,
including notions of equity and power relations, and how this kind of approach might improve
our understanding of rebuilding and help us achieve better social-ecological outcomes.
Methodologically, the research question is addressed by first reviewing fisheries collapses
globally, presenting evidence that locally and internationally, there is an imperative for us to
figure out how to effectively rebuild collapsed fisheries including not only the resources but the
industries and communities that depend upon them in an equitable and sustainable manner. A
case study of the Northern Gulf of St. Lawrence cod fisheries in Eastern Canada is used to
illustrate the challenges around the rebuilding of collapsed fisheries. A comparative pre- and
post-collapse analysis of the fish chain is conducted to understand the rebuilding challenges
associated with the Northern Gulf cod fisheries and to identify potential governance
opportunities for rebuilding.
In fisheries, as in other resource-based industries, the 'chain' metaphor is used in various
contexts and in different ways. It is used in research on value chains for fish products
(Gudmundsson et al., 2006), and on up-scaling and firm behavior in global production chains
(Bernstein and Campling, 2006; Wilkinson, 2006). The 'fish chain' approach is distinguished
from other chain approaches such as work on 'global commodity chains' or 'value chains' used
in the consumer goods industries (Gereffi, 1994; Kaplinsky and Morris, 200 I) by its focus on
understanding fishery systems across the entire production chain including ecosystem dynamics
and the human dimension of markets, stakeholders, and institutions (Bavinck et aI., 2005;
Thorpe et al., 2005). The fish chain also pays attention to various scales of production and
stakeholder interactions; including a good understanding of ecosystem and resource boundaries,
fishing activities and fleet mobility, processing and distribution networks, households and coastal
community linkages, to administrative and jurisdictional boundaries (Kooiman et al., 2005). The
fish chain approach builds on the geographical tradition of human-nature scholarship (Gober,
2000) and its relevance to research on public policy and governance (Massey, 2000; Martin,
2001; Vodden, 2009). The approach also emphasizes concerns about economic globalization,
environmental governance, biodiversity loss, and the commodification of nature (Liverman,
2004; McCauley 2006; Bair, 2009).
In essence, the fish chain approach thinks in terms of social-ecological systems and draws
attention to the strong relationship between humans and their environment, and to human
dependency on nature and resources for survival. This approach is, in part, a reaction to
anthropocentric perspectives to nature and growing recognition of the limits to human control
(Odum, 1983; Berkes and Folke, 1998). These related ideas have been applied within fisheries in
relation to a wide array of governance issues (see Charles, 2005; Folk et al., 2005; De Young et
al., 2008; Armitage et aI., 2009; Ostrom, 2009).
The fish chain framework is used as analytical tool to understand the challenges and
opportunities towards rebuilding of collapsed fisheries. The Northern Gulf cod (Gadus morhua)
stock is one of ten stocks (4RS3Pn) that collapsed in various Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Management regions in eastern Canada in the early 1990s (Figure I). The multiple collapses led
to two moratoria imposed on Northern Gulf cod between 1994 and 1996 and again in 2003, and a
massive reduction in total allowable catches (TAC) that continues to this day.
Since the early 1990s, several management measures and restructuring efforts have been
attempted to achieve stock recovery and a sustainable fisheries in the region (Cashin, 2003;
GNPFT, 2006). The cod stocks in the Northern Gulf and other parts of the region have not
rebuilt and the fishing industry continues to be far from sustainable despite two decades of
programs focused on reduced catches and industry downsizing. Most recently, a report that
developed out of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between key parts of the fishing
industry and the provincial government of Newfoundland and Labrador (NL) documented the
ongoing challenges of NL fisheries. The MOU recommended key policy initiatives to further
downsize the fishing industry as the solution to ongoing fragilities and the risk of industry
collapse (Clift and team, 2011). To achieve these rationalization goals, almost half a billion
Canadian dollars (CAD) in government funding was requested. This funding would, if provided,
be in addition to previous restructuring public investments of approximately CAD $4 billion
spent from the early 1990s to 2005 (Rice et at., 2003; Ruseski, 2008).
The substantial industry downsizing proposed in the MOU study would have significant
implications for already vulnerable small-scale fish harvesters and for equity and social justice at
the level of individual communities and regions, particularly fishery dependent regions such as
the Great Northern Peninsula on Newfoundland's west coast. Further downsizing would
contribute to even greater concentration of access of the resource and allocation of quotas and
would seriously threaten the socioeconomic foundation of many coastal communities.
Furthermore, there are no guarantees this would produce a sustainable multi-species fishery or
enhance the potential for groundfisheries rebuilding. The MOU recommendations had, as of
December 2011, been rejected by the NL provincial government! and this inaction has spurred
concerns about the future of the fishery (see Walsh, 2011).
While much has been written about the mismanagement of the cod stocks that led to the
collapses and about the ecological constraints on recovery (e.g. Storey, 1993; Hutchings and
Myers, 1995; Hannesson, 1996; Rose, 2007), there is still relatively little research that seeks to
systematically address the rebuilding imperative for these fisheries including the associated
challenges and essential governance mechanisms that might be required to achieve this goal (see
Vodden et at., 2005; Ommer et aI., 2007). In Canada and in many other parts of the world,
fisheries collapses have generally led to initiatives that focused mainly on stock recovery,
through attention to reference points and indicator systems that monitor productivity in the
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growth and reproduction of fish stocks (FAO, 1999; Garcia and Staples, 2000; Rice and Rochet,
2005). These indicator systems and reference points are essential for monitoring ecosystem
health and include the assessment of maximum sustainable yield (MSY), the spawning stock
biomass, recruitment of age classes, and rates of growth of fish from juvenile to maturity (Rice et
aI., 2003; Caddy and Agnew, 2005; Murawski, 2010). However, limited attention has been paid
to biodiversity considerations and to the potential role of regime shifts and multispecies
interactions in stock rebuilding (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2003; Bundy et
at., 2009; Morissette et aI., 2009). Furthermore, the institutional dimension of rebuilding such as
appropriate policy reforms and multi-level partnerships, along with social objectives for
dependent coastal communities, have not been fully incorporated into rebuilding strategies and
initiatives (Degnbol and McCay, 2006; Belbin, 2007).
The coastal communities in the Northern Gulf of St. Lawrence have historically
depended heavily on the groundfisheries resources (Felt and Sinclair, 1995; Hamilton et aI.,
2004; Canada-Quebec, 2005). The cod fishery was traditionally based on 'domestic commodity
production' with parts of it gradually evolving into 'petty capitalist' production in the early
1980s (Sinclair, 1985; Palmer and Sinclair, 1997). Northern Gulfcod fisheries transitioned from
small-scale production in the 1950s to include more industrial and commercial production in the
1980s (Sinclair, 1985; Wright, 2001). There was also a corresponding shift in commercial target
from groundfisheries to shellfisheries that accelerated rapidly after the groundfish stocks
collapsed in the early 1990s. Expanded seasonal eco-tourism services and the higher economic
value from shellfisheries have not, however, been associated with more stable or better rewarded
employment in Newfoundland, particularly for fish processors and small scale harvesters
(Schrank, 2005). Similar concerns are evident in Quebec in the 4S region (Figure I), particularly
on the Gaspe Peninsula and Quebec North Shore where fishing is also a historical and core
livelihood activity. The number of cod license holders in the Quebec region decreased by 60%
from 1985 to 2002 and total landed values declined by 17% (Canada-Quebec, 2005). Other
ongoing challenges in the Northern Gulf region include major out-migration, an aging
population, limited youth involvement in fisheries, low incomes, and a loss of export revenues
due to macroeconomic factors (GNPFT, 2006; FFAW, 2008).
The geographical isolation of the coastal communities in western Newfoundland and the
high level of dependency on fisheries resources, along with poor financial and technical
infrastructure and limited livelihood options, made this region extremely vulnerable to the
consequences of resource collapse (Felt and Sinclair, 1995; Hamilton and Butler, 200 I; Ommer
et al., 2007). According to some researchers and several task force reports, the region's survival
now depends on the collective efforts of comrnunity partners and federal-provincial agencies in
creating an effective governing framework for decision-making with active local involvement
(Felt and Sinclair, 1995; GNPFT, 2006; Belbin, 2007; Vodden, 2009). Integrated livelihood
strategies, labour market changes, and regional and municipal economic planning have not been
fully incorporated into rebuilding strategies (Ruseski, 2007; Sinclair and Neis, 2008). Related to
this, the Northern Gulf region lacks a comprehensive fisheries rebuilding plan that explicitly
outlines implementation strategies, timelines and targets, and specific roles and responsibilities
for stakeholder groups.
The fish chain analysis carried out in this thesis highlights the need for and potential
benefits of this expanded approach to rebuilding. The case study asks three central questions:
• How have changes (or the lack thereof) in marine ecosystems, socioeconomics, and
fisheries policies pre- and post-collapse affected rebuilding?
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• What are the policy implications of stalled rebuilding for fishing-dependent communities
on Newfoundland's west coast?
• What governing mechanisms and institutional arrangements might promote stewardship,
compliance, and equitable fisheries rebuilding for both current and future generations?
Specifically, this thesis seeks to:
• Identify and assess how fisheries policy changes have affected cod fisheries rebuilding
prospects and the viability of fishing dependent coastal communities (Chapter III);
• Analyze how seafood production and global markets have affected local rebuilding
prospects and the long-term social and economic viability of the fishing industry and
coastal communities (Chapter IV);
• Examine how entrenched viewpoints, power structures, equity and social justice
concerns, and institutional arrangements contributed to the collapse and have mediated
opportunities for rebuilding (Chapter V);
• Synthesize key findings regarding rebuilding challenges and governing opportunities for
Northern Gulf cod fisheries and provide lessons of potential relevance to those seeking to
rebuild collapsed fisheries elsewhere (Chapter VI).
The research design entails triangulation techniques and mixed methods (Hakim, 1987; Sabatier,
2007). The thesis employs a multi-scale approach including attention to ecosystem interactions
and resource management boundaries, fishing activities, key actors, institutions, and policy
instruments along the Northern Gulf cod fish chain. The research was carried out in three stages.
First, a literature review and document analysis of peer reviewed scientific material and of
technical and task force reports was carried out related to collapsed fisheries around the world to
see what could be learned from experience with efforts to rebuild collapsed fisheries in other
contexts. The focus then shifted to the case study of the Northern Gulf cod fisheries and an
analysis of published research and reports, including seafood market reports, and taskforce and
commissioned reports. In addition, existing statistical data on catch and landings, value, trade
flows, and demographics were collected and analyzed.
Second, informal discussions with key stakeholders were undertaken to document fishing
activities at harbors and wharves, plant processing methods and infrastructures, retail markets,
and restaurants. Third, semi-structured interviews were conducted with fifty key infornlants from
diverse stakeholder groups along the fish chain. The fifty key informants included
representatives from six main categories of stakeholders who occupy or had occupied different
positions along the fish chain. They included stakeholders with more than twenty years
professional and work experience to ensure they could contribute to a pre- and post-collapse
analysis. These key informants were:
• Scientists and fisheries managers knowledgeable about resource conservation and
ecosystems in the Northern Gulf;
• Resource user groups, especially fish harvesters2;
• Entrepreneurs in the processing and retail sectors, as well as plant workers;
• Municipal councilors and community planners;
• Current and former decision-makers at various organizational levels including federal and
provincial governments, inter-governmental organizations, as well as industry and trade
union representatives; and,
• Researchers and analysts from consulting firms and academia, conservation groups, and
other civil society representatives, and members of the media.
2 T heterm fish harvester is used consistently in this thesis to re fer to fishers and other resources users with access
rights. The term is widely used in the Newfoundland and Labrador context especially by the Fish, Food and Allied
Workers Union (FFAW).
Forty six interviews were done face-to-face, using a combination of audio-recording and note-
taking with informed consent. Four interviews were done over the phone. These telephone
interviews were conducted when face-to-face interviews were not feasible. A field assistant
helped with note-taking for forty of the interview sessions.
The interviews lasted between one and two hours and focused on three to seven themes
depending on the occupation and knowledge of the key informant about various aspects of the
fish chain. The themes included: i) the status and prospects of restored ecosystems and their
potential role in the rebuilding of the Northern Gulf cod fisheries; ii) scientific information
necessary for effective rebuilding and management efforts; iii) socio-economic and livelihood
concerns; iv) issues related to institutional and organizational decision-making; v) the attitudes,
social norms, and stewardship ethics of stakeholders; vi) information and data needs for
rebuilding; and, vii) governing mechanisms and initiatives that could contribute to rebuilding.
The interview questions were both open and close-ended allowing for efficient use of
time and an opportunity to follow-up on any leads in unexpected directions during the
interviews. The interview schedule is divided into two parts: Part I was used to collect
demographic information and Part II included specific questions on the fishery. Part II starts with
an introductory section for all key informants (Section A), followed by several specialized
sections designed to capture relevant knowledge and experience of different groups with
experience along different parts of the fish chain. Section B, for instance, deals with fisheries
biology and ecosystem science and targets scientist and managers; whilst Section C is intended
for resource users such as fish harvesters. Section D in intended to illuminate organizational
decision-making in government, industry, and civil society, and targets policy and decision-
makers. Two optional sections were included in Part II (Sections E and F), targeting all key
infonnants. These sections were designed to elicit information on attitudes and stewardship
concerns, and key infonnant's sense of understanding ofinfonnation gaps and data requirements
for successful rebuilding efforts. The detailed interview schedule, consent fonns, as well as an
approval letter from the Interdisciplinary Committee on Ethics in Human Research at Memorial
University can be found in Appendices I, II and III, respectively. Bathymetric charts were used
during interviews with fish harvesters to collect infonnation on their fishing activities and
locations and on their ecological knowledge on stock structure and migration patterns.
Ethical issues around key infonnant interviews were addressed through guidelines and
procedures as set out in the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Research Involving Humans.
The key ethical principles in this research included requirements to: i) ensure the free, informed
and voluntary participation of key infonnants; ii) protect the privacy of infonnants through steps
taken to ensure confidentiality; and, iii) ensure participants understood the purpose of the
research, who was funding it, and were infonned about the potential risks and benefits of
participating in the study. Because of these ethical considerations, care was taken to protect key
infonnants through non disclosure of names and the removal of references to specific places that
might make it easy to identify the infonnants. Within these constraints, I have sought to provide
enough contextual infonnation to illuminate various stakeholder perspectives on both challenges
and opportunities towards rebuilding, within the bounds of the ethical guidelines.
The interview transcripts were arranged and thematically coded to identify areas of
consensus, disagreements, or heterogeneity in responses, as they relate to rebuilding challenges
and opportunities. The interview transcripts were analyzed using both diagnostic and prescriptive
approaches. The diagnostic analysis centered on identifying rebuilding challenges and the
prescriptive analysis on identifying rebuilding opportunities and potential policy
recommendations. Data were categorized thematically based on the fish chain framework and
incorporated into the analysis in the relevant chapters as follows: information and comments on
the pre-harvest and harvest stages (Chapter III); information on related fishing activities and on
the post-harvest stage, also referred to as the supply and marketing portion of the chain (Chapter
IV), and information and comments relevant to an analysis of power dynamics and stakeholder
interactions (Chapter V). A synthesis chapter at the end of the thesis encapsulates the main
findings and offers policy recommendations (Chapter VI).
Thesis scope and chapter outline
The rest of the thesis includes five chapters developed using the manuscript-style format.
Chapter II develops the argument for the rebuilding imperative in global fisheries and introduces
the fish chain and clumsy solutions concepts. This chapter was recently published in Progress in
Oceanography DOl: 10.1016/j.pocean.201O.09.0l2 (Khan and Neis, 2010). It draws on
comparative case study examples of efforts to rebuild collapsed fisheries, and build the argument
for a rebuilding imperative. Several policy lessons are offered to illustrate the challenges and lost
opportunities associated with failed rebuilding and to argue that while fisheries governance is a
wicked problem, rebuilding collapsed fisheries is 'particularly wicked' because of
intergenerational equity concerns. Contextual factors that limit or promote rebuilding of entire
fish chains are identified, and ways to explore governance mechanisms for rebuilding. The
chapter concludes with the suggestion that one way to address the wicked problem of rebuilding
collapsed fisheries might be through 'clumsy solutions.' Clumsy solutions strive to bring
together the wisdom of diverse entrenched viewpoints relevant to public policy decision-making
(such as those characterized by individualism, egalitarianism, hierarchical approaches, and
fatalism) and to bring together the stakeholders associated with these perspectives to explore
governing options (Verweij and Thompson, 2006). These clumsy approaches may include
knowledge synthesis, integrated livelihood programs during rebuilding transitions and beyond, a
focus on food security, and attention to fairness and social justice. Moreover, accountability and
inclusive decision-making, policy reforms related to responsible seafood trade, compliance and
stewardship, as well as power-brokerage, leadership, and institutional innovation are also central
to rebuilding and potential aspects of clumsy solutions.
Chapter III shifts from global fisheries to the Northern Gulf cod case study in eastern
Canada. This case study introduces and illustrates the wicked rebuilding problems of collapsed
fisheries focusing on western and southern Newfoundland (NAFO region 4R3Pn). This chapter
is in preparation for submission to the journal Ecology and Society. It introduces the fish chain
conceptual and methodological approach and focuses on the pre-harvest and harvest stages of the
chain and their interlinkages. Various changes in management measures and restructuring
programs are itemized, and their impact on the resource and on livelihoods. The primary aim of
this chapter is to identify and assess how changes related to the pre-harvest and harvest stages of
the fish chain before and after collapse have affected rebuilding prospects for this fishery and the
related policy implications for fishing-dependent communities embedded in the production
chain. The main factors identified as stalling rebuilding in these two stages of the fish chain
include ecological constraints due to ecosystem shifts, the weakening role of science in
management, the lack of rebuilding targets, multispecies considerations such as by-catch and
discards, on-going livelihood issues, scale mis-matches and institutional inertia. The chapter
highlights key policy implications regarding missed stewardship opportunities, the need for
livelihood transition strategies and for investments in institutional capacity towards rebuilding.
Chapter rv looks at the marketing and trade aspects at the harvest and post-harvest stages
of the fish chain and demonstrates how changes in the pre- and post-collapse periods have
affected local rebuilding and economic viability. A shortened version of this chapter was recently
published in the Proceedings of the International Institute for Fisheries Economics and Trade -
IIFET (Khan, 20 I0). This chapter draws on the backward bending supply model of fisheries
(Copes, 1970) and theoretical developments in fisheries management and supply chain
governance to inform how seafood production is linked to raw material supply and economic
viability, and the significant role of institutions in sustaining the resource. Findings indicate that
the cod fish chain has transitioned from producer-driven chains in the pre-collapse period that
exports cod blocks to the US markets, to consumer-driven chains in the post-collapse period that
emphasizes cod fillets and eco-certified products to mostly UK markets. Furthermore, with the
constraints on raw material for groundfish, there has been a shift in target species to
shellfisheries, and major related changes in mechanized shellfish processing infrastructure. In the
event of full recovery, Northern Gulf cod fisheries thus present a marketing challenge as the cod
markets have been replaced by cheaper substitutes such as Alaskan Pollock (Theregra
chalcogramma) and tilapia (Tilapia spp). The chapter concludes with an argument for rebuilding
strategies that support social-ecological perspectives and multispecies approaches that address
the huge transformation in the processing sector, effective institutional mechanisms for
rebuilding policies, and stakeholder partnerships in marketing and value addition especially eco-
certification. These recommendations are more likely to promote resource sustainability and
economic viability in the event of rebuilding and afterwards.
Chapter V analyzes the role of power relations and governing interactions along the
Northern Gulf cod fish chain in the pre- and post-collapse periods showing how these relations
contributed to the collapse and hence constrained rebuilding. This chapter is in preparation for
submission to the journal Society and Conservation. Using Gaventa's (2006) power cube, an
analytical model to understand power relations, and not only how to engage but also where and
when to engage for policy change towards successful rebuilding; the chapter examines the
relationship between power, failed management, and stalled rebuilding. The analysis points to
the need to explore governing options that go beyond narrow management measures to broad-
based governance approaches if we are to achieve the rebuilding imperative. It delves into how
to create 'fields of opportunity' (necessary spaces for negotiating social relationships) for
rebuilding via clumsy solutions. The chapter further provides some potential examples of clumsy
solutions that could increase the likelihood of successful rebuilding in this region. Examples
include community supported fisheries such as in Nova Scotia, catch shares and community-
based governance models in the US, and one example of a regional quota allocation scheme for
community development in western Newfoundland. These governing examples integrate
fisheries rebuilding objectives with community planning goals, livelihood strategies, and bottom-
up approaches. They also open up spaces for engaging a broader range of stakeholders across the
fish chain and provide a full spectrum of perspectives on rebuilding challenges and potential
governing opportunities.
Chapter VI summarizes the main findings in the thesis by synthesizing key aspects from the
pre- and post-collapse analyses of the Northern Gulf cod fisheries, and returning to the
rebuilding imperative and associated wicked problems. The contribution of the research to the
larger literature in this field is described. This includes defining rebuilding collapsed stocks as a
'wicked' problem and seeking to employ a holistic approach through developing a 'fish chain'
analysis that includes careful attention to livelihoods, market and consumer preferences, and
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opportunities and constraints on institutional innovation. This concluding chapter argues that
fisheries rebuilding requires governance approaches that are equitable and socially just. Using
this social-ecological approach to rebuilding provides opportunities for governing deliberations
and creating a platform to explore governing options such as clumsy solutions. Clumsy solutions
tap into the strength and viewpoints of the various stakeholder groups along the fish chain for
inclusive decision-making towards rebuilding.
The fish chain framework offers a theoretical, methodological, and empirical analysis on the
various components and stages of fisheries production from 'ocean to plate'. The approach
provides policy entrepreneurship and avenues for participatory decision-making by drawing on
diverse key informant insights on ecological complexity, market dynamics, scale issues and
institutional fit, and stakeholder partnerships. A broader theoretical reflection is offered on this
approach, in addition to limitations of the study, and future research opportunities.
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Chapter II: The Rebuilding Imperative in Global Fisheries
[ntroduction3
Global marine capture fisheries are in a state of decline, with many commercial species fully
exploited or overexploited (FAO, 2009a). There is growing concern that in the absence of major
interventions, most commercial fish stocks could collapse beyond sustainable levels (Worm e/
aI., 2007). This paper contributes to the rebuilding imperative by analyzing factors that could
lead to successful recovery of overexploited and depleted stocks. The first section of this paper
demonstrates that overfishing is interacting with social and economic changes to threaten not
only marine ecosystems, but also food security, livelihoods, fishing communities and, in some
cases, larger societies (Ommer e/ al., 2007; Smith e/ al., 2010). These threats are severe and their
consequences are not evenly distributed between countries and regions, or across genders,
classes and generations (Le Sann, 1998; Neis e/ al., 2005). The next section provides a brief
overview of the current status of global fisheries and highlights the costs and consequences of
resource degradation. It also reviews the existing research on recovery of collapsed stocks,
highlighting the frequent failure of recovery initiatives and connects this to the tendency to focus
on fish stocks only and reactive changes in management policies. This premise provides a
platform to argue for a move towards a 'rebuilding imperative.' The rebuilding imperative differs
from the recovery imperative in that it treats fisheries as social-ecological entities and is
concerned not simply with the status of fish stocks but also with rebuilding entire fish chains;
from marine ecosystems to the harvesting sector, processing, marketing, retailing and final
consumption. Rebuilding is complex and challenging because of its multiple temporal, spatial,
) A version of this chapter has been published: Khan, A.S., and B. Neis. 2010. The rebuilding imperative in
fisheries: Clumsy solutions for wicked problems? Progress in Oceanography, 87(1-4): 347-356.
equity, and governance dimensions. In this light, some researchers have argued that fisheries
governance is a 'wicked' problem (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee, 2009). Wicked problems are
complex, persistent or reoccurring, often hard to detect and to fix, partly because they are linked
to broader social issues (Rittel and Weber, 1973).
The rebuilding challenges associated with collapsed fisheries and wicked problems are
examined next. The effective resolution of wicked problems requires not only good science and
management but also attention to socioeconomic and political considerations (Ludwig el al.,
200 I; Jentoft and Chuenpagdee, 2009). The very wicked problems most fishery collapses pose
for contemporary societies might best be addressed using clumsy solutions. Clumsy solutions are
devised with input from all facets of society including the state, the private sector, and civil
society. They are designed to cut across the discrete and somewhat incommensurable
perspectives that characterize and paralyze efforts to deal with wicked problems (Verweij and
Thompson, 2006). These issues are explored in the last section. Clumsy solutions within fisheries
are arguably more likely to support social-ecological rebuilding if the question 'rebuilding for
whom' and political economy issues are front and centre in the dialogue. The chapter concludes
with a summary of lessons learnt towards the rebuilding imperative and areas for further
research.
The dynamics and consequences of fisheries degradation
Fisheries include the whole fish production chain, from marine ecosystems, to harvesting
activities, processing, marketing, consumption, and the management and governance (Thorpe, el
aI., 2005). They are social-ecological systems characterized by interactivity across each
component of the fish chain and with other biophysical processes (Ommer el al., 2007; Perry el
aI., 2010a). As presently practiced, commercial overfishing pose profound threats to fish stocks,
marine ecosystems, seafood trade, food security, household incomes, as well as the socio-cultural
heritage of many fishing communities. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), which reports on the status of fish stocks, about 80% of fish stocks were fully exploited
and overexploited for the year 2007 (FAO, 2009a). Using FAO statistics, Mullon et al. (2005)
found that about 25% of fish stocks have lost about 10 per cent of their original biomass in four
consecutive years. Further, Worm et al. (2009) estimated about 67% of global fish stocks
requires rebuilding. These include major commercial species such as blue fin tuna, southern blue
whiting, tropical groupers, Georges Bank cod, Atlantic cod, North Sea and Baltic cod, European
eel, Northern and southern hake, and orange roughy (FAO, 2009a; Wakeford et aI., 2009).
Evidence concerning the negative ecological, economic and social consequences of
overfishing is mounting (Wramner et aI., 2009). Over-fished stocks entail vulnerability and
extinction concerns and thus concerns about loss of biodiversity (Hutchings and Reynolds,
2004). The well-documented patterns within marine fisheries of increased fishing efficiency
often masks resource decline until stocks collapse or fail to recover due to poor understanding of
fisher behavior (Makinson et aI., 1997). Of similar concern is shifting effort from depleted top
predators to species lower down the food web (Pauly et aI., 1998), with further implications for
ecosystem vulnerability (Bundy et al., 2009). These findings amplify biodiversity concerns and
raise questions about how overfishing might be affecting the overall productivity of marine
ecosystems directly through fishing mortality and indirectly through damage to marine habitats
(Halpern et al., 2008). Moreover, loss of marine biodiversity has been shown to affect the
provision of ecosystem goods and services (Worm et al., 2007).
Fisheries contribute tremendously to food security, livelihoods, trade and the global
economy. Fish provide about 20% of the protein intake globally for more than a billion people
and comprise a significant proportion of animal protein in human diets in many countries (FAO,
2009a). Total employment in the fishing sector, including fishing dependents, is close to half a
billion people worldwide (FAO, 2009a). The value of global exports of fishery products was
estimated at 86 billion USD in 2006, an increase of more than 50% since the 1980s (FAO,
2009a). Recent estimates of the contribution of marine fisheries to the global economy range
from 225-240 billion USD per year (Dyck and Sumaila, 2010). This includes direct, indirect and
induced benefits of goods and services generated by fisheries and seafood trade; from landed
value, employment and household income, boat building, infrastructure development, to
transportation of seafood across national and international boundaries.
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Report (Pauly et al., 2005a) and others (e.g.
Ommer et aI., 2007) describe the ongoing interactions between marine ecological degradation
and social and economic decline within fisheries systems. With few exceptions (Cunningham
and Bostock, 2005; Hilborn et al., 2005), existing commercial fisheries are characterized by
declining catch-per-unit-effort. This, in tum, is contributing to escalating costs, declining net
incomes and related food security concerns (Pauly et aI., 2005b, Smith et aI., 2010). On a global
scale, the World Bank (2004) estimates that about 30 million small-scale fishers have seen
declining incomes in recent years. Further, about one third of the global total catch from wild
capture marine fisheries, mostly coming from developing countries, is being used in reduction
fisheries to produce fish meal and oils for aquaculture and other industries (Alder et aI., 2008;
FAO, 2009a). These fisheries are contributing to over-harvesting and eroding food security, with
relatively little of the wealth and employment they generate trickling down to fishing-dependent
communities (Kaczynski and Fluharty, 2002). The rent drain and economic losses in fisheries
due to ineffective fisheries governance are estimated to cost approximately 50 billion USD per
year globally (World Bank, 2008).
Overfishing is sowing the seeds for poverty, malnutrition, and conflict in some regions
(Le Sann, 1998; Garcia and Grainger, 2005). It is also exacerbating income and employment
disparities between countries, regions, fleet sectors, as well as across genders (Choo et 01., 2004;
Neis et 01., 2005). In short, there are various ecological, socio-economic and socio-cultural
reasons to not simply sustain today's fish stocks but to also rebuild collapsed stocks to healthy
levels. This would entail effective management and the establishment of sustainable fishery
policies that are not only profitable but also equitable and socially just. This is referred to as the
'rebuilding imperative' in this paper. The evidence for an interest in this rebuilding imperative is
growing. Often, however, proponents focus their attention almost exclusively on advocating for
reduced fishing effort and better fisheries management. Generally, scientific assessments and
insights from fisheries management are thought to be the main inputs required for recovery (Rice
et al., 2003). Hence, stock recovery is evaluated in relation to conservation reference points, such
as those contained in the FAO's Precautionary Approach (FAO, 1995). Two key precautionary
reference points often used in recovery programs include: i) an increase in spawning stock
biomass to about 40% of historic levels; or, ii) an increase in the mature biomass to about 75% of
historic maximum sustainable yield (Caddy and Agnew, 2005).
Rebuilding is linked to recovery of collapsed stocks by an essential transition period that
is characterized by decision control rules based on harvesting strategies and stock status
(Rosenberg et 01., 2006; Wakeford et 01., 2009). Rebuilding in this context involves the
institutional and decision-making arrangements, spatial scale of implementation, costs and
benefits in both the short and long term, and addressing stakeholder concerns for buy-in,
compliance and stewardship. Rebuilding also deals with intergenerational concerns (recovery for
whom), re-training and adjustment programs, power, as well as distributional and allocation
policies. These concerns in addition to food security, the political economy of seafood trade, and
effective governance are often overlooked thereby constraining the rebuilding of entire fish
chains. Although this distinction is not often made in practice, it underscores successful recovery
through a well governed process. The US is one of few countries where there are both recovery
plans based on the Endangered Species Act, and fishery rebuilding strategies based on the
Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation and Management Act (Wakeford et al., 2009).
To date, and with approaches that focus primarily on stock recovery, about 9% of
collapsed and overharvested fish stocks have been rebuilt to historical levels (Worm et aI.,
2009). Despite some concerted efforts both locally and internationally and persistent calls for
management goals that promote recovery, Garcia and Grainger's review (2005 p.33) found that
"[t]he present global situation, as during the past five decades, can indeed be characterized as a
chronic degenerative trend with occasional, localized acute crises." There could be ecological
reasons for this but there are also socio-economic and socio-political reasons such as non-
compliance, resistance, the failure to implement recommendations, information needs, technical
resources, and lack of stewardship. This suggests that recommendations for conservation and
better management policies, while necessary, may not be sufficient for stock recovery and may
certainly not be sufficient to protect employment, incomes, food security and coastal
communities in the longer term.
Moreover, the recovery literature does not include detailed analyses of the potential
economic benefits of reduced overfishing and improved management. Some good examples
include Grafton et al.'s (2007) analysis of tuna fisheries in the Pacific, and prawns and orange
roughy in Australia. The study concludes that conservation promotes access to both larger fish
and higher profits. Sumaila and Suatoni (2006) also found that the potential economic benefit
from rebuilding 17 overfished stocks in the US was almost three times greater in terms of net
present value than the benefits from the present management scenario. The approach in Sumaila
and Suatoni (2006) was however partial, and did not account for non-market values such as
indirect use value, option value, bequest value and existence value. Incorporating non-market
values would provide a more appropriate sense of the potential economic benefits from stock and
fishery rebuilding. A recent non-market valuation of two European commercial fisheries, hake
and Norwegian lobsters (in the form of option and existence benefits) suggests that societies are
willing to pay high premiums for species recovery in the long term (Ojea and Loureiro, 20 I0).
Similar insights into non-market benefits were obtained for six regional aquatic species at risk in
Canada (Rudd, 2009). [n instances when cost-benefit analyses are undertaken to evaluate the
economic benefits of fisheries recovery and rebuilding, they often do not go far enough because
of myopic short term policies and conventional discount rates. Sumaila (2004) argues that
conventional cost-benefit analyses place less emphasis on future generational needs, suggesting
an intergenerational discounting approach is required (Sumaila and Walters, 2005).
These economic arguments can help recruit social and political support for rebuilding,
including improved science and management. Such broader approaches are crucial to capture the
full cost and benefits in both short and long tenns, and have the potential to promote stewardship
and public buy-in. These are, however, only one piece of a larger social-ecological approach to
fisheries rebuilding; in part because they don't deal explicitly with the governance challenges of
rebuilding such as equity, special interests, and stakeholder resistance.
Rebuilding collapsed stocks: Challenges and opportunities
Taking the rebuilding imperative as its point of departure, this section reviews the limited
literature on rebuilding initiatives focusing on some of the key factors that have been shown to
mediate their success and failure. Information on rebuilding plans and on actual outcomes of
such plans for collapsed stocks is often fragmentary and incomplete (Caddy and Agnew, 2005).
Generally, however, the likelihood and speed of rebuilding, as well as its consequences for
fisheries are mediated by a range of ecological, economic and wider social-political
considerations. Ecological factors include the degree and nature of the overfishing that led to the
degradation or collapse of the stocks (Hutchings, 2000), life history parameters and density-
dependent factors (Walter and Kitchell, 2001), predator-prey relationships and regime shifts
(Bundy et al., 2009), as well as other environmental and climate change factors (Brander, 2007).
Although all species are vulnerable to overfishing, longer-living bottom dwelling demersal
species such as cod and haddock are more susceptible to both economic and biological collapse
and require longer rebuilding timeframes and associated higher transaction costs (Dulvy et aI.,
2003; Caddy and Agnew, 2005). Moreover, potential ecosystem shifts, environmental variability,
and the spatial dynamics offish stocks may affect rebuilding outcomes (Powers, 1996).
Positive environmental change and associated good recruitment, reduction of fishing
effort, habitat restoration and proactive governance initiatives can sometimes reduce the risk of
stock collapse as in the case of one Newfoundland lobster fishery (Davis et al., 2004).
Conversely, early signs of recovery can lead to pressure from stakeholder groups to reopen
fisheries prematurely, followed by further decline (Charles, 2002; Rice et al., 2003). These
constraints and opportunities can be eroded or enhanced by social, economic and political
factors. Further, as stocks decline, technological improvements and spatial shifts in fishing effort
often help to sustain catch rates masking resource decline (Hutchings 2000; Neis and Kean,
2003). For such reasons, Walter and Parma (1996) cautioned that effort control measures are by
themselves insufficient because technological progress in gear design can increase fishing
efficiency. This was evident in the Newfoundland and Labrador cod fisheries between the 1960s
and 1990s (Hutchings and Myers, 1995). Data fouling caused by escalating discards of small fish
and illegal and unrecorded discarding (Wernerheim and Haedrich, 2007), often invisible to
managers but very visible to harvesters, enhance the risk of severe and unanticipated stock
collapse and associated delayed rebuilding (Mackinson et al., 1997).
Stakeholder resistance to limiting catch quotas, as well as a lack of scientific consensus,
played a key role in delaying the rebuilding of the California sardine fishery during the 1960s
and 1970s (McEvoy, 1986). Despite warnings about the effects and consequences of overfishing
in the 1940s, the fishing industry kept harvesting, encouraged by the scientific notion that pelagic
fisheries are abundant and cannot collapse (Ludwig et aI., 1993). Further, disagreement between
the fishing industry and scientists about factors leading to collapse, whether overfishing or
environmental changes, delayed recovery measures (McEvoy, 1986). Eventually, post recovery
plans commenced with a public-private partnership between the fishing industry and academia
that resulted in the formation of the California Cooperative Oceanic Fisheries Investigations
(CaICOFI) in the early 1950s. The sardine fishery went through many management measures
such as access restrictions and a moratorium until partial recovery occurred in the late I990s.
These positive developments have been largely attributed to the effectiveness of CaICOFI's
scientific initiatives, as well as to the collaboration between the fishing industry and the state
agencies that led to both investment in scientific research and to a relatively prolonged
moratorium. Scientists finally concluded that while the collapse of the sardine stocks was
primarily due to human-induced overfishing, unfavorable environmental factors may have
exacerbated the collapse (McEvoy, 1986). For this reason, current managers take variability in
environmental factors such as temperatures into account when determining harvest rates and
setting precautionary measure4 . Anderson et al. (2008) underscored that commercial fishing can
have a huge impact on fish populations, particularly on historical age distribution, contributing to
delays in their recovery. Similar concerns were evident in the recovery of the Peruvian
anchovetta (Pauly and Tsukayama, 1987) and the Norwegian Spring Spawning Herring
(Sandberg, 20 I0).
Transparency and accountability in decision making processes, especially harvest rules
and input from several stakeholders, are important to the success of rebuilding initiatives.
Stakeholder inputs into decision-making, however, can mask self-interest that may lead to
distrust and undermine collective action (Ostrom, 1990). For instance, Okey (2003) found that
the dominance of the fishing industry in some US regional fisheries management councils in the
1990s was sufficiently high as to constitute a conflict of interest situation with strong lobbying
powers for higher quotas. More generally in the US, Sutinen (2008) documented lobbying
expenditures from fishermen and processor associations, as well as contributions to political
parties, to be in excess of a million dollars per annum. Similarly, environmental coalition groups
were very proactive in influencing public policy in the wake of the groundfisheries collapse for
closed areas in New England (Fogarty and Murawski, 1998). The rebounding of haddock stocks
in New England is understood to be partly due to the implementation of legal regulatory
instruments to restrict fishing mortality, and related lawsuits by environmental Non
Governmental Organizations in the early 1990s (Caddy and Agnew, 2005; Brodziak et aI.,
2008).
4 hllp:l'www.nmrs.l1oaa.govlfishwalch/spccics/sardine.hllll accessed July 20, 2010.
Factors such as high fishing mortality, poor communication with stakeholder groups, and
lack of clarity in the rebuilding measures have been identified as key limiting factors in the
success of the Irish Sea cod recovery plan (Kelly el at., 2006). Appropriate choice of policy
instruments is fundamental to the success of rebuilding programs as they can provide incentives
for participation and in determining management outcomes (Munro, 20 I0).
Disciplinary boundaries between the natural and social sciences within fisheries
management can contribute to general governance issues (Charles, 1995; Verweij et al., 20 I0).
Limited interactions between fishers, scientists and managers, plus inadequate enforcement and
surveillance, poor compliance with codes of conduct, and other governance failures can, in turn,
produce a downward spiral in the legitimacy of fisheries management initiatives and thereby
encourage illegal fishing (Ludwig el at., 1993; Haggan el al., 2007; Pitcher el al., 2009). Illegal,
unreported and unregulated (ruU) catch has been estimated at about I 1-26 metric tonnes
globally, with a total value of about USD I0-23 billion dollars annually (Agnew el at., 2009).
Looking beyond the immediate benefits of rebuilding, incentives for stewardship and
conservation are good investments as they foster social capital that is relevant for civic
engagement, compliance and trust among fishers and other stakeholders (Grafton, 2005). They
are probably more likely to be successful if they build on local community or traditional
management structures (Jentoft, 2000). Some social scientists have pointed to the tendency for
modem fisheries management to erode localized customary management structures and to
neglect other worldviews and knowledge systems constraining options for recovery (Neis and
Felt 2000; Berkes, 2008; Bavington, 20 I0).
In many developing countries, despite the conservation and redistributive benefits of 200
mile EEZs, the enactment of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
has contributed to the development of unsustainable fisheries practices (FAO, 1993; Greboval,
2002). In Western Africa, for instance, UNCLOS has provided the legislative framework for
fisheries agreements administered through central governments and frequently without
meaningful input from local fishers and the broader public. These agreements have placed
increasing pressure on fish stocks in order to generate export earnings and support debt
repayment under structural adjustment programs with negative consequences for food security,
livelihoods and resource sustainability (FAO 200 I; Kaczynski and Fluharty, 2002).
Overfishing and failed management have been linked to the political economy of an
expanding fish trade guided historically by laissez-faire policies and recently through globalized
markets (see McEvoy, 1986; Feeny et al., 1990; Neis et aI., 2005; Berkes et al., 2006). This
suggests that localized rebuilding initiatives are unlikely to be sustainable in the longer term if
larger political economy issues are not dealt with. In general, while a wide range of ecological
factors can mediate opportunities for rebuilding, the challenges are complex and largely socio-
political. These issues are central to the growing literature on fisheries governance to which we
now turn.
The rebuilding imperative: A particularly wicked governance problem
Governance means different things to different people, especially in the social sciences where
there are multiple disciplinary approaches (Kjaer, 2004). Most would agree, however, that
fisheries governance goes beyond government, and is broader than fisheries management (van
der Schans, 2001; Gray, 2005; Kooiman et al., 2005). Fisheries management generally deals with
national agencies and constitutional acts and uses technical tools such as input or output control
measures. Fisheries governance on the other hand includes not only state actors and institutions,
but also actors in the private sector, multilaterals, and civil society. It includes formal and
informal rules, institutional mechanisms, and both analytical and normative elements. Thus,
governance encompasses the "collective, aggregate and integrated process of all these governing
actors, which can be more or less organized and routine, rarely harmonious but typically
interactive" (Chuenpagdee and Jentoft, 2009 p. Ill). According to Charles et al. (2009 p. 5),
"good governance of fisheries and the marine environment provides the foundation for resilient
ecosystems and communities; with governance institutions that are able to adapt to changing
economic, social and environmental conditions to remain viable in the long-term." Good
governance entails core democratic values including the rule of law, transparency and
accountability, management effectiveness, regulatory quality and compliance to rules (see
Grafton, 2007; Kaufmann et aI., 2007; Mora et af., 2009; Pitcher et af., 2009).
Fisheries governance is also about setting values and principles that can guide both
governors and non-governors alike in their deliberations (Chuenpagdee and Jentoft, 2009). While
there are many schools of thought on governance approaches to resource management (e.g.
Ostrom, 1990; Armitage, 2008), they all agree on certain general principles and values. These
principles include amongst others: responsibility, participatory and inclusive decision making,
effective communication, efficiency, precaution, effectiveness, legitimacy, equity and justice
(Berghofer et aI., 2008; Constanza et aI., 1998; Coward et al., 2000; Gray, 2005; Miles, 1999).
[n addition, research on institutional performance is scanty and sparse in fisheries despite
massive failures in management (Sutinen, 1999; Hilborn et aI., 2005; Wakeford et aI., 2009).
There can be little doubt, however, that effective governance is essential for stock recovery and it
is even more essential to rebuilding fisheries and to sustaining them once rebuilt. Governance
plays a particularly strong role in fisheries sustainability for at least three reasons (Smith et af.,
20 I0): i) fisheries are coupled social-ecological systems subjected to shocks and uncertainties
across jurisdictional management boundaries (Perry et al. 20 lOa); ii) high levels of dependency
on these public goods or common pool resources; and, iii) seafood is the most widely traded
commodity internationally (FAO, 2009a).
Few authors have identified the governance challenges specifically associated with
rebuilding depleted stocks and collapsed fisheries. Recently, the role of fishers, the fishing
industry, coastal fishing communities, environmental NGOs, community groups, the media and
the general public have been acknowledged as critical sources of input into fisheries planning
and decision-making (Bene and Neiland, 2006). However, contemporary fisheries governance is
infrequently open to input from a broad range of stakeholders and seldom embodies equity,
stewardship, or corporate social responsibility (Bundy et al., 2008).
Ostrom (1990) argues that successful institutional reforms and the devolution of
management to stakeholders require defined goals and articulated tasks and responsibilities. To
illustrate, the management success of the geoduck clam fishery in British Columbia (Canada)
both in terms of economic returns and ecological sustainability stemmed from an institutional
partnership implemented through a co-management framework (Khan, 2006). Other examples of
effective governance through cooperative or collaborative co-management partnerships can be
found in other parts of the world (Pinkerton, 1989; Khan et al., 2004; Raakjaer Nielsen et at.,
2004). Governance is also about how institutions perform and the relationship and
interdependence between the state, market and civil societies (Williamson, 1996; Kooiman,
2003; fentoft, 2005; Ostrom, 2005). From this perspective, coastal communities are sometimes
seen as having a vested interest in the long tenn rebuilding of fish stocks, with legitimate
concerns about distributional and intergenerational equity, and local leadership in fostering civic
stewardship (fentoft, 2000; Perry et al., 2010b).
Some scholars have argued that fisheries governance (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee, 2009),
conservation of endangered species (Ludwig et aI., 2001), and climate change (Rayner, 2006)
should be regarded as 'wicked' problems. Wicked problems are complex and characterized by
deeper problems that go beyond natural sciences to encompass social, economic and political
considerations. They can be difficult to perceive; do not "present a clear set of alternative
solutions," are associated with contradictory or irreconcilable certitudes, and tend to have
distributional and procedural equity implications for stakeholder groups (Rayner, 2006). As a
result, wicked problems tend to be persistent or reoccurring in part because they have no
technical solutions or fixes (Rittel and Weber, 1973). This is partly because the related policies
tend to become wedded to particular conflicting perceptions and 'ways of life' (Rayner, 2006).
If fisheries governance is a wicked problem, rebuilding fisheries is particularly wicked.
As argued above, stock rebuilding is not a simple linear process. It is often associated with high
levels of uncertainty linked to potential ecosystem effects of overfishing, and to the challenges of
managing stock fragments with imperfect knowledge. Problems of legitimacy for science and
management linked to the collapse can exacerbate these problems as can institutional inertia to
respond (Finlayson, 1994). Prolonged rebuilding and overcapitalization point to the need for
industrial adjustment programs which mayor may not match rebuilding requirements, and raise
questions about who caused the collapse, who will pay for the rebuilding, and who will
ultimately benefit. There is a high risk of conflict with outcomes that could be mediated by
differences in power between various stakeholder groups. Some authors have argued that these
very wicked problems can best be addressed through 'clumsy solutions' (Verweij and
Thompson, 2006). These ideas and suggestions are further explored for fisheries rebuilding
prospects in the next Section.
The case for clumsy solutions to wicked rebuilding problems
Clumsy solutions seek to recruit all facets of society including the state, the private sector,
multi laterals, civil society, communities and individuals to contribute to policy dialogue and
collective action (Verweij and Thompson, 2006). In the case of rebuilding fisheries, clumsy
approaches would be useful for: i) encouraging efforts for the development of integrative science
and knowledge syntheses (Miller el at., 2010); ii) supporting efforts to find reforms and
governance arrangements to deal with political economy issues (Sutinen, 2010); iii) identifying
policy options for sustaining global seafood trade and food security (Smith el at., 2010); and, iv)
getting involved in a problem-solving approach that supports institutional innovation and social
learning (lentoft, 2007a; Berghofer el al., 2008). Such reforms and innovations might help
address shortfalls and cognitive limitations in decision making at the administrative and
institutional level, a concept referred to as 'bounded rationality' (Simon, 1947).
Moreover, Verweij el at. (2006 p.l) claim that "successful solutions to pressing social ills
tend to consist of creative and flexible combinations of different ways of organizing, perceiving,
and justifying social relations". These contending policy perspectives justify, represent and stem
from four different ways of organizing social relations: individualism, egalitarianism, hierarchy,
and fatalism. 'Clumsy solutions', i.e., policies that creatively combine all these opposing
perspectives on what the problems are and how they should be resolved are therefore called for.
These four perspectives occur in fisheries debates and are particularly evident in responses to
fisheries collapse and the rebuilding challenge. The individualistic perspective underlies rational
choice theory and the tragedy of the commons perspective (Hardin, 1968). It informs claims that
privatizing fisheries and relying on markets is the best way to enhance stewardship, reduce over-
capacity and promote wealth generation from fisheries. From this perspective, incorporating
concerns about coastal-dependent fishing communities into marine ecosystem governance
reflects a 'rural romantic' mentality that contributes to problems with over-capacity and over-
harvesting. It also runs the risk of creating communities that act as social traps where
entrepreneurship is discouraged (Hannesson, 2002).
From an egalitarian perspective, fisheries privatization will not necessarily protect the
resource from overfishing, as has been demonstrated in many situations (Morgan, 1997).
Moreover, there are concerns about placing public goods into the hands of a few, thereby
deepening disparities between small-scale and large-scale fisheries, contributing to the erosion of
livelihoods at individual and household levels and the destruction of coastal communities (Davis
and Wagner, 2006). Those who support the egalitarian perspective emphasize the importance of
socio-cultural diversity, alternative knowledge systems, protecting food security and justice and
equity for sustainable fisheries (lentoft, 2000). They draw attention to social and ecological
complexity and to the history of local management about fisheries for the potential benefits of
the community (Berkes et aI., 1989; Wiber et at., 20 I0). They suggest that community-based
resource management can potentially play an integral role in addressing social justice and equity
issues; for example, who pays for rebuilding fisheries and who will ultimately benefit when the
stocks are recovered (see Charles, 1994).
The hierarchical perspective is evident in the view that fisheries (like other common pool
resources) are best protected and managed by technocrats and through planning and
management. Left to their own devices, fishers, fishing communities and firms will fish out the
resource and dissipate the resource rent (Hannesson, 1996). While there is a need for clear
guidelines and for expert engagement with rebuilding fisheries, top-down management structures
incur high transaction costs of monitoring and enforcement compared to decentralized
cooperative structures (Hanna, 1999). This is due to issues related to levels of compliance,
infonnation sharing, trust, social nonns and the limited space for stewardship roles by user
groups associated with this approach (Ostrom, 1990).
The fatalistic perspective is evident in the growing sense among many that given the
fragility of nature, diverse social nonns and values, market globalization, and lack of trust
amongst stakeholders across the fish chain; there is little point in struggling to reverse the
degradation of the world's fisheries. This perspective is frequently seen in gloom and doom
scenarios (Garcia and Grainger, 2005; Wonn et aI., 2007) and the lack of ingenuity in the search
for policy options (Homer-Dixon, 2002).
A clumsy solution approach seeks to take advantage of the fact that each of these
perspectives include 'elements of wisdom and experience' missing in the others, expressing the
way some portion of the populace thinks we should act, and the need for plural view points
(Verweij et al., 2006). It does this by looking for ways for all four perspectives and their
proponents to be taken into account in experimentation and problem solving while also
acknowledging that it may not always be possible to arrive at a workable solution.
Context is important to clumsy solution approaches. For example, research on water
management challenges in California found that some of the conditions that are conducive to
clumsy solutions included those where: i) there is a pattern of accumulating problems; ii)
proponents of all of the different perspectives have more to lose from inaction than from action;
iii) there is experience with collaborative arrangements; and, iv) leaders willing to take risks are
present and able to act (Lack et aI., 2006). There is little doubt that many fisheries collapses,
because of the challenges of rebuilding, can lead to a 'pattern of accumulating problems' starting
with short-tenn unemployment, industry viability challenges, scientific consensus on factors of
collapse, and management options. These short-tenn problems are often dealt with using
capacity reduction and restructuring programs; but these can be expensive, inefficient,
inequitable, and ineffective (Woodrow, 1998; Holland e/ aI., 1999; Clark e/ al., 2005), and thus
inadequate for dealing with prolonged rebuilding challenges.
Using a clumsy solution approach, fishery rebuilding would benefit from knowledge
about the entire production chain gathered at multiple spatio-temporal scales, as well as
communication of the insights garnered across various stakeholder groups and academic
disciplines (St. Martin e/ aI., 2007; FAO, 2009b). For instance, at the level of harvesting and
fisheries science, there is a growing literature that acknowledges a degree of incommensurability
between fishers' knowledge and science but that also notes the potential benefits of bringing
together both kinds of knowledge as inputs into decision-making (van der Schans, 200 I; Gray,
2005; Berkes 2008). Such integration could help to reduce miscommunication and deal with
knowledge gaps created by spatial and temporal scale mismatches and experiential and
organizational boundaries (Haggan e/ al., 2007; Murray e/ aI., 2008). If levels of conflict can be
mitigated and some trust and legitimacy sustained, such integration can also encourage the rapid
feedback essential to the context of resource vulnerability that is typical of post-collapse and
rebuilding (Neis and Felt, 2000). While such efforts are challenging and entail risks for fishers
and scientists and managers; the 'clumsy' products can be very valuable for problem-solving,
hypothesis-generation, testing and validation. The different perceptions of the various
stakeholder groups can be useful in resolving misunderstandings that arise from
miscommunication if there are no fundamental differences in opinion (Berghofer e/ al., 2008).
They also help to reduce the extent to which valuable and indeed essential knowledge is
overlooked or lost in the rebuilding process (Neis e/ al., 1999).
In the Newfoundland and Labrador cod fisheries, as in many others, proponents from
some of the different perspectives (individualism, egalitarian, hierarchical and fatalism) did not
initially have as much to lose from inaction than from action because of differences in their
reliance on cod relative to other species. At present, almost 20 years after the first cod moratoria,
many of those who depended on cod have been forced out of the industry (Hamilton and Butler,
2001). Among those remaining, there appears to be a strong perception that rebuilding cod stocks
might reduce the abundance and economic benefits available from higher value species (shrimp
and crab) which have become the focus for the most powerful industry survivors (see Schrank,
2005). Delayed rebuilding has led to the suggestion that cod should be listed as a species at risk.
This was resisted in the past by industry stakeholders, due to livelihood and socioeconomic
ramifications (DFO, 2005), and will likely continue to be resisted for some time, despite support
from some scientists and conservation groups.
Experience with collaborative initiatives, if weak at the point of collapse, can develop
during and in response to dealing with prolonged rebuilding. Collaboration, however, might
reflect some perspectives and approaches (e.g. industry or large scale concerns) but exclude
others (e.g. coastal community viability). Thus, fishery collapse can threaten or erode
collaborative arrangements as well as build upon them. An essential requirement is strong
leadership when dealing with prolonged rebuilding, and local capacity building initiatives across
generations. This was a key feature that emerged in the Newfoundland Eastport Lobster
Protection Initiative (Davis et aI., 2004).
Another potentially useful tool for a clumsy solution approach to fisheries rebuilding is
adopting a holistic and integrated livelihood framework. Such a framework takes into account
the natural, physical, human, financial and social capital necessary to deal with vulnerability in
the event of resource depletion, natural disasters, and environmental change (Allison and Ellis,
200 I; Allison et aI., 2009). An example of this is the Sustainable Fisheries Livelihood Program
in small scale fishery communities in West Africa, which was designed to reconcile fisheries
conservation and socioeconomic goals. The approach focuses on addressing vulnerability issues
through capacity building, diversification, policy processes, rural development and conservation
incentives (Allison and Horemans, 2006). Clumsy solutions require broad-based, adaptive
approaches and proactive strategies that combine a mix of instruments ranging from legal
regulatory instruments to economic incentives, public outreach, international agreements, and
stakeholder alliances. They need to be perceived as fair, because they will inevitably require
those with different but entrenched interests to give ground.
One of the most challenging issues in fisheries rebuilding is the complex range of
tensions revolving around accountability and blame for the collapse, and related perceptions and
realities regarding who will pay and who will ultimately benefit from rebuilding. This is called
the 'Rebuilding for whom' question. This question has not received the attention it should in
research on rebuilding (ammer et aI., 2007). Assigning blame for collapses is by no means
straightforward, as we can see from the history of debates about the collapse of California's
sardine stocks (McEvoy, 1986) and from those related to the collapse of the northern cod stocks
(Hutchings et aI., 1997). Proponents of different perspectives will tend to point the finger in
different directions - i.e. looking for the burden of proof (Dayton, 1998; Charles, 2002).
Similarly, assessing the transaction costs and thus establishing the basis for a fair allocation of
those costs across society is a very complex and contested enterprise. It requires good
understanding of the resource and ecosystem dynamics, effective information gathering,
appropriate decision making processes, monitoring and enforcement, tradeoffs between fleet
types, user groups and those employed directly and indirectly, as well as intergenerational
concerns. Rebuilding, particularly of long-lived species, requires long-term investment. Because
short term costs are tangible and long term benefits are intangible especially as these relate to
tenure and stock uncertainty, rebuilding efforts tend to be shortsighted with no interest in future
investment among most players (Hanna, 1999; Sutinen, 2010). Moreover, rebuilding challenges
often include by-catch restriction concerns that can threaten other fisheries while also driving up
the costs of monitoring and fanning debates over who should pay (Caddy and Agnew, 2005).
Fairness is related to equity and justice. Fairness and equity in fisheries can be defined in
procedural, distributional and intergenerational terms (Coward et aI., 2000; Sumaila, 2004;
Sutinen, 2007). Equity issues are among the strongest remaining concerns in the Newfoundland
and Labrador cod fishery as participation and employment have been substantially reduced since
the groundfisheries collapsed, despite an increase in production value based on harvesting
shellfish (Hamilton and Butler, 200 I; Shrank, 2005). In the process, wealth and access to the
resource have been concentrated in the hands of a declining number of skippers and processors
with some fishing communities and many processing workers particularly hard hit (Hamilton and
Butler, 200 I; Ommer et a/., 2007). Similar equity concerns have been raised in the U.S., in
association with efforts to rebuild Maine cod, Bering Sea snow crabs and Pacific canary rockfish
(Hanna, 2010). For instance, individual transferable quotas (ITQ) can work fairly quickly to
constrain access and eliminate excess capacity but raises concern about distributional concerns.
In some cases, the implementation of ITQs and effective institutional mechanisms appear to have
been associated with success in helping to conserve stocks and protecting the potential for
economic returns (Khan, 2006; Griffith, 2008). However, ITQs are not a panacea (Ban et aI.,
2008); they do not always promote conservation, and tend to rapidly concentrate access to and
control over public resources and resource rent in the hands of a few (Clark, 2006; Bromley
2009; Copes and Charles, 2004). These social costs are particularly high where recovery
initiatives do not include appropriate social welfare programs and support for diversification into
other economic activities. Long-term programs such as education, retraining and alternative
livelihood options are necessary to complement short term restructuring measures for successful
recovery outcomes (Holland et al., 1999). Who gets to participate in decision making (beyond
consultations) regarding rebuilding and who does not, is a key equity issue that can affect buy-in,
stewardship, compliance and stakeholder dynamics in both the short and longer terms.
The clumsy solutions literature, while valuable to our understanding of fisheries
rebuilding options and stakeholder dynamics, does not pay sufficient attention to the role of
power especially during economic restructuring (Sinclair and Ommer, 2006). Power can be
defined as the means to act, enforce and influence successful outcomes such as the rebuilding
imperative (Jentoft, 2007b). Power can be coercive, as in hierarchical decision-making;
disruptive as in protests; corruptive as in the case of seafood mislabeling (Jacquet and Pauly,
2008) and 'under-the-table sales' (Palmer and Sinclair, 1997); and constructive as in
collaborative partnerships in problem solving approaches (Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador,
2005). Analyses of rebuilding fisheries need to pay attention to how power relations contribute to
and are changed (or not changed) by fisheries collapses and reconcile rebuilding strategies and
outcomes (see Gaventa, 2005). Different kinds of power are relevant to understanding the
options and opportunities for rebuilding fisheries. These include: legislative power as in public
trust doctrines (Turnipseed et al., 2009), citizen power through electoral votes, lobbying power
or regulatory capture (Sutinen, 2008), market power (Anderson, 1991), gender power (Neis el
al., 2005), consumer buying power (Brownstein et al., 2003), and power related to knowledge,
such as in research and development.
Conclusion
For decades, if not centuries in the case of developed countries, most fisheries management
policies despite the best available science have been reactive rather than proactive. These
shortcomings have encouraged excessive fishing capacity and the steady degradation of marine
fish resources (Pauly et al., 2002; Clark, 2006). Fishers continue to operate in fisheries that are
not managed on precautionary principles and too often within a social-political context that
encourages non-compliance. These management approaches have frequently been exported to
developing countries where poor technical and financial resources further constrain successful
conservation and socioeconomic outcomes. The results have seldom been sustainable, with
ongoing problems of global overfishing and catch overages beyond precautionary reference
points and stock collapses (Pauly et aI., 2002). The ecological, social, economic and political
costs of these practices have escalated in recent decades and could, in the absence of major and
effective changes, contribute to the collapse of many existing commercial fisheries. These costs
are already high and unacceptable, frequently underestimated and disproportionately distributed
across classes, genders, countries, regions, and between generations. From local to global scales,
what we have called the rebuilding imperative is overwhelming. Unfortunately, little progress
has been made on identifying, implementing and rigorously evaluating the effectiveness of
rebuilding strategies; not simply with the goal of achieving stock recovery, but also in achieving
sustainable and equitable fisheries.
This review of the broader literature on recovery and rebuilding identifies four key
governance challenges: (i) distributional and procedural concerns for access and allocation
policy measures; (ii) stakeholder resistance or cooperation; (iii) political economy concerns; and,
(iv) uncertainties within the ecological, socioeconomic and governing systems. The limited
research on the rebuilding of commercial fish stocks suggests these initiatives need to use
multiple instruments, ranging from access control measures to seasonal closures, protected areas
and habitat protection, stewardship measures, conservation incentives, and international
instruments (Caddy and Agnew, 2005; Worm e/ aI., 2009). The success of US rebuilding efforts
for Pacific lingcod (Ophion elonga/us), summer flounder (Paralich/hys den/a/us), king mackerel
(Scomberomorus cavalla) and Atlantic sea scallop (Placopec/en megallanicus) has been
attributed to the introduction of clear legal mandates and regulatory frameworks, as well as to the
presence of appropriate institutional arrangements for both recovery strategies and rebuilding
plans (Rosenberg e/ aI., 2006; Wakeford e/ al., 2009). More specifically, rebuilding initiatives in
US marine fisheries have shown the importance and need for clear harvest rules, rebuilding
timeframes, secured access rights, effective enforcement mechanisms, ameliorating equity
concerns, and acquiring stakeholder support (Hanna, 20 I0).
Rebuilding is essential not only for the ecological resilience of marine ecosystems but
also to the wealth, livelihoods, food security and cultural meanings they can generate. During
recovery transition, the contemporary and intergenerational costs can be huge- particularly when
dealing with the collapse of large commercial fisheries with substantial subsistence components.
In these fisheries, the economic challenges associated with high transition costs, exacerbated by
short-tenn employment needs, discounted profits and conservation goals are only some of the
many challenges that need to be addressed.
Because of these complexities and broader connections to socioeconomic and policy
issues, fisheries governance has been described as a wicked problem. Finding ways to effectively
transition from collapsed and poorly managed fisheries to sustainably rebuilt fisheries that
promote equity and food security is a particularly wicked problem. Context matters to such
efforts, as they are frequently constrained by the social-ecological history of the area and the
wider system within which it is embedded, i.e., 'place' and geography matters. Recent literature
suggesting reliance on clumsy solutions for wicked problems like climate change and the
fisheries rebuilding imperative are worth exploring. Moreover, the high levels of uncertainty and
potentially huge social, economic consequences of stock collapse and the often prolonged and
disruptive aspects of rebuilding tend to produce particularly polarized perspectives and
conflicting viewpoints among stakeholders. Each perspective has elements of wisdom and
experience within it, but each is also lacking in critical ways. The clumsy solution option tries to
arrive at solutions that tap into the wisdom and experience in each and to bring together the
stakeholders associated with each perspective. Clumsy solutions within fisheries are partly
constrained by power dynamics, which can make inaction more attractive than action for some
groups. Power brokerage through social and economic networks may also marginalize options
and creates potential rifts and social dilemmas as argued by Gaventa (2005).
Frequently, one or two perspectives, such as the individualistic or hierarchical dominate
decision-making, skewing the distribution of the costs and benefits of rebuilding across groups
and potentially jeopardizing the success of rebuilding initiatives. Where problems are
accumulating and other conditions conducive to clumsy solutions exist, effective leadership
might be crucial to create the synergies and dialogue essential to move forward. Our analysis of
the literature on fisheries rebuilding suggests that future research needs to explore what types of
governing models and instruments work best, within which institutional frameworks, geopolitical
contexts, and at what spatial and temporal scales. Clumsy solutions for rebuilding fisheries need
to incorporate attention not only to fish stocks but also to the human dimension of the production
chain such as markets and seafood trade (Wessells et al., 2001), institutions that span from local
to global scales (Jentoft, 2005; Sumaila et al., 2007), and power (Gaventa, 2005). These are
useful tools to potentially enhance overall governance, sustainability, and food security concerns.
Clumsy solutions need to address procedural, distributional and intergenerational equity issues
through incentives for entrepreneurship, diversification, as well as empowerment through
capacity building. While no panacea, clumsy solutions are a potentially valuable tool in the
limited toolbox available to address the fisheries rebuilding imperative.
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Chapter III: A Fish Chain Analysis of Wicked Rebuilding Problems: Pre-
harvest and Harvest Stages of the Northern Gulf Cod Fisheries
IntroductionS
Around the world, many fisheries have collapsed and several others, particularly groundfish
stocks and large pelagics, are experiencing the impacts of overexploitation (FAO 20 I0). To date,
most institutional responses to collapsed stocks such as Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) have
sought to achieve the recovery imperative through reduced fishing pressure, industry
restructuring, and rationalization measures (Rice et al., 2003; Ruseski 2008; Cliff and Team
20 I I). These recovery attempts are largely state-driven and guided by a single-species model of
scientific enquiry that is uncertain due largely to multispecies interactions and environmental
changes (Charles 1997; Savenkoff et aI., 2007). Because of institutional rigidities and poor
communication (Hutchings et aI., 1997); these efforts have had limited success and are often
contested by stakeholder groups (Schrank 2005; Murray et aI., 2005).
We argue for a rebuilding imperative as the recovery approach is inadequate in dealing
with broader human dimension and institutional interlinkages. As mentioned in previous
chapters, rebuilding differs from recovery in that the former strives to address socioeconomic
and sociopolitical challenges, in addition to resource conservation concerns. We conceptualized
fisheries collapse and rebuilding as a 'wicked problem' because of the complexity of the
ecological and social systems, the governing system, and the interactions between them (Jentoft
and Chuenpagdee 2009). Further, attaining multiple fisheries objectives for collapsed stocks is
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complex, as it involves tradeoffs between short- and long-tenn considerations (Wonn el aI.,
2009). In fact, neither the reasons leading to fisheries collapse, nor the target reference points or
strategies for ecosystem recovery are easily agreed upon (Shelton and Rice 2002). These
challenges involve huge financial and institutional investments, and in the absence of a
participatory process and effective governing institutions, often result in recovery failure
(Wakeford el at., 2009; Murawski 2011).
As discussed in Chapter [ and II, the dilemmas raised by trying to achieve multiple and
sometimes conflicting objectives in resource governance necessitate a move towards human-
nature scholarship and coupled marine social-ecological systems (Folke el at., 2005; Ommer el
at., 20 I0; Perry el al., 20 II). Such rebuilding approaches pay attention to system interactions,
transitional management initiatives (Shove and Walker 2007; Fisher-Kowalski and Rotmans
2009), drivers and feedback mechanisms for sustaining both the resource and human welfare
(Osterblom el al., 2010,2011). We concur with this perspective, which also aligns well with the
interactive governance theory (Kooiman el al., 2005) drawn upon in this study. Specifically,
interactive governance theory posits that fisheries are a relationship between natural and social
systems that are highly interconnected through the pre-harvest, harvest and post-harvest stages of
the fish production chain or 'fish chain' (Bavinck el aI., 2005). The more diverse, complex, and
dynamic the fisheries systems and production stages are, the less governable they are likely to
be, unless the governing system is highly capable and appropriate institutional mechanisms exist
(Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2009). Concerns around governing capacity in fisheries, referred to as
governability (Kooiman and Chuenpagdee 2005) are central to rebuilding, as they provide the
foundation for capacity building and institutional innovation at various spatial scales.
This chapter introduces the Northern Gulf cod case study and the analytical framework
for a fish chain approach that informs this and subsequent chapters. Northern Gulf cod (Gadus
morhua) fisheries collapsed in the Gulf of St. Lawrence in the early 1990s, resulting to two
complete moratoria imposed between 1994 and 1996, and again in 2003. In addition in these
management measures, there was a reduction in total allowable catches (TAC) in subsequent
years, along several restructuring and adjustment programs in fleet and fishing capacity. The
impact of the stock collapse has consequences along the entire fish chain, especially on
livelihoods, processing sectors, marketing and retail, fishing dependent coastal communities,
organizational structures, and decision-making approaches.
The collapses of the Northern Gulf cod fisheries and other groundfish stocks in Atlantic
Canada have been attributed to many factors. Paramount amongst these are overfishing beyond
biological reference points, unsustainable fishing practices by dragger fleets, non-compliance
and 'under the table sales' (Sinclair and Palmer 1997), stock assessment failure and data fouling
(Finlayson, 1994), ineffective fisheries management, environmental changes, as well as
institutional rigidities (Rice et al., 2003; Hamilton et aI., 2004; Ommer et aI., 2009).
The challenges for fisheries rebuilding have implications beyond fish stocks and marine
ecosystems, to livelihood issues, equity and social justice, community empowerment, marketing,
and institutional mechanisms. In this chapter, we first provide background information on the
case study region in the pre- and post-collapse periods, and demonstrate how rebuilding the
Northern Gulf cod fishery is a wicked problem. Using a 'fish chain' framework, the chapter
examines rebuilding challenges and opportunities focusing on the pre-harvest and harvest stages.
Findings on the comparative fish chain analysis of the Northern Gulf cod fishery are presented,
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underscoring the scientific, socioeconomic, and institutional ramifications of resource collapse
and rebuilding prospects. This is followed by a discussion and policy implications for rebuilding.
Northern Gulf cod case study
The pre- and post-collapse context
Northern Gulf cod fisheries in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Management Organization
(NAPO) region 4RS3Pn collapsed in the early 1990s in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, bordering
Quebec, and Newfoundland (Figure I). The cod stocks are one of ten stocks in eastern Canada,
with an annual migration between southeastern Quebec and southwestern Newfoundland in both
the spring and summer months (Methot et aI., 2005). In the spring, the stocks undergo a
spawning migration from Quebec (Division 4S) and western Newfoundland (Division 4R)
towards Bay St. George and the Port au Port Peninsula (Division 3Pn) as shown in Figure I. In
the summer, as the waters get warmer and cod prey such as capel in (Mollutus villosus) increases
in abundance, the stocks take a northern feeding migration towards 4R and 4S. In the winter, the
stocks are found in the 3Pn region at depths of more than 366 meters (DFO 201 Oa).
Although these stocks are considered isolated, there is scientific evidence that they
occasionally mix with other NAFO regions including the Strait of Belle Isle around 3K, the
Burgeo Bank region in 3Ps, and the southwest part of the gulf region around 4TVn (Yvelin et
aI., 2005). As will be later discussed, the stock migratory behavior contributes to making
rebuilding a wicked problem, in part because of scientific uncertainty of stock structure and other
biophysical factors such as ice over (Frechet, 1990), and unregulated fishing activities in this
management zone and adjacent ones.
The Northern Gulf cod fishery falls under various jurisdictional management structures,
including the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) for harvesting regulations and
resource conservation and various provincial departments in Quebec and Newfoundland and
Labrador for processing and marketing operations.
Figure I: Northern Gulf cod migratory routes in NAFO region 4RS3Pn (adapted from Yvelin et
al.,2005andMurrayetal.,2008).
The Fisheries Act (1867) is the key legislature that governs the management of marine fishery
resources in Canada. According to the Supreme Court of Canada in 1997, it is the duty of the
--
Ministers of DFO to manage, conserve, and develop the fisheries on behalf of all Canadians in
the public interests (Hutchings 2010; OAG 20 I I). DFO is the main federal agency responsible
for developing and implementing fisheries management plans. In 2010, DFO had a budget of
nearly 2 billion CAD with about 11,000 people in seven regions across the country, namely the
Pacific, Maritimes, Newfoundland and Labrador, Quebec, Central and Arctic, Gulf region, and
the National Capital Region6 . New institutional mandates and policy initiatives have been
enacted by the federal government after failed attempts to modify the Fisheries Act. Notable new
legal instruments include the Oceans Act in 1997 and the Species at Risk Act (SARA) in 2003.
According the Office of the Auditor General (2011), "we concluded [in 1999] that the [Fisheries]
Act did not include clear objectives that reflected the social, economic, and ecological nature of
sustainable fisheries (OAG, 2011: p23). The two Acts are to accommodate policy shortcomings
in the Fisheries Act for broader stakeholder involvement in marine stewardship initiatives,
ecosystem approach, and integrated management.
In Newfoundland and Labrador (NL), the Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture
(DFA) is in charge of processing and marketing policies. Similarly, the Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food in Quebec is responsible for fish processing and food. Quota allocation for
cod stocks in the gulf region reflects historic sharing mechanisms of about 75% to NL and 25%
to Quebec (GNPFT 2006). In NL (especially the 4R3Pn region), both the harvesting and
processing sectors are unionized, notably the Food, Fish and Allied Workers Union (FFAW)
represents fish harvesters and plant processing workers; and the Association of Seafood
Producers (ASP) and the Seafood Producers of Newfoundland and Labrador (SPNL) for plant
owners and processors.
http://www.otlawacitizen.comlbusincss/Stralcn ic+rcvicw+Fisheries+Oceans+aiTect+cmpioyees/5844597/story.html
last accessed December 13th2011.
During the 1970s and 1980s in the pre-collapse period, fisheries management was based
on licensing, total allowable catch (TAC) quotas, individual allowable vessel quotas, and vessel
and gear restrictions. Vessel length categories range from less than 25' to more than 100' long,
with gross registered tonnages (GRT) of about 15 for small vessels, 15 to 60 for medium vessels,
and greater than 100 for larger trawlers. The smaller vessels are mostly inshore and nearshore
fleets (less than 25' and from 25'to 34') using fixed gear such as long lines and gill nets. The
larger vessels are in the midshore (35' to 64') and offshore fleet categories (greater than 65'),
mostly utilizing mobile gear and with enterprise allocations (a form of individual quotas
allocated to vessels). Since the 1970s and 1980s, there has been a drastic decline in the use of
large trawlers with GRT exceeding 1000 especially groundfish otter trawlers (Pinforn 1988).
Before the collapse of the fishery, both foreign and local vessels were prosecuting the fishery
resources using various fishing fleets.
Early signs about stock decline were raised by inshore fish harvesters in the late 1980s
(Palmer and Sinclair 1997), but went unheeded till the early 1990s when the stocks were
pronounced collapsed by DFO. Fisheries management measures were revised and updated to
take into consideration the stock collapse: starting with two complete moratoria, one from 1994
to 1996, and a brief one in 2003. [n between the two moratoria and starting from1997, the
Northern Gulf cod fishery has been managed on a small commercial and recreational fishery
basis. The TACs have been reduced to about 90% historical levels, in addition to implementing
fleet restructuring and income adjustment programs. The TACs are limited to less than 9,000
tonnes for the stocks to rebuild, and have fluctuated from 3,500 tonnes to 7,000 tonnes in the
years from 1997 to 2010 depending on stock recruitment and growth (DFO 2010a). Foreign
fleets and offshore mobile fleets have not been permitted to take part in the current fishery till the
TACs rebound beyond 9,000 tonnes. New policy measures have been implemented including the
establishment of dockside monitoring and on-board surveillance mechanisms (DFO 20 lOa). The
total number of licenses issued in 2009 was 915 and 905 in Quebec and Newfoundland
respectively, with 179 active in Quebec and 720 active in ewfoundland. All the active licenses
are for boats less than 65' long using fixed gears in inshore regions, with none of the larger
mobile boats greater than 65' been operational at the moment (DFO 2010b).
Several task forces on restructuring and adjustments have been established in response to the
collapse of these regional cod fisheries in Atlantic Canada, beginning with the federal Task
Force on Incomes and Adjustments in the Atlantic Fishery in 1993, and culminating to federal-
provincial Cod Recovery Action Teams in 2003 (Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador 2005,
2006; Canada-Quebec 2005). The adjustment programs and restructuring initiatives include the
Atlantic Fisheries Adjustment Program, Northern Cod Compensation Adjustment and Recovery
Program, Atlantic Groundfish Adjustment Program, the Atlantic Groundfish Strategy, the
Canada-Newfoundland Agreement on Economic Renewal, the Canadian Fisheries Adjustment
and Recovery Plan, the Short-term Adjustment Initiative (for the Gulf region only) and the
Temporary Fishers' Income Program (ACOA 2004). The cost of the restructuring initiatives and
adjustment programs implemented in eastern Canada from early 1990s to mid 2005 has been
estimated at 4.0 billion CAD (Rice et aI., 2003; Ruseski 2008). These programs were tenninated
in 2005 due to several reasons; i) the programs were very costly for the federal government in
the long-term; ii) the demand for more social assistance was escalating in the absence of other
options such as transitional livelihoods; and iii) the programs did not fully contribute to
addressing the social needs of the stakeholders mostly affected (Rice et al., 2003; Best 2009).
Regional task forces were also established to initiate policy discussions and community
engagement amongst stakeholders, such as the Great Northern Peninsula Fisheries Task Force in
western Newfoundland (GNPFT 2006). A Provincial Act for professionalization of the
harvesting sector was put in place in 1997 to limit access and to provide safety and other types of
training for fish harvesters. This was primarily based on the recommendations from the federal
Task Force on Incomes and Adjustments Reports (Cashin, 1993; GTA Consultants Inc, 1993).
Similar policy measures were recommended for the processing sector with the intention of
reducing capacity, including limits on new licenses for primary processing, placing a freeze on
secondary processing licenses, and various divestiture programs to downsize the industry and
reduce on government support (DFO 1996).
Despite these legislative policy changes and recovery efforts to date, scientific stock
assessments show that Northern Gulf cod stocks are below conservation limit reference points,
meaning that rebuilding has stalled (Rice et al., 2003; DFO 20 lOa). There are also concerns
about how marine food webs may have been altered, thus affecting biodiversity and recovery
timeframes (Savenkoff et aI., 2007; Morissette et al., 2009). These related changes in the
ecosystem, the current poor status of the cod stocks, and the uncertain outcomes of the
restructuring programs have had serious implications for livelihoods and for the regional
economies within which the fishing communities are embedded (Ommer et aI., 2007).
The NAFO region 4RS3pn, although under one regional management jurisdiction is
culturally diverse and heterogeneous, based in part on historical settlement patterns. The 4S
region lies in Quebec and also hosts DFO's regional science branch (Maurice Lamontagne
Institute) and regional management offices for the NAFO gulf region (Mont loli and Moncton
respectively). The 4R3Pn region in western Newfoundland is the main case study region, which
is equally diverse, stemming from historical settlement patterns, social norms, and diverse
biophysical environments. Settlement in western Newfoundland in the 4R region dates back to
1000 AD, to early European settlements by the Vikings at L' Anse aux Meadows; and in the early
1900s to the 'French Shore' settlements (Sinclair (985). This is a region where French fishers
under the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) were allowed to process their fish centered around Port au
Choix region till 1904. The fishery in this region has also evolved within the past century from
fixed gears using traps and lines to more sophisticated mobile dragger fleets (Sinclair 1985); with
conflicts amongst fishers as well as with processors and fish merchants (Macdonald 1985; Felt
and Sinclair 1995). Despite these conflicts and protests, this region has a history of community
development, with one of the earliest community development corporations (Sinclair and Neis
2008), and have been involved with regional initiatives such as the Great Northern Peninsula
Fisheries Task Force (GNPFT 2006).
The coastal communities in western Newfoundland in the 4R region are considered to be
among the most fishery dependent in Canada (Hamilton and Butler 2001). They historically
depended on the ground fish resources, and since the collapse, there have been demographic
changes through an aging adult population and youth outmigration (Felt and Sinclair 1995;
Hamilton and Butler 2001). Also, the socioeconomic impact in terms of the loss of livelihoods
has been devastating in this region, with approximately 50% reduction in employment in both
the harvesting and processing sectors (GNPFT 2006). An estimated 6.3 million CAD was lost to
the economy of the Red Ochre Regional Economic Development Soard (RORDS) in the Great
Northern Peninsula in the western Newfoundland due to the second moratoria alone. Thc
RORDS is one of twenty regional economic development boards (REDSs) set up in the province
to promote alternative livelihoods in the early 1990s (ACOA 1995).
Unlike the 4R region that is highly dependent on fisheries and with little economic
options, the 3Pn region has been a transportation hub and trade routes for merchants not only to
mainland, but also to some New England states 7. This unique feature of the Channel- Port aux
Basque region in the 3Pn region was spurred by the Trans-Newfoundland railway in the 1890s
and a ferry service across to Nova Scotia. The fishery in this region also dates back to the 1500s
when Basques whalers frequented this region and became a prominent fishing region because of
its ice free harbor (see Frechet 1990). The region also gained strong French influence because of
the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713. During the 'glory days' of high landings by the dragger fleets in
the 1970s to 1980s (Palmer and Sinclair 1997), this region saw a lot of fishing activity, as most
of the draggers from the 4R especially Port Saunders and Port au Choix will conduct winter
fishing activities in this region. This led to several conflicts between fixed gear and mobile gear
fleets, which resulted to a buffer zone in the late 1980s that excluded dragger fleets in waters less
than 100 fathoms deep, the '100 fathom edge rule' (Palmer 1992). Other conflicts were evident
in the processing sector, with the trucking of fish from the southwest coast to the northeast coast
and other parts by processors, resulting to employment and equity concerns (Palmer 1992).
In the post collapse periods in the 1990s and 2000s, there have been several stewardship
initiatives by local inshore fishers and community organizations in the 3Pn region. First, a major
breeding and spawning ground was identified in St. Georges Bay by local fishers, which was
officially declared a seasonal closure in 2002 (DFO 2010a). Second, local inshore fishers
recommended the adoption of a strictly hook and line fishing policy since the early 1990s, which
was approved by DFO and is currently in effect. Third, in collaboration with community partners
such as the town of Burnt Island, Service Canada, The harbor Authority, and Fisheries
7 htlp:llwww.portauxbasgues.ca/tourism/historv.php last accessedDecember 13th2011.
Committees; a hook and line museum was created in Burnt Island in 2003 to showcase fishing
culture and local stewardship, and to also promote eco-tourism in the region8.
As these bottom up stewardship garnered recognition, in addition to collaborative efforts
to promote stick recovery, there is a gradual shift in target species from groundfisheries to
shellfisheries, mainly Northern shrimp (Panda/us borealis) and snow crab (Chionoecetes opilio)
in the 4R region. These, together with more intensive lobster fisheries, a seal hunt and some
small pelagic fisheries have provided livelihoods for those remaining in the fishery in the gulf
region as a whole. According to the 2010 Provincial Seafood Industry Review, shellfisheries
comprised nearly 60% of landings by volume and approximately 84% of the total landed value in
the province as a whole. However, this higher production value has not resulted in an increase in
livelihood opportunities due to lower landed volumes and limited value-addition. This is partly
because lobsters are largely exported live and the mechanized nature of shellfish processing
methods (Schrank 2005).
We build upon the argument in Chapters I and II that rebuilding fisheries is a wicked
problem because of the complex socioeconomics and sociopolitical linkages. In the next section,
we examine the wicked attributes of the Northern Gulf cod fisheries, in order to identify key
rebuilding challenges and to explore institutional mechanisms for successful rebuilding.
Wicked rebuilding challenges
This section analyzes the wicked rebuilding problems associated primarily with three key
changes: policy measures, rebuilding programs, and institutional arrangements prior to and after
the collapse of the Northern Gulf cod fisheries. The analysis focuses on changes happening in the
pre-harvest and the harvest stages of the fish chain.
8 hnp://burnlis13ndsnl.ca/hookccnlcLhlmiiaSlaccessedDecemberl3th2011.
In the case of the Northern Gulf collapse, stock abundance and rebuilding efforts have
been highly contested. This relates to the multispecies nature of the fisheries, where population
size for some collapsed species may create by-catch concerns for non-threatened species; and
associated problems with high grading and discarding. Moreover, the collapse of the
groundfisheries may affect predator-prey relationships amongst fish groups leading to regime
shift and longer recovery timeframes (Morissette et aI., 2009). Also, previous moratoria on
collapsed cod stocks have created loss in employment for many households (GNPFT 2006; OFO
2010a). Changes in target species from groundfisheries to shellfisheries may also affect
stakeholder buy-in on quota reductions for stocks to rebuild to sustainable levels (Hamilton et
aI., 2004; OFO 20 1Oa).
Because the cause of the collapse cannot be attributed to anyone reason, the choice of
policy instruments for fisheries rebuilding raise doubts and concerns with stakeholders about
what is effective, at what spatial scales, and how legitimate the proposed policies are, as well as
concerns about agenda setting, and social and environmental justice (Coward et aI., 2000).
Fisheries rebuilding is also tied in with community livelihood issues, as quota reductions and
plant closures affect community and regional economic development, especially in the absence
of effective institutions that pay attention to equitable allocation and stakeholder needs (as
discussed in Chapter V). Because of the centrality of the rebuilding imperative, there are often
trade-offs between short-term loss and long-term benefits of rebuilding, especially with the
'rebuilding for whom' question (Ommer et al., 2007). Often, the transition from overfished to
rebuilt status call for a reduction in the exploitation rate for stock recovery, relying on biological
reference points such as Maximum Sustainable Yield (Worm et af., 2009). This transitional
period is also very challenging to manage, as compliance to decision control rules and harvest
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strategies, are necessary but not sufficient for effective rebuilding. Rather, evidence from
Europe, North America and Oceania suggests that much depends on dealing with the livelihood
and institutional issues (Wakeford et aI., 2009). Evidence also suggests that reductions in
exploitation rates and TACs have ramifications on distributional equity, employment, revenue,
and uncertainties regarding cost and benefits in the long term as demonstrated in the rebuilding
efforts for cod stocks in Canada and the US (Ommer et aI., 2009; Hanna 2010). These
socioeconomic concerns make rebuilding highly contested and challenging; as issues of power,
accountability, blame, social and economic impact of restructuring causes persistent conflicts. As
argued in Chapter II, these socioeconomic and sociopolitical concerns make rebuilding a very
wicked problem, as stakeholders have the capacity to influence rebuilding outcomes. Scientific
uncertainties in stock status and trends have led to protests amongst stakeholders as evident with
the California sardine rebuilding (McEvoy 1986). Lessons from the GulfofMain cod rebuilding
have also shown how various forms of contestation about scientific uncertainty, distributional
equity, and various stakeholder concerns can lead to litigation, congressional intervention, public
commentary, and subsequent amendments to the regional fisheries management plan (NEFMC
2008; Hanna 2010). Controversies resulting from these socioeconomic impacts have also led to
federal intervention estimated at $16 million USD to assist the fishing industry in its transition to
deal with these concerns (NOAA 2009).
Livelihood transitional concerns and stakeholder conflicts are not the only notable
challenges about wicked rebuilding problems. Scientific uncertainty and potential regime shifts
bring in transformation concerns regarding appropriate institutional mechanisms towards
ecosystem approaches and adaptive governing capacity (Gelcich et aI., 20 I0; Osterblom et aI.,
20 I0). In response to implementing successful ecosystem approaches and considering
stakeholder values (see Wilhere 2008), the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration issued ten key requirements in the case of the US ocean policy, relevant towards
rebuilding efforts9. These include: public engagement, strong leadership, communication among
stakeholders; incentives for collaboration, cross-boundary facilitators, clear measurable goals,
science-based decisions, legislative mandates, adaptive management, and sustainable funding.
Wicked problems also entail making hard choices, sometimes between small-scale versus
large-scale fisheries, restructuring initiatives that are both equitable and socially just, and the
choice of local versus international seafood marketing (as discussed in Chapter IV). Moreover,
fisheries collapse as a wicked problem can be symptoms of larger problems beyond fisheries
management. For instance, they can be related to economic globalization, global environmental
change, and cultural shifts in values. These multifaceted problems are relevant to understanding
wicked rebuilding challenges for Northern Gulf cod fisheries as they point to the need for
holistic approaches that are social-ecological and underscore the rebuilding imperative.
With this in mind, this chapter specifically seeks to address two questions: How have
changes in Northern Gulf cod fisheries in the pre-harvest and harvest stages of the fish chain
affected rebuilding prospects? And what alternative institutional mechanisms could promote
social-ecological rebuilding of Northern Gulf cod fisheries?
Methods
Two key steps were undertaken. First, an extensive review of fisheries recovery efforts was
conducted, covering existing and historical documents, policy and legal statutes, statistical
information, scientific research, and government commissioned reports. An analysis of these
information sources was performed to identify ecological constraints towards cod rebuilding,
9http://www.csc.noaa.gov/maoazinc/2011.06/articlc2.hlm11astaccessedDecember 15th2011.
policy changes that promote or exacerbate rebuilding, community concerns on governing
options, and institutional arrangements for economic viability.
Second, semi-structured interviews were conducted with fifty key informants from
diverse stakeholders groups along the entire fish chain as shown in Figure 2. The interview
themes for the pre-harvest and harvest stages of the fish chain center around the following: i)
status and prospects of restored fisheries ecosystems; ii) scientific and management efforts; (iii)
socio-economic and livelihood concerns; iv) stewardship towards rebuilding; and (v) institutional
and policy initiatives for rebuilding. Although the post-harvest stage and the governing
interactions are briefly touched upon, they are fully discussed in Chapters VI and V,
respectively.
The key informants included seven scientists and fisheries managers, twelve resource
harvesters, eight entrepreneurs in the processing and retail sectors as well as plant workers, seven
municipal and community planners, ten bureaucrats and policy makers, six research analysts
from consulting, academia, and the media. The key informants were identified based on
background research and through snow-ball sampling techniques. The in-person interviews were
conducted throughout northwestern and southern Newfoundland in the 4R3Pn gulf region in the
fall of 2009 mostly with fishers, processors, community planners, and municipal leaders. More
interviews with fisheries scientists, managers and policy makers in Comer Brook and St. John's
(NL), Mont Joli (Quebec), and Ottawa (Ontario) were undertaken until the spring of 2010
through face-to-face interviews and sometimes through telephone interviews.
The interview transcripts and the policy documents were analyzed using both diagnostic
and prescriptive approaches. The diagnostic analysis centers on identifying rebuilding challenges
that stem from two of the three production changes, i.e., the pre-harvest and harvest stages of the
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fish chain. The prescriptive analysis is used to identify opportunities and provide policy
recommendations for rebuilding prospects that consider livelihoods security and coastal
community viability.
The fish chain analytical framework
If rebuilding Northern Gulf cod fisheries is truly a wicked problem, then the traditional
hierarchical and technical management approach is insufficient to address these multifaceted
social, economic, and jurisdictional challenges. "For wicked problems, a governance approach is
needed, whereas management is for what Rittel and Webber call tame problems" (Jentoft and
Chuenpagdee 2009: 554). Such governance approaches collectively encompass contributions
from the state, civil society, and industry in decision-making and shared stewardship (Gray 2005;
Kooiman et al., 2005). Moreover, issues of equity, community viability, compliance, by-catch
and discards and stewardship are best addressed through an 'argumentative process' of
interactive learning and stakeholder buy-in, which is another key aspect of governance (Jentoft
and Chuenpagdee 2009). These considerations provide opportunities to identify contextual
factors that influence successful outcomes and governing options.
The fish chain is an analytical and holistic framework that examines fisheries as coupled
social-ecological systems and that considers rebuilding problems as extending from 'oceans to
plate'. The conceptual framework is drawn from the interactive governance theory (Kooiman et
aI., 2005), which posits that fisheries are a relationship between natural and social systems
interconnected through three production stages: the pre-harvest, harvest, and post-harvest stages,
as shown in Figure 2.
Fishingregulatoryinsltllments
Figure 2: The fish chain framework includes vertical and horizontal linkages between the three
production stages (ovals), policy instruments (texts on the top) and stakeholder groups (texts in
the bottom box). Diagram adapted from Mikalsen and Jentoft (2001) and Bavinck el at. (2005).
At the pre-harvest stage, the focus is on understanding the marine environment, including
fisheries biology, life history migratory patterns, habitats, and ecosystems. Both bio-physical and
ecological factors and processes such as nutrient flow, temperature changes, currents, upwelling,
and predator-prey relationships are forefront in this stage. The harvest stage includes fish capture
and harvesting strategies, fishing fleets and fishing operations, by-catch and discards, dockside
value, as well as cost and earnings of fish harvesters. The post-harvest is the final stage in the
fish chain, concerning with various types of processing activities, coastal community inter-
linkages and labour markets, quality control, labeling standards, marketing strategies, and
distribution channels that spans local boundaries and across global markets.
The various production stages do not operate in isolation (Johnson et a/., 2005). They are
interconnected through formal and informal institutions as well as social networks and economic
organizations at multiple scales (Perry and Ommer 2003; Hartley 2010). Moreover, a mixture of
policy instruments is employed to govern the fish chain ranging, from conservation measures,
fishing regulations, stewardship incentives, international agreements, processing standards, and
marketing strategies. As shown in Figure 2, these instruments interact with ecosystems as well as
actors through socio-political arrangements that mediate governing outcomes. The stakeholders
along the chain are not fixed in one stage; they are interactive and may be dominant in one or
more production stages with varying levels of influence and power (Mikalsen and Jentoft, 2001).
Spanning multiple spatial and temporal scales, fish chains are highly diverse, complex,
and dynamic (Bavinck et af., 2005). As illustrated in Figure 2, the analytical framework is useful
for understanding rebuilding challenges by identifying key stakeholders and their networks,
policy instruments, contextual drivers, and governing interactions that may affect rebuilding
prospects along any of the production stages. Also a comparison of the cod fish chains pre- and
post-collapse provide opportunities to understand how changes (in marine ecosystems, policy
instruments, restructuring programs) affect cod fisheries rebuilding prospects and the viability of
fishing dependent coastal communities.
Findings on the comparative cod fish chain for the pre-harvest and harvest stages
The findings on the comparative fish chain analysis in the pre- and post-collapse periods are
presented in three sections based on key emerging themes in the pre-harvest and harvest stages:
a) scope of science and policy at the pre-harvest stage and consequences for stalled rebuilding;
b) changes in harvesting policies and their impacts on transitional livelihoods and
stewardship; and
c) institutional inertia, policy disconnects, and scale mismatches.
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Scope ofscience and policy and consequences for stalled rebuilding
The study findings revealed that the scope of science and policy-decision making towards
rebuilding is generally narrow, and thus has consequences for ecosystems restoration,
transitional livelihood programs, and community viability. There have been changes in marine
ecosystem structure, such as shifts in capelin predation rate and energy flow, from groundfish
predation in the pre-collapse period to cetaceans and seals in the post-collapse period (Savenkoff
et aI., 2007). These changes have implications on cod growth, recovery timeframe, and harvest
rates for fishing activities (Bundy et aI., 2009). Moreover, the lack of harvest decision rules for
setting rebuilding targets, and the continuing reliance on single species approach that ignores
ecosystem interactions, environmental changes, along with a high level of livelihood dependency
of fishers on marine resources, all contribute to inhibiting effective rebuilding. These, and the
implication for stewardship and livelihoods, are further discussed below.
Weakening role ofscience in policy decision-making
Key informants, in particular research scientists from government agencies and academia,
identified the current shortage of research funding and technical resources for undertaking
research on assessing resource status and ecosystems changes. The lack of technical resources
and staff further constrains the ability of scientists to play an appropriate role in fisheries
management. As exemplified by one key informant, a research scientist, decisions about fisheries
harvest rates, like the setting of the TACs, are no longer based on science, but have, instead,
become more political and ad-hoc:
The role of science has weakened [starting] in the 1960s and 1970s, not just in fisheries. I
think there was a movement that said that things would be better with scientific
verification. I still believe that, [but] government doesn't. Decision makers had to address
why they made their decisions based on science. The link became weaker between
science and decision making, maybe because of society. We used to have decision rules
in the 1970s and 1980s for setting the TACs based on the harvest rates. It was based on
Fo.1- fixed percentage of the biomass...That strategy worked quite well, but they
abandoned it [in the 1970s] through OFO and NAFO, they went to an ad hoc approach ... 1
think it was the wrong approach. Instead they sit around a table and debate as what the
TAC should be and that's what to do [to date].
[n addition, one key informant with experience in both state agency and conservation science
observed that the increased need to place scientific findings in the context of decision-making
and the mis-interpretation of science due to poor communication affects the role of science in
fisheries management:
... As a scientist, when you get familiar with the bureaucracy, you have to place the
science in the context of the decision making framework...1 hate it when communication
is filtered, misrepresented, undue control on the flow of information, I think that's simply
wrong from a societal perspective...
A fish harvester on the Northern Peninsula for instance complained that: "The government is not
putting enough money into it to try to fix things, to come up with stuff that I'm not thinking
abollt, like the Nordmore grid [by-catch exclusion devise], different grates for different
fisheries ... trying new ideas, like they are in [doing] in Norway and Iceland." These stakeholder
concerns point to the need for the best available science and an appropriate institutional
framework where science-policy debate is healthy and fruitful. With recent cutbacks in OFO
spending and the disbandment of the Fisheries Resources Conservation Council, there are
concerns that these challenges may persist with ramifications for fisheries rebuilding.
The limitations ofsingle species and challenges ofecosystem-based approaches
Several concerns were raised, by scientists, fishers, and policy makers alike, regarding the single
species approach to fisheries management and the challenges of implementing policies for
ecosystem-based management. One key informant, a senior research scientist at DFO, further
explained these challenges:
Ecosystem science is very complex .. We are going to have to invest in it. We are
collecting more data these days. The simplest interaction is cod, capel in, and seals.
Capelin is down, cod's down, seals are up, question is can we rebuild cod? Are there no
cod because there is no capel in? If we could isolate those interactions and have some
predictions, we might be able to influence decisions, but we can't even show the
interactions right now. If we tried to do it in a computer simulation, if we culled seals
20%, what would be the impact on capelin. We can't tell you. The models are so
dependent on the parameters ...These things aren't perfect. Scientific advice is single
species, based on assuming that these interactions don't happen. There's variability but
things are changing that much over time. Managers are not geared up to trading off
species ... You can't have MSY simultaneously.
In addition to challenges in implementing ecosystem-based approaches towards rebuilding, a
fishery research scientist also identified evolutionary change as a major limiting factor:
Fish evolved to live in the ecosystem for millions of years. Then we came along and
created a strong pressure. The fish changed to compensate for that. The debate is whether
it is due to genetic or phenotypic plasticity. Couple of papers says that it's an
evolutionary change- they are maturing younger, growing slower, and mortality is higher.
The overall impact is that they are less productive ... We've seen ecosystem changes, for
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example on the East Coast, capel in was much more dominant. Fish are less reproductive,
even harder to rebuild them. You've got to rebuild the life history...
This concern is supported by earlier studies done on Northern cod that reflected on evolutionary
changes on rates of maturity and life history traits (Olsen et 01., 2004). Such evolutionary
changes have implications for predator-prey relationship and for management measures in
setting harvest rules on cod prey (capel in). Some of these management dilemmas have been
addressed through a participatory process. A good example is the DFO's Regional Assessment
Process 10 for peer review, which allows stakeholders to provide inputs into policy decision-
making and deliberate on precautionary approaches for harvest decisions.
The move towards ecosystem-based approaches in the post-collapse period has led to
efforts towards stakeholder involvement and knowledge synthesis for marine conservation
policies. Because knowledge takes many forms, there is a need to integrate both formal and
informal knowledge systems, undertaking interdisciplinary scholarship, and participatory
research for decision-making (Neis and Felt 2000; Degnbol et aI., 2006). In the pre-collapse
period, local ecological knowledge was largely ignored in science and policy, because of top-
down management and poor stakeholder involvement. With the collapse of the fish stocks and
criticisms of scientific uncertainties in stock assessment, local knowledge and user participation
have become more important in rebuilding initiatives and in stewardship.
In this context, fish harvesters, in particular, suggested how their acquired traditional
ecological knowledge could be useful in stock assessment and tagging studies, and as part of
participatory and collaborative strategies. One key informant remarked on the relevance of
knowledge synthesis: "one of our biggest failures I think is to connect the two groups of people
that should be working together much more closely [fish harvesters and scientists]. With [their]
10 hllp://www.dlo-mpo.gc.ca/csas-sccs/process-proccssus/particip-elw.hlm last accessed May 28th 2011
two distinct sets of knowledge ... find[ing] more ways to mesh the two; if you don't mesh them,
you get this conflict all the time. You [can] develop better relationships in a mutual respect."
These participatory approaches in both science and policy have included fish harvesters'
collaboration on stock assessment through tagging and sentinel surveys, as well as in developing
conservation harvest plans. These efforts are crucial for trust and legitimacy and lead to
compliance and greater stewardship ethics, which are necessary prerequisites for rebuilding.
Related to participatory approaches in the Northern Gulf, the Large Ocean Management
Area (LaMA) program was mandated under the Oceans Act and the Oceans Strategy through an
Integrated Management program that adheres to precautionary principles, shared responsibility,
and for broader stakeholder involvement in ecosystem based management. The LaMA mandate
falls under the Gulf of St. Lawrence lntegrated Coastal Zone Management committee that was
formed in 1999. It involves a multi-level stakeholder team including federal and provincial
agencies (DFO, Parks Canada and DFA), the fishing industry, two Regional Economic
Development Boards in the Northern Peninsula (the Nordic Economic Development Corporation
and the Red Ochre Regional Economic Development Board), municipal governments, and civil
society groups. The achievements of the steering committee include identifying and mapping
ecological sensitive spots such as coral reefs, developing pilot projects for Integrated
Management plans in two communities (Blanchard and Wall 2009), holding annual forums and
policy deliberations (GNPFT 2006), conducting stakeholder workshops on issues scanning, and
forming institutional partnerships for resource management and collaborative governance 11.
These initiatives have potential for stakeholder input into future rebuilding strategies in
the region, as well as providing a platform for civic engagement on rebuilding strategies. To
date, there are concerns that the LaMA program may not get into the next phase of
II hltp://www.coaSlalplanniJ1!wnp.cal lasl accessed December 14th , 2011.
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implementing an integrated fisheries management plan, as budget cuts and strategic reviews will
affect the future implementation of these local programs.
The significance ofharvest decision rules and recove,y targets
According to Hutchings (2000), the lack of any criteria to monitor trends in the level of
vulnerability for marine commercial fisheries especially cod, may worked against achieving
conservation objectives and effective recovery. Successful stock recovery planning requires a
transition period for stocks to grow, and the use of harvest decision rules for monitoring stocks in
meeting target reference points (Wakeford et 01., 2009). These scientific procedures are critical
for monitoring recruitment and growth rates, and providing feedback response to stakeholders
and policy makers (Murawski 2011). Caddy and Agnew (2005) proposed two key indicators for
monitoring stock recovery: an increase in spawning stock biomass (SSB) to about 40%, and an
increase in mature biomass to about 75% of historical maximum sustainable yield (MSY) levels.
Stock assessment data by OFO (2010a) indicates that both the matured biomass of 3
year+ and SSB have declined from historical high in the pre-collapse periods in the 1980s to
historical lows in the post-collapse periods in the 1990s. Trends in SSB peaked in 1983 at about
378,000 tonnes and then gradually declined to 9,000 tonnes in 1993, prompting a complete
moratorium from 1994 to 1996 (Figure 3). In the post-collapse period, the SSB has slightly
increased and averaged about 38,000 tonnes (OFO 2005). This trend suggests that the stocks are
far from recovered to historical highs in the early 1980s prior to the collapse. Similarly, the total
3 year + biomass increased from 300,000 tonnes the mid 1970s to twice this amount in 1983, and
gradually reduced to about 26,000 tonnes in 1993 as shown in Figure 3. Since the first
moratorium in 1994 to 1996, the 3 year + biomass slowly increased to about 50,000 tonnes in
early 2000s, but declined steadily leading to the second moratorium in 2003. The 3 year +
biomass have steadily peaked up again from 2004, increasing to about 80,000 tonnes in 2008
(DFO 2010a).
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Figure 3: Trend in biomass estimates for Northern Gulf cod stocks based on DFO stock
assessment data and recovery indicators proposed by Caddy and Agnew (2005).
Interview responses from research scientists in both academia and state agencies concur that
there is a lack of harvest decision rules employed in setting target and limit reference points in
recovery planning in Canada. Unlike Canada, decision rule-based approaches and conservation
reference points are strictly adhered to for setting TACs and monitoring stock rebuilding points
in the US (Shelton and Rice 2002; Caddy and Agnew 2005). These policy measures in the US,
which are enshrined in the revised Magnuson-Stevens Act, are required to prevent overfishing
and rebuilding collapsed stocks. So far, these legal mandates have contributed to the rebuilding
of twenty one collapsed stocks from 2000 to 2010, including the Georges Bank haddock
(Melanogrammus aeglefenus), Atlantic Pollock (P. pollachius), and spiny dogfish (Squalus
acanthias) (NMFS 20 II). In addition to the biomass and MSY reference points, the Fish Stock
Sustainability Indicator is also used in the US as a performance measure to evaluate and monitor
fisheries rebuilding, in addition to dealing with equity and uncertainties (Hanna, 20 I0).
Northern Gulf cod was designated as threatened in 2003, and is now considered
endangered as of April 2010 by COSEWIC (DFO 2011). Recovery potential assessments on the
necessary scientific criteria and requirements for listing have been undertaken regarding
decisions to list the species as endangered and for subsequent recovery plans and strategies. A
conservation limit reference point has been estimated at 116, 000 tonnes, and the SSB has been
below this limit point since 1990 and stood at 16,000 tonnes in 2010 (DFO 2011).
According to Rice et al. (2003), the high levels of dependency on the fishery resource
and scientific uncertainties about stock abundance have provided justifications for ignoring
proposed harvest decision rules in the Canadian context. Key informants suggested that this is
due to the lack of broad-based governance approaches that barely consider diverse stakeholder
interests during agenda setting. An inclusive approach that considers avenues towards
precautionary approaches, effective harvest decision rules, transitional livelihood strategies, and
compliance by resource users are central to successful rebuilding.
Natural factors and management decisions interacting to stall rebuilding
Key informants identified both natural factors and human management decisions that have
inhibited the recovery transition and successful rebuilding. These include: i) poor recruitment
and growth rates and environmental changes; ii) continuous directed fishing for cod and for
capelin and herring that cod preys upon; and, iii) stock mixing and unregulated fishing concerns.
Scientific assessment of cod juveniles indicate that recruitment rates for Northern Gulf
cod stocks are below conservation reference points since the stocks collapse in the early 1990s
(Rice et at., 2003; DFO 2010a). Using the 3 year + cohorts as an index of recruitment, the stocks
have fluctuated from an estimated historical high of 206,000 tonnes in 1980 to a fluctuating and
steady decline to about 13,000 tonnes in 2008 (Figure 4).
~r-.,....,...,...~~IIIIIIIIIIII""U
Figure 4: Trend in 3 year + recruits of Northern Gulfcod (Source DFO 2010)
Many of the key informants, primarily fish harvesters and managers, expressed ambivalence
towards the recovery prospects of Northern Gulf cod fisheries. As one fish harvester in Rocky
Harbor observed: "I could see cod coming back [past years] ... but this year, for whatever reason [
don't know... there was some cod, but there was not the abundance that have been in the last
number of years ...and what did show up was in very poor condition". This observation is
corroborated with recent OFO findings on cod biology: " ... the mean length-at-age for older fish
and age and size at maturity remained at lower levels now than in the 1980s. Cod start maturing
at age 4 and the size at 50% maturity is currently about 45cm at age 5 (OFO 201 Oa: 3). This
reflects challenges with recruitment and growth rates, food availability, and cod biology. In
addition, Northern Gulf cod has experienced higher natural mortality from the mid 1980s to the
mid 1990s leading to stalled rebuilding (DFO, 2005). This poor growth rate has been partly
attributed to food availability and cold oceanographic conditions, which have had a negative
impact on growth, size and sexual maturity (OFO 20 lOa).
Furthennore, high fish exploitation rates from 1999 to 2002 have been identified as a
contributing factor to stalled rebuilding, with present exploitation rates "inconsistent with a
rebuilding strategy" (DFO 2010a: II). Moreover, there is high fishing pressure for commercial
fisheries that target capelin and herring on which cod preys. As noted by a key infonnant in
western Newfoundland where there is a significant commercial pelagic fishery: "I can't see how
stocks can recover when we are still fishing capelin and other stuff, how can the fishery recover
when we are destroying the very foundation for the fishery"
Related to recovery prospects are concerns about growth and recruitment overfishing.
Although some key infonnants including managers and fish harvesters are optimistic about long
term recruitment rates in the future, concerns were raised about the survival of small juvenile cod
that are often caught as by-catch in mixed fisheries or discarded because of their small size. For
these reasons, fishery scientists at DFO are now using a survival index to measure the rate of
successful recruitment and to use precautionary approach in setting harvest decision rules and
TAC quotas. Similarly, the concept of reproductive value of spawners has been used to
determine the level of viability of a population mainly for sedentary fish such as lobsters
(Rideout 2007).
The concerns listed above about population viability have led to policy recommendations
for protecting spawning areas in certain bays in western Newfoundland. One key infornlant, a
fish harvester in the 3Pn region around Port Aux Basques, underscored how closed areas and a
closed fishing season have been initiated and implemented by fishers around Bay St. George in
Port Aux Port Peninsula to protect spawners primarily for cod and halibut. DFO has additionally
implemented a seasonal closure to fishing from April 1st to June 15th (DFO, 2010a). These
initiatives call attention to the role of stakeholder involvement and participatory governance for
stewardship and local conservation initiatives. In the 4RS region in Quebec and western
Newfoundland, however, the use of gill nets is the biggest obstacle to protecting cod spawners.
According to one key informant, a fisheries manager:
One thing that concerned us a little while ago .. in 2007 and 2008, there were the largest
fish being landed in size since we monitored the stock in 1974. The reasons for that may
be the choice of gear; there is more and more gill net fishery .. [which] catches larger
[spawning] fish.
Whilst fish harvesters in the 3Pn region prefer using long lines and hooks, fish harvesters in the
4R region prefer gill nets. According to a fish harvester in the Port Aux Basques region who
fishes in 3Pn, "Hook and line is the safest way to catch fish and it is the best quality". Fish
harvesters in the 4R region on the other hand claimed that the stocks are already 'belly full' by
the time they migrate from 3Pn to 4R on their summer feeding migration. The stocks therefore
do not adequately respond to baits on lines or hooks, so they rather prefer gill net fishing as it is
most cost effective.
The migratory nature of the stocks and their possible mixing in other NAFO regions also
raise rebuilding challenges about the 'fit' of management boundaries to policy instruments, such
as effective harvest policies and fishing activities. Fish harvesters interviewed in the 3Pn region
were apprehensive about successful recovery due to the migration patterns of 4RS3Pn stocks and
on-going winter fishing activities in NAFO region 3Ps. Local fish harvesters and scientists agree
that the stock might have been 'hammered' during its winter migration and related possible stock
mixing around Burgeo and in other areas. Whereas the 20 I 0/ I I TAC was reduced to 2,000
tonnes in the 4RS3Pn region, the TAC in 3Ps was maintained at 11,500 tonnes despite the fact
that this TAC was not landed last year (DFO 2010c). Besides, these concerns contribute to the
legitimacy of fisheries management measures and power imbalances as discussed in Chapter V.
Part of this challenge has been addressed in the post-collapse period through seasonal and area
closures from mid November to April along the Burgeo Banks in 3Ps region (DFO, 20 lOa).
Other emerging concerns include developing habitat protection measures and residence
times for migratory stocks, the impact of oil and gas exploration and seismic activities on
habitats and stock behavior, coastal eutrophication, and invasive species such as Green Crab that
impacts habitats for juvenile cod (DFO 2011).
Changes in harvesting policies and impact on transitional livelihoods and stewardship
Rebuilding means different things to various stakeholder groups, adding to the complexity of
definitive outcomes, and the diverse expectations of what rebuilding brings forward. Whilst most
fisheries scientists and managers regard rebuilding in terms of stock recovery using biological
reference points; conservation biologists are more concern about improving biodiversity and
resiliency; and resource users and dependent coastal communities see rebuilding in ternlS of
secured livelihoods and the preservation of culture fishing for current and future generations.
An analysis of policies along the fish chain in the pre- and post-collapse era shows that
some policy changes have contributed to resource sustainability through better control and
surveillance mechanisms, as well as unintended consequences on livelihoods and community
viability. This highlights a contested viewpoint of what is been rebuilt and for whom. Rebuilding
is a wicked problem because of these multiple challenges within and beyond the pre-harvest
stage and harvest stages, and the domino effect on livelihoods and communities embedded along
the fish chain. As shown in Table I, key informants identified several changes in the pre-harvest
and harvest stages relevant to resource sustainability and having unintended consequences on
fishing livelihoods. These changes are further discussed under three key themes: i) by-catch and
multispecies concerns; ii) changes in access policies and its ramification on equity; and iii)
transitional livelihood and cultural heritage concerns.
Table 1: Changes in management policies relevant to understandingrebuilding barriers and opportunities
Policy measures
alon lhefishchain
Instilufional
mechanisms
By-catch concerns
Abllndance ofcod stocks and high predation
fiowfrom~oundfisheries.
No specific conservation measures for
ecological hotspots or sensitive habitats such
opolicyprocessandlegalmandaleforrisk
orvulnerabilit assessment
Misreporting, high grading, illegal and
unreported catch
trawlerfieets.
on cat~l· landings
inshorefieels.
Poor consideration towards regional or
communlt uotas.
Top down management and single species
approach.
Limited role forFFAW in shared stewardship
and conservation initiatives
High depcndencyon grollndfisheries in both
harvcstin and rocessin sectors.
Limited attempts at integrated livelihood and
rcionallannin initiatives.
Deplelionofcodstocksandalrophodynamic
shiftin redator-rerelationshi
LOMAeffortsinidentifyingecologicallyand
biologically sensitive areas and creating
rotecled areas or seasonal closures.
Enaclment of SARA and the role ofCOSEWIC
in the listin rocessofvulnerablesecies.
Dock-side landing and monitoring programs, in
additiontolo booksandvesselmonilorin.
by-cat~h species.
NorthemPeninsula.
involvcmcnt.
Low dependency on grollndfisheries as slocks
collased,lantclosures,andlossof·obs.
Greater emphasis on integrated management and
regional economic development throllgh the
creation of REDBs and other ro rams.
With the collapse of the groundfisheries, several stocks are regulated with by-catch regulations.
For example, there are current by-catch restrictions for cod in the directed turbot fishery. In
essence, compliance to by-catch limitations in multispecies fisheries is necessary for cod stocks
to grow and mature to healthy levels and to meet rebuilding targets without problems of
recruitment overfishing. The by-catch challenges were explained by a fish harvester in the Bonne
Bay region (4R):
We always had what was called a multispecies harvesting plan where .. back in the early
80's, if you went out and set your trawl and you had 200 pounds of flounder, 500 pounds
of cod fish, 300 pounds of halibut, you brought it all in. You take a pick up to the plant,
so the catch you made you would get. Now if you come in, Christ Almighty, ['m almost
afraid to come up around the wharf because DFO is going to charge me something.
Most of the key informants in various stakeholder groups in the fishing industry are aware of the
persistence of by-catch issues in both the pre- and post-collapse periods. The reasons for non
compliance to by-catch regulations vary by stakeholder groups and by regions in the Gulf of St
Lawrence. For instance, discards and by-catch are generally higher in the 4RS region where gill
net is predominant and lower in 3Pn region where hook and line is the main fishing gear. In the
3Pn region, fish harvesters have adopted a solely hook and line gear and constructed a museum
to promote this stewardship ethics in the region. Additionally, some fish harvesters suggested
initiatives towards landing and reporting by-catch without penalty, and more involvement in
conservation policies, recognizing that these issues affect their livelihoods and successful
rebuilding outcomes.
Changes in access policy and equity implications
The collapse of the ground fisheries brought in new access and allocation measures that
encourage output control measures such as individual transferrable quotas for shellfisheries,
enterprise combination policies, and access restrictions through the 1997 Professionalization Act.
Premised on core and non-core fish harvester categories, professionalization of the fishing
industry entails limiting access and entry based on level of dependency, years of fishing
experience, and enterprise ownership (Cashin 1993; GTA Consultants Inc 1993). A core fish
harvester is a full time, experienced enterprise owner with license(s) to fish key species such as
cod, crab, and shrimp who obtains 75% of his/her income earnings directly from fishing
activities. Others are considered non-core fish harvesters and would be mainly new entrants who
need to go through an initial Apprentice Program. Upon successful completion of this training,
the Apprentice Program leads to an advanced fishing Level I, then to Level II, and ultimately to a
core fish harvester level. The Professional Fish Harvesters Certification Board, created in 1997,
is mandated to provide training programs and courses to non-core members. Upon meeting
certain criteria and approval from DFO, core fish harvesters can sell their fishing enterprise or
transfer to a family member who is at Level II (Schrank, 2005). Non-core enterprises (Level I or
II), however, can neither be transferred nor sold. These policy changes were identified by several
key informants to have ramifications on stewardship ethics, distributional and intergenerational
equity especially on the question of 'rebuilding for whom', and the viability of fishing dependent
communities. One of the biggest changes identified by key informants especially fish harvesters
and managers was the rapid shift in target species from groundfisheries to shellfisheries, and
changes in processing infrastructure from labour intensive to mechanized infrastructures. As
shown in Table I, the post-collapse era has seen changes in access and allocation measures for
new market opportunities through a shift in target species to shellfisheries. What is more, key
infonnants in the fishing industry talked about new emerging markets in Europe and Asia that
hold promise for these new species with higher landed values and profit margins.
The increased harvesting rate of shellfisheries has raised many other concerns such as
those related to long term resource sustainability and the huge transformation in the processing
sector. The total shrimp landings in NL have increased from 20,000 tonnes in 1990 to 120,000
tonnes in 2008 (DFO 2010b). Similarly, total crab landings in the province increased from 8,500
tonnes in 1987 to 70,000 tonnes in 1999 (DFO 2010b). Further, from the perspective of
harvesters and processors benefiting from the shift to shellfisheries, cod recovery may reduce the
abundance of shrimp and crab, and jeopardize their incomes and profits. One key informant (a
plant manager) raised a major concern about the changes in harvesting and processing
infrastructure in the event of cod recovery:
...Well, we could not cope with that right here today [cod abundance], and neither could
any of the plants down the [west] coast because they are all shrimp. You would have a lot
of changes; someone would have to invest in [new] processing [for cod]. I have a
problem picturing what the cod fishery would look like if they were to come back.
Depending on how that transpires, that would determine if someone would build a
processing plant on shore. A lot of fishermen have retired since 1992; [the] thing is the
younger people are not interested. I think that ifcod comes back it should come back as a
hook and line fishery, and we should conduct it at the time of year when we can have
good production [value].
According to one key informant, a fisheries manager with DFO, the policy changes in target
species from groundfisheries to shellfisheries came with allocation changes as well. For instance,
in the post-collapse period and in the context of very small TACs for cod, most mobile gear
quotas were allocated to fixed gear inshore boats, especially in fishing dependent regions such as
the Great Northern Peninsula. As mentioned by one fisheries manager, these initiatives were
spurred by "The Dave Decker Plan", initiated by David Decker on behalf of the FFAW to
redistribute unused mobile offshore quotas to inshore fishers. However, most fish harvesters
interviewed in both 4R and 3Pn regions were uncertain about future stock abundance and
allocation measures in the event cod rebuilds to historical levels or shrimp quotas decrease
because of predator prey relationship.
As argued earlier, rebuilding is a wicked problem partly because solutions are
consequential with policy ramifications. This means that new problems can emerge from
program implementation of proposed solutions. In the case of professionalization, the new policy
change of restricting access, along with the high cost of fishing licenses, has made it almost
impossible to get new entrants or youths to enter the fishery. Additionally, the low economic
returns and the high levels of debts within the fishing industry and associated demographic
trends highlight intergenerational equity concerns related to who would benefit when the fishery
is rebuilt, and what species and stocks will exactly be rebuilt.
Transitional livelihood concerns, cultural heritage. and coastal community viability
The adjacency principle, based on the law of the sea and national constitutional mandate, is a
useful mechanism for administering territorial use rights and cultural claims for coastal
communities in Canada especially during rebuilding transition (DFO 2002b, 2004). The principle
provides justification for equitable allocation and access policies especially during restructuring,
transitional livelihood considerations from collapsed to rebuilt fisheries. A research analyst in St.
John's commented on the issue:
'[ think the adjacency principle is the key point but how do you operationalize it. That's
the trick, nobody has ever done that in this [rebuilding] context. .. the Americans have a
much more federalized system with regional management councils ... in the Philippeans,
the municipal level is where the action is. I'm not saying that is necessarily the best
approach. The fed government [in Canada] is in the drivers seat, but the people in the
regions have no say, they are disempowered, disenfranchised ... Most sectors you have
boards, boards where decisions are made transparently. The Minister makes decisions
that blow up in their faces because they have no mechanism to include communities. I
think that's a failure of bureaucrats, if you can't have communities interacting in a
rational way, we [society] have failed to provide politicians with that mechanism.'
Another issue raised by key informants linked to rebuilding prospects and community viability
was the annual recreational or food fishery. In the pre-collapse period, there was no restriction on
recreational fishing for cod and most families enjoyed sharing these cultural past times. After the
collapse, restrictions were imposed, with a limited catch of up to five fish a day and a maximum
of three people in a given boat. According to the 2007 Survey of the Recreational Fishery in NL
commissioned by DFO, about 161 tonnes of cod fish were caught in the 4R3Pn region in
Newfoundland in 2006, by 6,584 residents ranging from youth to seniors. The recreational
fishery, which lasts about five weeks in the summer, has limited surveillance and dockside
monitoring system in place, and has implications for food security, compliance, and cultural
heritage.
Using an inventory system of community food systems in the Bonne Bay region in
western Newfoundland for instance, Lowitt (2009) found strong cultural and social relevance of
the recreational fisheries to seafood security and fishing traditions. It also identified local
concerns along the supply chain, which mostly caters for global markets and pay less attention
for community needs and local marketing. According to provincial regulations in NL, fish
harvesters are not allowed to sell their catch directly to local residents or at the wharf, except to
fish buyers and processors who also need licenses to do so. This system creates problems in the
non-fishing season, when access to fish is only possible at retail stores and prices are far higher
because of handling and transportation costs (as discussed in Chapter IV).
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[n addition to the recreational food fishery and the community dimension to fish
marketing as discussed above, there are loss of livelihoods and concerns about distributional
equity during the rebuilding transition. According to the GNPFT (2006), about 50% of fish
harvesters and plant workers have lost their livelihoods since the cod fishery collapsed as shown
in Figure 5. This illustrates the interlinkages between the various production stages starting from
the pre-harvest stage to the harvest and post-harvest stages, and the ripple effects and changes it
produces along the entire production chain.
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FigureS: Socioeconomic impact of cod fisheriescollapseintheNorthernPeninsula
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The high level of dependency on the fishery resource for surviving harvesters and their
households, particularly in recent years due to the absence of transitional livelihood programs
have implications for the successful achievement of rebuilding targets. This was underscored by
one key informant, a senior fisheries manager with DFO: "the short term consequence [of
rebuilding] is immediate with dramatic impacts on communities that are socially and
economically dependent on fisheries. Without a transition plan, [there is] real economic and
social hardship."
According to one key informant, a fisheries manager, emerging bottom-up governance
initiatives in the post-collapse period including regional quota allocation have been identified as
a unique model to address equity and livelihood concerns, as well as a stimulus for regional
economic development as discussed in Chapter V. These governing arrangements could be better
situated to deal with the wicked rebuilding challenges especially in the pre-harvest and harvest
stages, as stakeholders are interested in stewardship initiatives and share responsibility. In
addition to developing initiatives towards livelihood transition strategies, institutional
partnerships and addressing intergenerational equity concerns and the question of 'rebuilding for
whom' are central to rebuilding success.
Institutional inertia, policy disconnects, and scale mismatches
The fish chain framework and key informant responses highlight concerns around adequate
institutional mechanisms for fisheries rebuilding in addition to policy coherence across the
various production stages. As discussed earlier, the lack of a rebuilding plan that details targets
and harvest control rules in the Fisheries Act and SARA demonstrates serious shortcomings and
institutional inertia towards rebuilding success. Developing rebuilding plans and harvest control
rules as mandated under the revised Magnuson-Stevens Act, in addition to participatory
governance mechanisms are crucial for community and livelihood transitional challenges. These
community dimensions have been central to the success of stock rebuilding in the US and for
implementing catch share programs (Wakeford et al., 2009; Ecotrust, 20 II).
Despite the collapse of the groundfisheries in eastern Canada, which resulted to the
largest layoff in Canadian history, no legal or constitutional changes have been made to the
Fisheries Act to accommodate fisheries rebuilding or transitional challenges in ecosystem or
livelihood transitions (Hutchings 2010). Moreover, the institutional design of the fishing industry
in NL has evolved over the past centuries to include policy disconnects between the federal and
provincial governments, as well as the harvesting and processing sectors (Kirby 1982; Storey
1993; Schrank 2005). Issues of constitutional power and agency have historically been central in
the debate, with current arguments about blame, accountability, and responsibility (Hutchings et
aI., 1997; Cadigan 2004). According to the Office of the Auditor General's Report on the
Environment and Sustainable Development: "the [federal] government must decide how access
will be divided among the various stakeholders who have claims on the resources ... [and] must
take account of principles of equity and constitutional protected rights, such as the Supreme
Court ruling that allowed some Atlantic fisheries to be used by Mi'kmaq and Maliseet First
Nations" (OAG, 2011: p. 10).
The SARA enacted in 2003 (Irvine 2005), is also not well suited to listing commercial
species, as reflected in the debate about COSEWIC's recommendation for listing (Hutchings and
Festa-Bianchet 2009). In the case of marine fisheries, it is the joint responsibility of three federal
agencies, namely DFO, Parks Canada, and Environment Canada. For a species to be recovered
under the SARA mandate, the species has to be listed based upon recommendations on the level
of vulnerability by an independent panel of experts - the Committee on Status of Endangered
Wildlife in Canada (COSEWIC). COSEWIC recommendation to list Northern Gulf cod stocks
was disputed on the grounds of negative socioeconomic implications for fishing dependent
communities and fishing livelihoods (DFO 2005). Conversely, the non-listing of cod as an
endangered species has consequences for the livelihoods of cod-dependent coastal communities
and for long-term recovery prospects. A research scientist commented on the issue:
Cod will never be listed. No fisheries department will ever list cod. I think that's ok.
COSEWIC is going to assess cod again, I have no idea what the assessment will look
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like. Some people say it is never going to be listed ...The fact that it will never get listed,
that's OK from a science communication perspective. It helps to put it to public
[scrutiny]. ..DFO can and should be held accountable.
Three scenarios and associated recovery plans have been proposed through SARA for listing
Atlantic cod stocks following cost benefit analyses. These include: a) no direct fishery with some
allowable by-catch; b) prioritized rebuilding with 50% by-catch; and c) maximum rebuilding
with a zero by-catch (DFO 2005). These proposed listing scenarios have implications for the
recovery of fish stocks, lost revenue, and livelihood opportunities. According to OFO (2010b),
sustainable harvesting methods and gear use policy through eco-certification are central for
rebuilding and market access, although none of these measures have been enacted to
accommodate the stalled rebuilding for cod. Sustainable harvesting practices and eco-Iabeling
considerations may promote support from conservation campaigns such as Sea Choice and David
Suzuki through consumer awareness campaigns.
The lack of inclusion decision-making and difficulties with legislative changes was
identified by the Fisheries Resources Conservation Council of Canada as barriers to rebuilding:
"the top down prescriptive nature of the Species at Risk Act [which], will largely remove industry
from participation in management of the resource, and will counter initiatives towards
stewardship and co-management. Governance and management will also be considerably aided
by modernization of the Fisheries Act" (FRCC 2011: 5). A senior research scientist further
lamented on the shortfalls of the SARA process:
There was no long term evaluation [for recovery]; no value was placed on non-use. I'm
concerned about species without [non] economic value; by-catch is still an issue.. .The
government will not list any species with economic benefit. They nuked it, they blew it
up. That would have been a positive way. Instead they said they are going to deny every
listing. If they had accepted the cod stock as threatened, they would have put in a timeline
for recovery. But instead, they said no, we're going to go [along with] this Cod Action
Team. They never considered the trade offs. That would have been extremely positive,
but instead they created a smoke screen. Read the report it's just nothing, totally useless.
There's no rebuilding plan for the cod stocks currently. We're still doing it year by year.
Take as much as you can this year, we'll worry about next year when it comes. Without a
plan, I don't think we are going to rebuild these stocks, unless nature gives us a miracle.
To date, there is no rebuilding plan, implementation strategies and timelines. Moreover,
rebuilding initiatives in SARA have not been properly linked and coordinated with the Oceans
Act, especially for Integrated Management and in providing transitional and integrated livelihood
strategies with eco-tourism (see CURRA 2010). Key informants identified these shortcomings as
opportunities for institutional innovation and stakeholder partnerships for rebuilding by taking
into consideration integrated management. Municipal leaders and regional planners interviewed
also showed interest in participating in fisheries rebuilding initiatives at the local community
level. A discussion with a fish harvester in Bonne Bay on who should participate underscored the
role of community representation and the need for inclusiveness: "Yeah, a lot of community
leaders would sit in, not only for the fishery, but then the fishery is going to hold your
community together."
Furthermore, some study participants identified disconnects and scale mismatch between
resource management boundaries, livelihood activities, and jurisdictional boundaries.
Understanding the causes and consequences of the mismatch of management systems in relation
to ecological processes, institutional linkages, and fit across jurisdictional boundaries have been
the focus of attention in recent decades (see Young 2002; Cumming et at. 2006; Wilson 2006;
Ekstrom and Young, 2009). Scale matching of institutional mechanisms to ecosystem and
socioeconomic boundaries are essential for resilience, social learning, lower transaction costs,
adaptive capacity, and participatory decision-making that may lead to effective rebuilding. In the
case of the Northern Gulf cod fisheries, this is even more so with knowledge gaps on stock
migration patterns, and fishing activities within and outside the 4RS3Pnjurisdictionai boundary.
A senior fisheries manager in Ottawa commented on the issue of scale-matching and
local involvement: "We are really talking about nested problems and nested scale [solutions] ..
the top-down management models work at the scale that they are good at working at [national
and regional]. They cause havoc at the finer scales. The bottom-up [approach] is not good at
working at large-scale problems ...This is a classic problem." This comment calls attention to the
relevance of context in rebuilding planning and implementation. Another key informant, a
regional economic development officer, pin pointed the problem on too many administrative
jurisdictions and socioeconomic boundaries that are not well coordinated and span across
municipal, provincial and federal mandates with little collaboration. For example, within the
Northern Peninsula in western Newfoundland, there are two REDBs, several municipalities, and
fishing cooperatives, in addition to several provincial and federal government agencies with
limited institutional structure for communication and interaction. To deal with these concerns,
key informants, predominantly inshore fishers, mayors, and community planners suggested a
larger role for municipal and regional involvement through bottom-up approaches.
Most key informants supported the need for participatory governance and for nested
institutions appropriate for different scales of governance in dealing with management
challenges and addressing equity concerns. According to a retired civil servant:
' .... put as much responsibility as possible on a localized idea. [fyou don't do that, if you
manage a fishery from a region, all the problems bubble up to that level. The higher up
they go, the more difficult it is to solve it, remoteness of the problem [emphasis added].
[At] a political level, you don't get a solution, the manager of fisheries and oceans
Canada doesn't have a good handle on what is happening in Rose Blanche [a fishing
community]. .. the more authority you have, the more accountability [you give].'
Summary and policy implications
By conceptualizing fisheries as a wicked problem, a fish chain approach helps identify
challenges and opportunities across the entire production chain. The comparative analysis in the
pre-harvest and harvest stages identified five key rebuilding challenges: i) ecological constraints
in growth and recruitment, predator-prey relationships, and lack of multispecies considerations;
ii) high exploitation rates, along with inadequate research on harvest control rules and stock
migration patterns; iii) poor focus on integrated livelihood programs and transition models that
could foster community involvement and stewardship; iv) professionalization impacts on youths
and concerns about intergenerational equity; and v) institutional inertia and lack of policy
initiatives for collaboration and to influence successful rebuilding. Recent estimates and
projections in achieving stock recovery are dire, and if present fishing conditions and
productivity continues, the population is expected to increase in the short term but subsequently
falls down to 2010 level (15% of the limit reference point) by the year 2046 (DFO 2011).
This pre- and post-collapse analysis of the two stages of the Northern Gulf cod fish chain
indicates that rebuilding is very challenging due to the complexity of fisheries ecosystems and
the mixed results of policy changes that are both beneficial and detrimental. As shown in Table
I, changes in management measures due to stock collapse in the pre-harvest stage illustrate that
rebuilding is not only about the natural systems; somewhat the socioeconomic and institutional
dimensions are also central to rebuilding success. There was a general agreement amongst key
informants that coastal fishing communities are strongly dependent on fisheries and that the
fisheries are in tum dependent upon these coastal communities for local stewardship. However,
key informants cited many examples of how coastal communities have been marginalized and
poorly represented in the fisheries restructuring and rebuilding decision-making. For example,
restructuring programs in the early 1990s were ineffective because they ignored linkages to
community development on the Northern Peninsula (Holland el at., 1999). An OECD 2007
Report drew attention to shortfalls in restructuring and the need for institutional partnerships and
scale-matching: "what is clear from Canada's experience is that fisheries departments alone will
not have the answers, and success will require a whole governance approach that includes
partnering with community stakeholders. Solutions will remain costly and require significant
long-term planning and flexibility to be successful. .. " (Ruseski 2007: 73). [n addition to
livelihood issues, there are current challenges with scale matching of fishing activities relative to
jurisdictional boundaries, and stock migration patterns. These challenges provides opportunities
for knowledge synthesis, social learning opportunities amongst stakeholders, and developing
adaptive capacity and feedback strategies for better outcome. There are diverse stakeholder
interests along the fish chain, with limited opportunities for broader agenda setting and
stakeholder inputs into decision-making especially on stewardship, allocation mechanisms,
livelihood options, and other community viability concerns. This implies that fish chains require
a high level of coordination across the various production stages and effective institutions that
match their mandates at various governing scales.
Drawing from international experience, the success of the US rebuilding programs for
four species are attributed to legal and institutional mandates under the revised Magnuson
Stevens Act, robust scientific process, and policy development that is inclusive and sensitive to
stakeholders and regional and local contexts (Wakeford el at. 2009; MFS 2011). The various
Acts (Fisheries Act, Oceans Act, and SARA) and corresponding federal-provincial policy
initiatives could lead to far more successful outcomes with stronger institutional linkages and
policy coherence across the fish chain. Moreover, changes in management policy such as by-
catch measures and area closures that recognize stakeholder inputs may get buy-in and
compliance as demonstrated in the 3Pn region in southwest Newfoundland.
The challenges identified using this approach and according to key stakeholders are
opportunities for the development of better governing options through institutional partnerships,
effective transitional programs, and interactive communication. Because fisheries rebuilding
involves multiple spatial, temporal and governance dimensions; stakeholder deliberations on
trade-offs between long term gains and short term costs could highlight the imperative to explore
governing options and transition livelihood opportunities.
In conclusion, defining fisheries rebuilding as a wicked problem provides opp0l1unities to
better understand and address the multifaceted concerns along the entire fish chain. Paying
attention to cod stocks and multispecies interactions, transitional livelihood programs,
institutional mechanisms for stakeholder buy-in and compliance, and scale matching, are
essential requirements for shared stewardship and rebuilding success.
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Chapter IV: A Fish Chain Analysis of Wicked Rebuilding Problems: Harvest
and Post-harvest Stages of the Northern Gulf Cod Fisheries
Introduction 12
Northern Gulf cod fisheries found in the Gulf of St. Lawrence bordering Quebec and
Newfoundland collapsed in the early 1990s. Despite many rebuilding initiatives and changes in
management measures, stock assessments indicate there has been no significant increase in the
abundance of Northern Gulf cod stocks. Furthermore, there are ongoing challenges threatening
the viability of the fishing industry in this region and elsewhere in Newfoundland and Labrador
(NL). [ discussed in Chapters I to III that these challenges are complex and multifaceted and
rebuilding collapsed fisheries should be understood as a particularly wicked problem. I argue that
the usual stock recovery approach employed in fisheries management is insufficient to deal with
the challenges associated with the wicked problem of Northern Gulf cod rebuilding. This is due
to constraints in raw material supply, multispecies interactions, political economy issues relating
to fish trade, eco-certification, economic viability, poor institutional response, and lack of
stewardship incentives.
In this chapter, I examine how changes in seafood production in the harvest and post-
harvest stages of the fish chain have affected local rebuilding prospects and the long-term
socioeconomic viability of Northern Gulf cod fisheries and dependent communities. I do so by
first reviewing literature on theoretical developments on fisheries management and supply chains
to discuss the relevance of a fish chain approach in understanding seafood production and
rebuilding prospects. Next, drawing on the fish chain framework and focusing on the harvest and
12A short version of this chapter has been published: Khan, A.S. 2010. A market chain analysis of Northern Gulf
cod fisheries pre-and post-collapse: Implications for resource sllstainability and economic viabil ity.ln: IIFET(Eds)
Proceedings ojthe Internationallnstiflltejor Fisheries Economic and Trade. IIFET, Montpellier. pp 1-12.
post-harvest stages, I undertake a market analysis of seafood production in both the pre- and
post-collapse periods to examine rebuilding challenges and opportunities.
Seafood is currently the most traded commodity internationally, with global exports
exceeding 100 billion in 2009 (FAO 2010a). Fish landings and seafood trade has increased to
nearly 40% in the past few decades, with approximately 80% of wild captured fish stocks fully
exploited or overexploited (FAO 2010b). This current status of global fisheries raises concerns
for biodiversity conservation, seafood trade, and food security (Pauly et aI., 2005; Smith et aI.,
20 I0; Srinivasa et aI., 20 I0). Fishing affects marine food webs (Pauly et al., 1998); especially as
large predatory stocks are fished out, raising the possibility of cascade effects and regime shifts
(Frank et al., 2005; Savenkoff et aI., 2007). In this circumstance, demand for crustaceans, which
are lower down the food web, could affect resource sustainability and economic returns
particularly in the absence of appropriate policy measures (Hannesson 2002).
Before the collapse of the groundfisheries in the early 1990s, Canada ranked second
globally as a seafood exporter following the US (DFO 2008a; FAO 2009). Total landings and
dockside value in 1988 were about 1.7 million tonnes and 1.6 billion CAD, respectively 13. In
2006, after the groundfisheries collapse, landings decreased to around 1.1 million tonnes, with a
total production value estimated at 4.2 billion CAD, placing Canada in the sixth place after
China, Norway, Thailand, US, and Denmark (DFO 2008a). About two thirds of the total catch is
currently landed in Eastern Canada, comprising mostly shellfish and small pelagic and NL
contributed about a quarter of the landings in 2006 (DFO 2008a).
Total production value of all fisheries in NL increased to about one billion CAD in 1999,
and fluctuated between 900,000 CAD in 200 I and 1.2 billion CAD in 2004. However,
13 Department or Fisheries and Oceans Statistics: httD:l/www.dro-mpo.l!c.ca/stals/commercial/land-
(kbarglsum/sum8891-eng.htm accessed July 20th, 2010.
production value declined to 830,000 CAD in 2009 14, due to global fluctuations in fish price,
especially for shrimp (DFO 2008a). According to the 2010 Seafood Industry Review, total
production value in 20 I0 for both wild capture fisheries and aquaculture reached 942,000 CAD.
The Northern Gulf fisheries in western Newfoundland contributed nearly 12% of the
production value in 2004 (GNPFT 2006). Stakeholders in the Northern Gulf region are
concerned about future economic returns from the fisheries, because of poor resource access,
macroeconomic drivers, and changes in fisheries policies to accommodate global seafood market
trends (GNPFT, 2006). Related to this is the red listing of Atlantic Canadian cod products by
SeaChoice, a group of Canadian environmental conservation group that promotes marine
stewardship and consumer awareness 15.
Conceptual approaches to marketing and international seafood trade have primarily
focused on supply chain management and value addition of fishery products (Thorpe and Bennet,
2004), and less so on resource sustainability or stock rebuilding (see Folkert and Koehorst, 1997;
Gudmundsson et at., 2006). In the case of rebuilding collapsed fisheries, there has been little
emphasis on the interlinkages between ecosystems, resource sustainability, economic viability,
and the role of institutions in rebuilding (OECD, 20 I0). Using the fish chain approach (Bavinck
et aI., 2005), this chapter examines the interactions in cod seafood production, focusing on the
harvest and post-harvest stages and their implications for economic viability and rebuilding
prospects. I used a seafood market analysis that examines catch statistics, cost and earnings data,
and trade flows; combined with key informant's perspectives on changes in supply chain
organization and institutional mechanisms in both the pre- and post-collapse periods.
14 Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture, Seafood Industry Year in Review·
http://www.fishaq.oov.nl.ca/publications/yir 2009.pdfaccessedJune 1,2010.
15 Seafood choice red listing of Atlantic Canadian cod prodUC1S:
http://www.seafoodsource.com/ncwsarticlcdclail.aspx.!id=4"J94990J65 accessed June 1,2010.
Literature review and theoretical developments on governing fish chains
The theoretical approaches to understanding the biological and economic interactions of the
fishing industry have evolved from a static Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model (Gordon 1954;
Schaefer 1954), to include dynamic optimized models and multispecies approaches (Clark 2006).
This theoretical review and developments are relevant to understanding rebuilding challenges
and opportunities as the biological and economic disciplines have had a long-standing influence
on fisheries management and policy.
The key contribution of the fishery bioeconomic model lies in its ability to assist in
predicting resource use strategies and net economic benefits through time. The Gordon-Schaefer
model assumes that annual total cost (TC) is proportional to fishing effort (E) and that annual
total revenue (TR) is also assumed to be proportional to annual catch or yield (Y). The maximum
sustainable yield (MSY), as shown in Figure I (left hand side), is a conservation reference point
in fisheries management and fundamental in setting harvest rates and rebuilding targets. The
bioeconomic model predicts that in a common pool unregulated or poorly managed fishery, E
will increase to a point where TC equals TR, referred to as bionomic equilibrium (BE), where
rents are totally dissipated. The sustainable resource rent from the fishery is the difference
between TR and TC. (Clark 1990). As shown in Figure 1 (left hand side), increasing fishing
effort beyond E2 at the MSY level will lead to both economic and biological overfishing. It is
argued that lower fishing effort below MSY such as at E 1 provides higher rents at MEY and also
promotes conservation goals. In addition, harvesting at a higher rate than the natural growth or
replenishment rate would lead to overfishing and stock collapse. Therefore, sustaining the
resource and maintaining profits in the longer-term implies keeping harvest rates at levels such
that the growth rate is higher than the harvesting rate.
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Figure I: Static Gordon-Schaererbioeconomic model orfisheries(Gordon, 1954)
Similarly, the provision of fishing subsidies from governments to the fishing industry especially
in capital-intensive fisheries will lead to higher participation and increases fishing effort from E)
to E4 as shown in Figure I (right hand side). This corresponds to a shift from BEl to BE 2 thus
leading to further negative consequences for resource sustainability and economic viability.
Copes (1970) built upon this theoretical model to incorporate a decision-making component
within the context of supply and demand, and potential externalities to the environment.
Economic theory predicts that changes in demand and supply will affect the quantity produced
and hence shift the equilibrium price, assuming that the product is not easily substituted and that
price is elastic. As shown in Figure 2 (left hand side), as fishing increases because of high
demand from D 1 to D 2, the quantity produced will first increase from QI up to the MSY level,
and then decline to Q2, with corresponding changes in price from PI to P2. In this context, the
long-run supply curve for fisheries may be backward bending owing to the biological constraints
on growth and reproduction, and the common pool nature of fisheries (Copes 1970). This is due
to the social-ecological nature of fishery systems which are highly susceptible to both human-
induced and natural shocks and uncertainties (Smith et al., 20 I0). This scenario is unique to
seafood production compared to agri-commodities, because of their common pool nature and, in
some cases, their highly migratory behavior.
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Figure 2: Backward bending fish supply chains (adapted from Copes, 1970)
In theory, fish supply chains in well governed fisheries should not be backward bending, as
fishing effort will be regulated and monitored relative to natural growth rates. Copes (1970)
suggested several institutional mechanisms that could be used to avoid collapse and the
dissipation of economic rent; including restricting fishing effort, raising taxes, as well as using
marketing initiatives to deal with price fluctuations and product substitution. Institutional
mechanisms and support for rebuilding initiatives are thus essential to restore resource supply to
its previous MSY level as shown in Figure 2 (right hand side).
These bioeconomic considerations are essential for both theoretical development and
methodological approaches towards rebuilding. In addition, fish stocks, like many other
renewable natural resources, are regarded as natural capital that is capable of yielding a stream of
benefits to society through time (Munro and Sumaila, 2002). 'Investments' in natural capital
such as stewardship and institutional mechanisms for better management and compliance can
lead to sustained economic returns. 'Disinvestment' in natural capital through activities such as
overfishing or high-grading can affect resource sustainability and lead to collapse and economic
loss (Sumaila et al., 2010a). Furthermore, improvements in fishing technology during periods of
collapse may lead to an increase in 'catchability', thus allowing fleets to target vulnerable
discrete remaining stocks thereby limiting early recovery (Mackinson et al., 1997).
In addition, varying discount rates affect the level of investments in natural capital, with
recent research recommending greater attention to intergenerational considerations (Sumaila and
Walters, 2005). High discount rates and unregulated access signify support for immediate
benefits over future gains. This affects the effectiveness of conservation policies, especially for
long-lived species with low intrinsic growth rates. However, rebuilding policies that place
emphasis on long-term benefits at the expense of short term gains are often opposed by the
fishing industry. For example, quota reduction has been resisted in several rebuilding efforts in
New Zealand (Clark 2006), as well as in Canada and the US (Khan and Neis, 20 I 0). Low
discount rates and regulated access have been major policy measures used to promote the
conservation of many long-lived species, especially groundfisheries and whale populations
(Clark, 1990). Conservative discount rates also provide incentives to invest in fisheries
rebuilding as bigger fish sizes and species abundance could yield higher profits (Grafton et aI.,
2007; Asche and Smith, 2010). Size and abundance are not the only factors that affect profits;
value-addition could playa key role in revenue generation (van der Schans et al., 1999).
Both supply and seafood value chains involve numerous institutions, stakeholder groups,
diverse species and product types with the potential to affect rebuilding and economic viability
(FAO 2010b). Supply chains for seafood are among the most complex and dynamic of food
chains (Bavinck et al., 2005). Their complexity increases as the scale of seafood production and
trade becomes global in scope (UNEP 2009; FAO 20 lOb). On-going efforts and initiatives to
sustain global seafood trade have involved many partnerships and collaborations amongst
stakeholder groups and institutions. These include the promotion of corporate social and
ecological responsibility through sustainable fishing practices, fair trade rules, quality control,
and chain of custody rules. Some of these institutional mechanisms have greatly influenced
fisheries sustainability through seafood trade policies, eco-certification, and potential price
premiums (Smith et aI., 20 I0). Although there are emerging discussions on market power
(Anderson, 2008), regulatory capture and lobbying power (Sutinen, 2008), in addition to
consumer buying power (Guillen, 20 I0); little research has been done on power relations along
fish chains and their potential role in rebuilding fisheries (see Chapter V).
Power relations and the political economy of seafood trade have been a topic of debate
due to the current status of global fish stocks, the persistence of trade distorting and capacity
enhancing subsidies, human welfare issues, and tariffs and other trade barriers (Sumaila et aI.,
2007; Nielsen 2009; Ashe and Smith 20 I0). Efforts to understand consumer choice and eco-
certification schemes are all necessary for designing institutional mechanisms for sustainable
seafood trade (Wessells et aI., 2001). Traceability and mislabeling (Jacquet and Pauly 2008),
ruu fishing, and high seas biodiversity concerns have been shown to affect resource
sustainability and economic returns (Sumaila et aI., 2010b). These concerns have led to calls for
ecosystem-based approaches and adaptive management that acknowledge uncertainties and risks
in fishery systems (FAO, 1995; Charles 1998; Armitage et al., 2009). In summary, the governing
challenges involved in seafood production especially when attempting to rebuild collapsed
fisheries necessitate a move towards holistic approaches that integrate ecosystem considerations
and supply chain governance.
Methodology
Fish chain approach
As highlighted in Chapters II and Ill, the fish chain approach incorporates the linkages between
marine ecosystems, raw material supply, economic viability, supply chain actors and the role of
institutions (Bavinck et aI., 2005). The fish chain focuses on three production stages and their
interactions: pre-harvest (marine ecosystems), harvest (fishing operations), and post-harvest
(processing, retail, and consumption), as illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3: The fish chain showing linkages between production stages and the flow of goods and
services (Bavinckelal., 2005)
Fish chains for commercial species such as cod consist of multi-scale interlinkages and
stakeholder interactions in the global seafood marketplace. The chain is not only horizontal in
scope, but encompasses vertical inter-linkages through key actors, social networks and policy
instruments. The analytical framework integrates ecosystem-based approaches and institutional
mechanisms through a suite of instruments that shape stakeholder strategies and consumer
behavior for successful governing outcomes (Kooiman el al., 2005; Thorpe et al., 2005). These
instruments include, amongst others, conservation measures, fishing regulations, international
agreements, subsidies, taxes, voluntary measures, access rights, consumer awareness and
infonnation measures.
External factors such as trade liberalization and globalization may affect various aspects
of the fish chain and affect rebuilding. Additionally, the options for policy changes along the fish
chain are mediated by historical context such as institutions, power relations, leadership,
innovation and decision-making strategies. The next section provides a market analysis of
Northern Gulf cod production, emphasizing how raw material access, economic viability, supply
chain organization and institutional mechanisms have affected rebuilding prospects.
Seafood market analysis
A seafood market analysis was conducted for both the pre- and post-collapse periods for the
Northern Gulf cod and related fisheries in western Newfoundland. The analysis examines trends
in landings, data on costs and earnings by fleet types, trade flows across international markets,
supply chain organization, and institutional mechanisms for rebuilding collapsed fisheries. The
analysis aims to determine factors that have and are affecting economic viability and rebuilding
prospects in this region; focusing on the harvest and post-harvest stages of the Northern Gulfcod
fish chain. It also seeks to understand key drivers affecting harvest rates and resource supply,
processing requirements and consumer markets for various seafood products. Unlike most
seafood market analysis that focuses on both investment and profitability for finns (Moore et at.,
1993; KPMG 2004), or costs and earnings for individual boat owners and fleets (DFO, 1985,
2007a), the approach in this chapter combines both financial and economic considerations.
For the first step of this seafood market analysis, an archival and document analysis was
undertaken drawing on existing documents, policy and legal statutes, statistical information on
landings and value, seafood market reports, scientific research on stock status, and government
commissioned reports on fishing policy. The review and synthesis focused on trends in fish
landings, infonnation on predator-prey relationships, price and landed value, fleet operations,
policy changes, costs and earnings, price-setting mechanisms, consumer preference, retail
markets, and trade flows.
The second phase of the research involved a set of semi-structured interviews with fifty
key infonnants from diverse stakeholders groups located along the fish chain. Unlike other
research techniques that rely on statistical or econometric analysis (e.g. Roy et 01.,2009), the key
informant interviews in this study focused on understanding stakeholders' perceptions of policy
processes, marketing opportunities, organizational and decision-making approaches relevant to
rebuilding. The interviewees were identified through the literature and document analysis, as
well as through snow-ball sampling techniques with stakeholders along the fish chain.
The interview questions focused on several key issues associated with the harvest and
post-harvest stages of the fish chain. Notably raw material access, allocation measures, spatial
scale of organizations, harvesting and processing policies, marketing chains, distributional
networks, and institutional mechanisms. The key informants included six main groups of
stakeholders with each key informant having a minimum of 20 years experience within the
fishery to ensure adequate knowledge of the fishery prior to and after the collapse. These groups
included: seven scientists and fisheries managers; twelve fish harvesters; eight entrepreneurs
engaged in the processing and retail sectors; seven municipal and community planners; ten
bureaucrats and other decision-makers at different organizational levels including within the
federal and provincial governments, industry, and inter-governmental organizations; and six
research analysts from the consulting, academic, and the media. The results include quantitative
and statistical data gathered from scientific research and trade reports, in addition to insightful
accounts from key informants along the fish chain on developments, opportunities, and
challenges for rebuilding in the harvesting, processing and marketing portions of the fish chain.
Findings
The findings on the changes in the marketing stages of the Northern Gulf fish chain (harvest and
post-harvest stages) are provided in four sections to illustrate rebuilding challenges and
opportunities. These include: i) changes in raw material access; ii) changes in the marketing
chain regarding supply chain organization; iii) changes in the marketing chain regarding
economic viability; and v) institutional changes and policy options.
Changes in raw material access pre- and post-collapse
The current total allowable catch for Northern Gulf cod stocks is 2,000 tonnes, which is 2% of
the historical maximum attained in the early 1980s. A pre- and post-collapse analysis of stock
assessment data, ecosystem models, and policy documents revealed ecological constraints for
cod population viability and raw material access in the post-collapse periods (Morissette et aI.,
2009; OFO 20 lOb). These ecological constraints were corroborated by key infonnants who
identified the following key concerns for resource abundance and raw material access: i) on-
going fishing activities for cod and other small pelagics such as capelin on which cod feeds; ii)
increasing natural mortality due to predation from seals; iii) seismic activities in the gulf that
might affect cod habitat and population viability; iv) concerns about by-catch and discard rates
from other fisheries such as turbot; and v) institutional inertia and poor stewardship incentives
for cod rebuilding.
The cod stocks have failed to rebuild and are currently assessed below conservation limit
reference points (OFO 2010b). As discussed in Chapter III, the lack of institutional mechanisms
for decision control rules and rebuilding targets for collapsed stocks have the potential to
exacerbate rebuilding timeframes. These shortcomings are not well-communicated to stakeholder
groups and are essential for public acceptance and buy-in especially on conservation measures
and lower TACs. Regarding stewardship initiatives for stock rebuilding and resource access,
some key infonnants mostly fish harvesters in the 3Pn region identified policy measures that
have been implemented to protect spawning as well as juvenile cod. Most of the fish harvesters
interviewed on the southwest coast recommended using only hook and line gear for fishing
groundfish as practiced in the 3Pn region, in addition to initiatives such as a seasonal closure of
cod spawning area in Bay St. Georges.
In the pre-collapse period, technological development and increasing fishing effort in the
face of ineffective fisheries management in addition to capacity enhancing subsidies to offshore
dragger fleets have been cited as having contributed to the collapse (Sinclair, 1986; Palmer and
Sinclair, 1997). Current predation rates on cod especially by seals, on-going commercial and
recreational fishing activities, and potential ecosystem shifts have been identified to affect
Northern cod rebuilding (Rice et al., 2003; Savenkoff et al., 2007; Morissette et aI., 2009). With
stalled rebuilding and livelihood concerns in the post-collapse period, Northern Gulf fishing
activities have shifted focus to invertebrate species, mostly shrimp and crab, as shown through
recorded landings in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Changes in catch rates for major fish groups in Northern Gulfregion (source:
Savenkoffetal., 2007)
These changes in target species have affected the organization and distribution of processing
infrastructure and been associated with new consumer markets for shellfish. The higher
production value for shellfisheries raises concerns for backward bending supply implications,
especially in the absence of institutional mandate to stop overfishing and to rebuild fisheries.
There are emerging signs of poor resource supply and environmental changes that resulted in one
voluntary crab closure in western Newfoundland (DFO, 2009) 16. This stewardship initiative in
snow crab management area 12G spanning from Cape St. Gregory to Broom Point was initiated
by fishers because of poor stock status, and supported by the union and the Department of
Fisheries and Oceans for two years' closure. There have also been reductions in TACs in several
other NAFO management regions for shrimp and crab stocks in the province (DFO 2008b), with
equity and allocation implications especially for the inshore fishers (Schrank 2005). Further
rebuilding concerns about changes in target species, especially for forage fish such as capel in,
were articulated by several key informants. According to a community planner in the Comer
Brook region: "I can't see how stocks can recover when we are still fishing capelin and other
stuff, how can the fishery recover when we are destroying the very foundation for the fishery".
Furthermore, some fish harvesters in the 4R and 3Pn regions in Newfoundland raised
concerns about the small cod they were catching and the corresponding poor prices they had
received from fish processors. A fish harvester explained the relationship between price and size:
"when the fish is small, we get 0.50 CAD for 16-20" and greater than 20" the price hikes up to
0.62 CAD". The difference in price, particularly in the 4RS region where gillnets are used raised
concerns about discarding and 'high grading' of small sized fish and concerns about recruitment
overfishing. Management measures for by-catch restrictions vary by gear and species targeted in
the Gulf of St. Lawrence. For instance, gillnets for cod fishing have high by-catch restrictions in
NAFO region 4R and strict penalties on voluntary landings. However, in NAFO region 3Pn in
South-western Newfoundland where hook and line is the only fishing gear allowed for
groundfish, the maximum percentage of by-catch permitted is 20% for American Plaice and
White Hake, and 10% for Greenland Halibut as stated in the 2008 DFO-FFAW harvest plan. To
16 Weslern Shorefast Newsleller, Spring 2009:
hllp:!!www.curra.ca/docul11cnls!CURRA%20Ncwslellcr%20-%20Sprill"%202009.pdf accessed June 2, 20 IO.
deal with issues of discarding, I asked some fish harvesters how to deal with these challenges.
They suggested mechanisms to permit trading of by-catch in meeting their quotas, and
compulsory or voluntary disclosures as practiced in countries such as Norway. These proposed
measures are arguably necessary for compliance, sustaining the resource, and for accurate
reporting.
Changes in the marketing chain pre- and post-collapse: Supply chain organization
A review of market reports, in addition to key informant responses, illustrates that the cod supply
chain was much longer and producer-driven in the pre-collapse period. In this era, cod chains
were characterized by high production volume of mainly cod blocks primarily targeting the US
market. These supply chains entailed primary and secondary processing components, domestic
and international, as well as wholesale and retail outlets as shown in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Pre-collapse cod marketing and distribution networks to US and foreign markets
Three US market segments were dominant during this producer-driven era: white table cloth
restaurants and fast food joints; cafeteria food services; and retail grocery fish stores (Kirby
1982; Wright 2001). The current operational range of the post-collapse cod fish chain is shorter
and characterized by poor resource supply due to a lower TAC and cod is predominantly being
sold as fillets. Most of the supply chain for cod processing has been restructured to meet fleet
capacity reduction programs and corresponding whole sale operations. There have been limits on
new licenses for primary processing and a further freeze on secondary processing licenses.
The current markets are mostly retail-based involving less chain actors and targeting high
end supermarkets or niche markets in the UK and US. Total production volume has drastically
reduced, with about 39,000 tonnes of groundfisheries landed in NL in 20 I0, and cod constituted
only 24%. The total landed value for the groundfisheries in 2010 was about 50 million CAD
according to the 2011 Annual Seafood Industry Review. Key informants in the processing and
marketing sectors highlighted numerous changes in the cod fish chain from a producer-driven
chain to a more consumer-driven chain that produces high value cod fillets for niche markets and
local consumption. Alaskan Pollock (P. polachius), New Zealand Hoki (Macruronus
novaezelandiae), Icelandic and Norwegian cod (Gadus morhua) have replaced NL cod in the
global markets in the post-collapse period (O'Reilly 1993). In addition to Pollock, other
whitefish such as hake (Merluccius spp) and tilapia (Tilapia spp) have taken up about 75% of the
US market share since 2005, with imports doubling from USD ISO million in early 1990 to USD
300 million in late 2000 (Asche and Smith, 2010).
Furthermore, for most local fishers who have remained in the fishery, the more lucrative
shellfishery is a better option due to its higher landed price and production value. According to
the 20 I0 Seafood Industry Review, shellfisheries accounted for 60% of total landings and
generated 84% of the total landed value (369 million CAD). In a discussion with a key informant
about the recovery potential of cod, he remarked that cod is now a nuisance, because of its low
landed price relative to shellfisheries:
[If cod were to come back] ... you are going to have to manage it in a very different way
than we used to. We have to come up with a new concept. Ok, who fishes that cod? The
cod right now is a nuisance, because it's a nuisance in by-catch, too much by-catch. This
guy is fishing turbot [higher landed value], but he can't fish it because of all the
[juvenile] cod. The other thing is, he is looking at cod as a predator of small shrimp and
crab [higher landed value], and right now they've spent tens of thousands in changing
from cod to shrimp and crab fishery. They don't want to go back to cod; right now cod is
a nuisance [emphasis added].
Equally important, these changes in target species affect consumer markets. Seafood exports
have shifted towards shellfisheries that target global seafood markets to the EU, US and Asia,
and away from the predominant US market (DFO 2008a). These changes in consumer markets
and seafood prices have ramifications for transition costs and buy-in from industry stakeholder
groups. As explained by one key informant, a fish processor and exporter:
[There would be a] huge impact if the groundfisheries were to come back. Shrimp
production is highly computerized [mechanized]. If groundfish recovers now, the union
[FFAW] would say, how could you restructure all the debt, from crab to groundfish?
There will never be groundfish at 2.47 CAD a pound [price for crab] ... If we have
ground fish recovery of large volumes; the challenge would be the market place is not
strong. We don't have the labour force if the groundfish were to come back .. When cod
comes back, crab, I'd say we have 2 or 3 years left of shrimp, it will be gone...
Apart from predator-prey and ecosystem concerns if cod rebuilds, key informants identified a
potential supply glut during the summer months that could affect profitability. According to one
processor, cod fish caught in summer in places such as western Newfoundland (4R) are on their
feeding migration and full of capelin. Catching fish at this time affects processing quality and the
sale price in the market place. These mismatches between the cod harvesting season, quality and
market demand often led to 'distress selling' in the past because of inventory costs (Kirby 1982).
Suggestions for future marketing options from stakeholders included more direct wharf
sales to local consumers and in tourist niche markets in the summer. The formation of
cooperatives was proposed by harvesters for high end sales as formerly practiced in Petty Harbor
and Fogo Island in Newfoundland. Other examples across Canada include the community
supported fishery in Nova Scotia (Off the Hook), a local fishery that promotes 'short fish chains'
by directly selling to consumers, sustainably harvested by gear friendly nets, and supports local
fishing entrepreneurs directly without processors and middlemen. Other suggestions from
stakeholders in the fishing industry specifically fish harvesters, included fish auctions and direct
bidding as practiced in Japan and Iceland. Secondary processing, product differentiation,
branding and eco-certification were mentioned as future opportunities, considering the role of
third party labeling initiatives such as the Marine Stewardship Certification (MSC).
MSC certification is a voluntary stewardship scheme that often involves a third party to
evaluate and assess sustainability along the fish chain using chain of custody rules. Created in
1996 by World Wildlife Fund for Nature, and Unilever (the largest fisheries buyer and processor
at that time), it is the major global certifier for wild capture fisheries (Gulbrandsen, 2009). Other
examples of seafood eco-certification and traceability initiatives include Friends of the Sea,
Thisfish, and the Marine Aquarium Council. The growing reliance on eco-certification as a
policy instrument is partly attributed to the globalised nature of food production and the buying
power of consumers (Stringer and Le Heron, 2008; Swartz et aI., 20 I0). The programs have been
partly successful because of consumer awareness campaigns from conservation groups and
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commitments from retail marketing chains in Canada and abroad (such as Unilever, Wal-Mart,
Sainsbury, Marks and Spencer, Loblaw, and Carrefour). Generally, eco-certification focuses on
key sustainability criteria along the fish chain including healthy fisheries ecosystems, effective
management, compliance to regulations, and consumer awareness on seafood production
(Gulbrandsen, 2009). Critics have argued that these criteria are insufficient, as they neglect social
justice and equity issues, in addition to trade barriers for certain fisheries especially in the small
scale sectors (UNEP 20 I0). Due to the high level of institutional collaboration required, eco-
certification process raises questions about the credibility of the fisheries assessment, the
potential costs and benefits to local economies, and its effectiveness in the long tenn (Jacquet et
aI., 20 I0). Moreover, the cost of eco-certification is sometimes too high to afford by certain
stakeholder groups, in addition to the duration of the assessment process, and other political
economy issues (Ponte, 2007). These challenges pose new dilemma for fisheries managers and
the fishing industry. To date, about 268 fisheries are engaged in the MSC certification program,
with about half certified and another halfunder assessment'?
Out of the 130 fisheries that have been certified by the MSC around the world, only 18
are found in Canada, with several others under assessment (OAG, 2011). In Newfoundland and
Labrador, two fisheries have been certified by the MSC - the Fogo Island Cooperative and the
Association of Seafood Producers, both harvesting the Northern Shrimp (Pandalus borealis).
This shrimp fishery uses otter trawler vessels under 65 feet, that are owner-operator, has full
observer coverage and the fleets are required to use the Nordmore grate system to reduce by-
catch and prevent habitat damage.
17hltp://www.msc.or,,/business-supportJkey-filcts-about-msc last accessed December IOth2011
Because of the huge investments in shellfisheries processing infrastructure and in eco-
certification schemes, there are concerns about the implication of cod rebuilding on ecosystem
structure and its potential impact on the lucrative shellfish trade.
Changes in the marketing chain pre- and post-collapse: Economic viability
The economic viability of the fishing industry (harvesting and processing sectors) is assessed in
terms of operational profits, which depend on total revenue in relation to total costs. The cost
structure of fishing operations varies by type of fishing enterprises, capital investments, and fleet
types, as well as the number and types of fishing licenses. Fishing costs can further be divided
into fixed or sunk cost, and variable cost.
Interviews with inshore harvesters reveal mixed responses on the viability of fishing
enterprises in the post-collapse period. According to one fisher:
r don't like the way the fishery is going bye. The fishery is going belly up for the small
[scale] man. I think if you can afford to be there, you are going to be there. And if you
can't afford to be there, if you can't afford to spend thirty, forty thousand dollars a year,
you aren't going to stay into the fishery. I'll be paying off credit card payments until
fishing next spring to payoff what I spent in to it this year .. r haven't broke even in the
last four or five years ..
Other inshore harvesters interviewed, however, seemed to have viable enterprises. This is
primarily due to access to multiple quotas and licenses for lobsters, crab, shrimp, halibut,
capel in, and herring. Those who have numerous licenses have better economic performance of
current fishing operations. According to the 2006 Costs and Earnings Survey, net income for
medium sized vessels in the 35-60' category with multiple fishing licenses for cod and other
pelagics was about 97,000 CAD before taxes, with total fishing revenues estimated at 292,000
CAD for the gulf region (DFO 2007a). For smaller vessels less than 25', total revenue was about
27,000 CAD, operating and maintenance costs were estimated at 17,000 CAD and net income at
about 7,000 CAD before taxes and not including income from Employment Insurance (DFO
2007a). Furthermore, the financial performance of enterprises engaged in shellfisheries is higher
for combined crab and shrimp enterprises in the 35-64' vessel category, than for groundfisheries
in the same vessel category.
The DFO (2007a) Costs and Earnings Survey did not take into account debts and
seasonal unemployment benefits. Key informants identified indebtedness as the biggest
challenge in the fishing industry. One key informant, a research analyst, explained: "Debt, it's
our biggest problem, the capital we've used in this industry, its huge" referring to issues of
'capital stuffing' and investment in fish finding devices and technological improvements.
The types of fishing licenses and fishing enterprise determine crew profits and revenue
sharing mechanisms. Although crew sharing arrangements vary from one enterprise to another,
there are some indications that a more equitable crew-sharing ethic was adhered to in the pre-
collapse era (DFO 1985). In the post-collapse period, Schrank (2005) documented higher owner
shares for skippers sometimes in excess of 100,000 CAD per year; whilst crew members
received about 22,000 CAD of which 45% was income from Employment Insurance. As
highlighted by one key informant, the change in revenue sharing mechanisms appears to have
affected labour markets including particularly the retention of skilled workers in fishing
communities and the human capacity to deal with rebuilding challenges.
In the pre-collapse era for the processing sector, larger plants with multispecies licenses
mainly for groundfisheries, pelagics, and shellfisheries were economically more successful than
smaller plants with few licenses (Kirby 1982; Moore et al., 1993). Key informants identified the
former Fishery Products Lnternational and National Sea Products (High liner) as more successful
in acquiring global market share because of stronger marketing strategies and state support. In
the post-collapse era, these bigger companies sought to keep their market share by importing
groundfish from the Barents Sea to keep their processing operations going in till the early part of
2000 (Dean, 200 I; Schrank 2005).
Regarding individuals and fishing households in coastal communities in the Northern
Peninsula, about 50% of livelihoods in the harvesting and processing sectors have been lost due
to the collapse and restructuring measures as shown in Figure 5 in Chapter Ill. Out of the
seventeen processing plants reported in the pre-collapse period in this region, only eight
remained as of 2007 (GNPFT 2006). This pattern of changes in coastal livelihoods is similar to
that in the province as a whole as shown in Figure 6, illustrating numerous closures in number
and location of fish processing plants.
Figure 6: Number and location of fish processing plants pre- and post-collapse (Adapted from
McManus, 1991 and Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture Annual Seafood Report 2010)
Currently, most of the secondary processing of groundfish including cod is done in low cost
countries mainly in China and re-exported to Canada (DFO 2008a; FAO 2010). Key informants
in the processing and harvesting sectors identified only one major cod processing plant and
seafood exporter left in the province (located at Arnold's Cove), targeting mostly niche markets
in the UK. Profits in groundfish processing in the post-collapse era are very low due to
competition with cheap substitutes such as Pollock from Alaska and Tilapia from Asia, and
consumer demand for certified and sustainable seafood products.
In the pre-collapse era, interest rates affected profitability, contributing significantly to a
16% decline in 1989 (Moore et aI., 1993). Key informants, predominantly industry stakeholders
in the processing and retail sectors expressed concerns about the increasing parity of the
Canadian dollar with the US dollar. One key informant, a medium scale processor illustrated this
with an example:
... the Canadian dollar is up now. That got a reflection in the market place and that got a
reflection on the price you pay to the fishermen. [ went back about two weeks ago and
looked at what the exchange rate was last year; it was 21 cents. Right now we're less than
five. That's a big difference. You're looking at probably 18 cents difference on a pound
of filets. That's a lot of money. Every hundred thousand pounds of filets is 18,000
dollars.
Because most of the Canadian exports are tied to the US, industry stakeholders are exploring
other markets with stable currencies. In 2005, the US received about 66% of NL seafood
products in terms of value (DFO 2008a) next to the EU (14%), followed by Japan (II %) and
China (9%). This trend had changed by 2008, as the US dollar depreciated, the Euro remained
stable, and China became a bigger player in seafood trade (Roche 2008). In 2008, the US and
China captured 32% and 23% of export markets by value, with Russia and Japan following at
7.5% each, the UK at 7% and Denmark at 5%18. These changing global markets and
macroeconomic factors impact seafood trade, the viability of local fisheries, and cod recovery
prospects especially with poor consideration for macroeconomic factors in rebuilding planning.
The Northern Gulf market chain for cod and related fisheries involved four to eight key
stakeholders in both the pre- and post-collapse periods, depending on market destination and
consumer preferences. The key stakeholders continue to include the fish harvester, buyer,
processor, broker, distributor, wholesaler, retailer and final consumer. A fish buyer can also be a
processor; however, most buyers lack primary processing licenses and truck their raw material to
processors with primary or secondary licenses.
In the pre-collapse period, raw material in the form of cod landings contributed to about
62% of plant operating costs; next to labour and wages at 22%, energy at 3%, and profits
assessed to be around 13% (Kirby 1982). Key informants in the processing sector mentioned that
a similar cost structure was evident in the current cod fish chain but there has been an increase in
packaging, distribution, and brokerage costs. In 2009, a pound of cod at dockside valued at 62
cents purchased from fish harvesters eventually cost about 6 to 8 CAD at the retail end of the
chain (Figure 7).
Figure 7: Price and retail value across the marketing chain for cod fillet in lhe post-collapse period
(Khan, 2010)
18 Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture, Seafood Industry Year in Review:
hllo://www.fishaq.gov.nl.ca/oublicalions/annual reoort08 09.DdfaccessedMay6,2010.
The cost structure for the processors would include the 'flesh cost' (which is 0.33% processing
yield), as well as distribution costs.
The Fishing Industry Collective Bargaining Act of 1971 governs fish price setting
between fish harvesters and processors in NL in both the pre- and post periods. Dockside fish
price setting is one of several 'focal points' along the fish chain that requires cooperation and
negotiation to avoid conflicts (see Schelling 1960). Following disputes in the early 1990s
regarding the dockside price for shrimp, binding arbitration was put in place along with an
amendment to institute a price setting panel (Vardy et al., 1998). The Report on the Standing
Fish Price-Setting Panel for 2008/09 on collective bargaining for fish prices showed that out of
ten key species, agreement was reached for only five 19, with further court decisions to be made
on the justification of the panel decisions.
According to key informants especially harvesters, the cost and benefits are not fairly
distributed across the marketing chain and in setting fish prices. There are high levels of mistrust
amongst stakeholders, mainly between fish harvesters and processors in negotiating fish prices.
Fish harvesters are very concerned about the poor price they receive for their raw material
compared to the retail store price they observe sometimes in their own communities. Some are
opposed to the provincial law against selling directly to consumers or welcoming buyers from
outside the province. A fish harvester in Port Aux Choix explained the fluctuating prices:
We were getting in 1986; we got close to a dollar a pound. That was a good price. Here
we are today, 24 years later, we got 37 cents this year. .. You can't do that right [?]. The
price, it's hard to say, the world economy [is at a downturn], and you would expect less
this year. We got to look at our expenses and that; I can't say what we should be getting.
19 Slanding Fish Price-Setting Panel Annual Report 2008109:
http://www.hrle.gov.nl.callishpanellpdfiFishPaneIAnlll1al Renort0809.pdf accessed May 4, 20 IO.
You look at the basics of it; we got to have at least 60 cents a pound to survive. Cod
should be close to a dollar a pound. That's for good fish ...
The market prices for cod block fluctuated around 0.90 CAD a pound in the 1980s and steadily
increased to \.25 CAD in 1988; followed by a sharp fall to less than 0.70 CAD in 1989 and
gradually increased to a peak of 1.15 CAD in 199\ (O'Reilly, 1993). In the post-harvest period,
the retail market price for fresh cod fillet has fluctuated from 5 to 8 CAD in the past five years,
with periodic shortage especially in the winter months. The price for frozen cod from the local
Sobeys retail store sells for 5 to 7 CAD for a pound in the summer of 2009, almost the same
price for imported frozen cod from High Liner. Some Canadian companies such as High Liner
outsource their secondary processing to Asia in order to boost their dividend and to recompense
for the rising Canadian dollar2o.
To deal with the low prices received by fish harvesters, some key informants suggested
policy changes to facilitate direct selling to buyers from out of the province or direct wharf sales
to local residents. However, fish harvesters are by law not permitted to sell their fish directly to
consumers in NL. The rationale for this policy is to ensure quality control through processing
requirements, secure local processing jobs, and to ensure accurate catch reporting. The
disagreements between harvesters and processors about price setting, and direct sales to either
consumers or buyers outside of the province raise concerns along the marketing chain for
collective action on marketing initiatives and value addition programs.
Institutional change and policy options
Seafood trade is important for export earnings, food security, and local livelihoods especially in
NL. However, sustaining the benefits from seafood trade requires strong institutional
20 High Liner Seafood Company news http://www.theulobeandmail.com/reporl-oll-bllsillcss/how-captaill-high-liner-
beal-the-dollar-odds/articieI501362/sinulepaue/lastaccessedAlIglist 15,2011.
mechanisms across all three stages of the fish chain. lnstitutional innovation amongst
stakeholders is crucial in strengthening stewardship and marketing policies for reversing the
backward bending supply in the event of collapse, shown in Figure 2. Furthermore, institutional
mechanisms are critical in avoiding path dependencies and exploring options for economic
change (North 1990). Three main concerns were raised by key informants related to effective
institutions for rebuilding and sustaining the Northern Gulf cod fisheries. These concerns
included: i) issues of overcapacity and restructuring; ii) multispecies management strategies and
marketing initiatives; and iii) rebuilding plans and implementation measures.
Despite several restructuring and social adjustment programs implemented after the
collapse of the groundfisheries, and as outlined in Chapter III, the fishery is still considered
overcapitalized by some research analysts (Schrank 2005; Clift and Team 20 II). For those who
hold this view, overcapacity is defined in terms of inputs of fishing effort relative to the resource
abundance, measured in terms of capital investments, total revenues, and technological
efficiency in both the harvesting and processing sectors (Asche 2008). The combined outcomes
of overcapacity and poor resource supply amidst industry restructuring were raised by
stakeholders as key challenges to be addressed in order for rebuilding to be successful. This is
due to the high level of indebtedness and low economic viability, which act as obstacles for
reducing TACs and other effective rebuilding strategies such as by-catch measures.
Key informants interviewed in both the harvesting and processing sectors showed interest
in multispecies harvesting and processing options for economic viability. These suggestions were
in response to by-catch and stewardship concerns, which could boost viable operations, through
multispecies harvesting plans. Although there are interests amongst stakeholders in various
marketing programs, efforts to establish a fish marketing council as recommended under the
Federal-Provincial Fishing Industry Renewal initiative were opposed by a majority of processors
in the Province21 . According to one small-scale processor who voted against the marketing
council "the marketing is not for us, it is for the big processors to inventory their fish in the US".
Despite these marginalization concerns, funding for a marketing council has been approved by
both provincial and federal agencies22 , based on recommendations from a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) report (Clift and Team, 2011). In the event that the marketing council
initiative goes as planned, it may create legitimate concerns for the smaller processors who
opposed it. Moreover, because the MOU report did not adequately address cod rebuilding and its
marketing challenges, it poses concerns in the light of eco-certification, chain of custody rules,
and for environmental groups that promote sustainable seafood. These on-going conflicts
between small-scale versus large-scale processors, inshore versus offshore fleets, and
groundfisheries versus shellfisheries producers demonstrate that rebuilding problems are
complex and linked to institutional change, power, and participatory decision-making.
As argued in Chapter II, in addition to market valuation techniques for consumptive
goods such as fish and seafood in rebuilding planning, non-market valuation for ecosystem
services is also essential (Sumaila and Suatoni, 2006). One of the biggest concerns identified by
some stakeholders in the conservation community is that the assessment and decisions made by
the Committee on Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada (COSEWIC) charged with assessing
vulnerable stocks do not take into consideration non- market valuation, discount rates, and long-
term intergenerational and societal needs. A conservation biologist who is familiar with
COSEWIC and the DFO's vulnerability assessment process commented on these shortcomings:
21 Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture Press Release:
~2t1~~~~~~v:~;~:~sae~m~~;n~fc~~~~Cr~:~~~~0:~f~:~~(II:~:e l ~~~s~'~~~e:~e~essed May 4,2010.
htlp://www.releases.gov.nl.ca/rdeases/2011/fishag/0718n03.htm accessed August 19,2011
DFO currently does economic analysis, and they aren't very good. 1 don't think they
should do them because they are inherently biased. That is exactly what harvesters need
to know - the short and long term ramifications... if we close this fishery; this is how
much lost income would be. If we go through some short term economic difficulties, we
are anticipating the fishery will go from here to there, and this is how much more money
it would be worth. I think that information is important but it's not communicated at all.
DFO is sadly biased towards the industry... basically on the Species at Risk; the decisions
do not take in to account the societal benefit of listing, [and] don't account for something
called non use or market value. These species have value to these people, and they are
willing to increase taxes or whatever, to keep these species intact.
In dealing with intergenerational equity concerns and industry participation, Sumaila and
Dominguez-Torreiro (2010) have suggested governance approaches that improve the legitimacy
for buy-in from resource users and reduction in transaction cost for managers. Such governance
approaches could improve compliance and stewardship and support long-term benefits.
Discussion
The theoretical review and empirical findings from this research along the Northern Gulf cod
marketing chain illustrates several reasons for stalled rebuilding and on-going poor economic
viability in many Northern Gulf fisheries. Achieving sustainability and rebuilding stocks require
paying attention to both biological and socioeconomic factors, as well as institutional
mechanisms across the fish chain; rather than focusing on only one piece of the chain (see
Sumaila 2002). The case study illustrates that paying attention to these factors could support
rebuilding of fish stocks and fishery communities; but only if effective institutional mechanisms
are put in place to promote conservation, sustainable harvesting practices, livelihood and food
security considerations, and globalised seafood trade.
As discussed in Chapter III, the high level of fishing beyond sustainable levels, non-
compliance to TACs, unsustainable fishing practices, and poor institutional responses not only
contributed to stock collapse, but have led to stalled rebuilding. Other problems in the pre-
collapse period related to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and 'under the tables sales'
exacerbated catch statistics for stock assessment projections especially as they relate to future
harvest rates and setting TACs (Palmer and Sinclair, 1997). In the post-collapse period,
institutional changes such as dockside monitoring and other policy measures have reduced these
potential external threats to the resource and improved shared stewardship in management.
Changes in target species from groundfish stocks to shellfisheries and pe1agics and
growing seal populations raise concerns about changing predator-prey relationships and by-catch
issues that may be affecting cod rebuilding. These interactions in the harvest and post-harvest
stages demonstrate that rebuilding goes beyond single species management and reactive
restructuring measures to include attention to multispecies and ecosystem considerations, global
seafood market dynamics, regional and community-level concerns, and equity.
As discussed in the theoretical review, rebuilding the resource and maintaining higher
profits in the long term implies the need to keep harvest rates at low levels to avoid the ongoing
problems of growth and recruitment overfishing. Increase in natural and fishing mortalities due
to high predation rates, on-going fishing activities, and high dependency on the fishery appear to
have prolonged stock rebuilding especially in the absence of stakeholder buy-in and effective
institutional mandates for conservation measures. The theoretical arguments about the backward
bending nature of fish chains, and empirical findings demonstrate that institutional mechanisms
are central to avoiding overfishing, as well as to promoting compliance and stewardship required
for successful rebuilding and viable fisheries. Better management practices and innovation are
crucial in strengthening stewardship ethics and to reversing the backward bending supply in the
event of collapse as shown in Figure 2. Recent institutional partnerships and efforts towards eco-
certification initiatives for consumer awareness, corporate social responsibility, and for
encouraging sustainable harvesting policies through chain of custody rules for seafood trade are
proving to be effective policy instruments for viable and sustainable fisheries. Although eco-
certification has its shortcomings (Jacquet and Pauly, 2008; Gulbrandsen, 2009), it nonetheless
provides opportunities for non-state actors (especially consumers and the fishing industry) to
contribute to sustainability practices and behavioral policy changes.
Key informants recommended policy coherence between the harvesting, processing and
marketing sectors; as well as institutional partnerships on price setting and value addition. The
analyses further suggest that a closer interaction between the fishing and processing sectors may
influence stakeholder partnerships and marketing initiatives; recognizing changes in global
markets, macroeconomic factors, foreign competition, and the significance of value-addition.
[n addition to transformative initiatives amongst stakeholders during rebuilding
transitions and beyond (see Gilcich el al., 2010), institutional mechanisms are also critical in
avoiding path dependencies and enhancing economic performance (North 1990). One key
informant, a retired civil servant, pinpointed to the relevance of legislative mandate and
institutional mechanisms towards successful rebuilding:
... we've learned next to nothing since the collapse ...all I know is that our existing
legislation is inadequate ... The Americans have had Sllccess, and what [ like abollt it,
everybody knows what the objectives and timelines are. It has to be taken out of the
political hands. Our current system is terrible with the amount of input the industry has.
The Minister of Fisheries and Oceans is looking at the industry too intently... You can
have science wanting to close the fishery, minister was going to close it, [but] gets a call
from the boys in Quebec, and what do you know, the fishery doesn't close. It will never
go away unless we have some kind of legislation...
Drawing on the success of international examples for fisheries rebuilding such as in the US;
appropriate policy instruments, legislative mandates, and governing arrangements that emphasize
compliance and stewardship are central (Caddy and Agnew, 2005; Wakeford et al., 2009). For
example, the rebuilding success and viability of four commercial species in the US was due to
three critical institutional mechanisms (Wakeford et al., 2009). These include: (i) the 1973
Endangered Species Act, which deals specifically with conservation measures and recovery
mandates, (ii) the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act and the reauthorized 2010 Magnuson-Stevens
Act that deal with the rebuilding of collapsed fisheries to previous MSY levels, and (iii) regional
fisheries management councils that coordinate with key stakeholders and community groups
regarding policy development (Hanna 20 10). Evidence from the North Sea cod fisheries
rebuilding exemplify the potential benefits of taking an ecosystem approach and adhering to
policy consensus with stakeholders for collective action (Gray et aI., 2008; Davis and Rangeley,
20 I0). These rebuilding efforts epitomize legal and institutional mandates, stewardship
incentives, ecosystem considerations, as well as stakeholder partnerships in seafood production.
Conclusion
In this chapter, a fish chain approach is employed to understand pre- and post-collapse changes
in the marketing chain for cod and related fisheries in the Northern Gulf of St. Lawrence.
Drawing upon theoretical developments and the empirical findings, this multiple analyses
demonstrate that in collapsed fisheries, marketing factors are central to resource sustainability
and economic viability. Seafood is the most traded commodity globally; involving fish supply
chains that are complex, dynamic, and spanning several administrative and jurisdictional scales.
Key findings indicate that the cod fish chain has transitioned from a producer-driven
production model in the pre-collapse period that exports cod blocks to the US, to a consumer-
driven production model in the post-collapse period that place emphasis on cod fillets and eco-
certified products. The pre- and post-collapse analyses of Northern Gulf cod marketing chain
further demonstrate the need to align policy instruments to changing ecosystems, resource
supply, fleet and processing capacity, livelihoods, and consumer markets. These complex and
multiple challenges are best addressed through effective institutional mechanisms that deter
overfishing, support multispecies rebuilding approaches, pays attention to value-addition, and
explores diverse policy options with stakeholder groups and local communities for both local and
global seafood markets.
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Chapter V: A Fish Chain Analysis of Wicked Rebuilding Problems: Power
and Governing Interactions in the Northern Gulf Cod Fisheries
Introduction 23
Despite the longstanding concerns about failed fisheries management in Canada (Charles 1995;
Hannesson 1996; Wappel 2005), and the growing literature on the role of fisheries governance
(Kooiman el al., 2005; Ommer el al., 2007), fisheries management is still assumed to entail tame
problems that can easily be fixed. A tame problem, following Rittell and Webber (1973), is one
that is well defined, with clear objectives and solutions that are testable and applicable to other
problems such as those seen in engineering and the natural sciences. Related to this, most
management approaches for major commercial fisheries are hierarchical with centralized
decision-making and frequent reliance on so-called 'fishfull thinking' (Pitcher and Lam, 2010),
which includes 'band aids' (Hilborn el aI., 2004), 'technical fixes' (Degnbol el aI., 2006), and
cure-all 'panaceas' (Ostrom el aI., 2007). This reliance on technical management measures has
been described as similar to trying to 'paint a floor with a hammer' (Degnbol el aI., 2006), and
has generally resulted in such management failures as overfishing, collapsed stocks and failed
rebuilding.
[n Chapter II we argued that in the Northern Gulf of St. Lawrence cod fisheries, as well
as globally, there is a strong rebuilding imperative with ecological, social, equity and food
security dimensions. Building on Jentoft and Chuenpagdee (2009), we argued that rebuilding
collapsed fisheries poses a particularly wicked problem from the point of view of governance.
With wicked fisheries and coastal governance problems, there is no definitive agreement on what
the problem is, let alone on solutions. [n fact defining the problem is also part of the problem
23 A version of this chapter will be submitted for publication: Khan, A.S. and B. Neis (in preparation). Beyond
management panaceas to clumsy governing options for Northern Gul f cod fisheries. Conservation and Society
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because, from a governance point of view, the process of defining the problem often excludes
key groups and options. Because wicked problems are place and context specific, and because
there are often unintended and severe consequences from reactive fisheries management
measures, there are no 'one size fits all solutions' to these problems. Moreover, there is limited
space for failure and social experimentation because there is a high level of both perceived and
real risk that can be difficult to anticipate because of the complexity and dynamics of social-
ecological fishery systems. Rebuilding involves multiple spatio-temporal scales including
tradeoffs between short-term losses and long-term benefits and between regional small-scale
fisheries and global large-scale fisheries. Further, policy initiatives in one part of the fish chain
will have consequences elsewhere. For example, the rebuilding of one species (for e.g. cod)
impacts the abundance of others (such as shrimp or capel in), causing ripple effects within marine
ecosystems and associated fishing activities and livelihoods. Similarly, past experience has
shown that moratoria on fish stocks often create by-catch concerns and related discarding or high
grading with negative consequences for stock rebuilding as discussed in Chapters 1Il and IV.
As with other wicked problems, the capacity to rebuild a particular collapsed fishery is
mediated by existing institutional structures and power relations. For instance, who loses the
most from a stock collapse and who stands to gain most from the sacrifices required for
rebuilding is affected to some degree by how the problem is defined and who is involved in
decision making, both of which are related to power. The exclusion of key groups from decision-
making can affect buy-in, compliance and stewardship, particularly in contexts where the
legitimacy of science and management regimes have already been undermined by stock collapse
(Finlayson, 1994). Chapter 1Il of the thesis focuses on the pre-harvest and harvest stages of the
fish chain assessing how post-collapse fisheries policy changes have constrained cod fisheries
rebuilding prospects and threatened livelihoods in fishing dependent coastal communities.
Chapter IV focuses on the harvest and post-harvest stages of the fish chain. It analyzes how
changing seafood production and global markets have affected local rebuilding prospects and the
long-term social and economic viability of the resource. This chapter revisits, once again, the
wicked problem of rebuilding collapsed fisheries and the case of the Northern Gulf cod collapse
and stalled rebuilding. Our focus here, however, is on the role of governing institutions and
power relations in mediating options for solving the wicked problem of rebuilding collapsed
stocks in this region and elsewhere. Specifically, this chapter explores how governing
interactions vis-a-vis power brokerage, inclusiveness, and sharing of tasks and costs and benefits
amongst stakeholders can both create wicked problems and, when changed, provide a means to
resolve them.
According to Jentoft (2007), conceptualizing power has been an arduous task in the social
sciences (see also Gaventa, 2006), especially as power influences many aspects of social
relations from the household level, to the economy, industrial organizations, to institutional
mandates, and the contributions of civil society associations. For example, market power in the
form of monopoly and price control affects seafood trade and revenue generation and benefits to
local communities (Dean 2001; Anderson 2008). Political and interventionist power have been
identified as crucial in historical patterns of seafood trade and current supply chains (Swartz et
al. 2010). Although there is a debate as to how producers and consumers influence power along
supply chains and behavioral outcomes (FAa 2010), corporate social responsibility and
consumer buying power are recognized worldwide as potential conservation tools through eco-
labeling and chain of custody rules (Brownstein et al. 2003; UNEP 2009).
In the commodity and supply chain governance literature, power is analyzed by looking
at four main indicators (Kaplinsky and Morris 2000): i) the relative bargaining power of
stakeholders, ii) protection from competitors, iii) information control, and iv) revenue
distribution and share of profits by stakeholders (see Gordon et af. 2011). While useful, this
approach attends only to the market aspects of the fish chain and there is a need for an approach
that could also track the relationship between power, institutions, stakeholder interactions, and
ecological changes. Therefore, in this chapter, we utilize Gaventa's multidimensional approach
to power, most recently presented as the 'power cube' (Gaventa 2006). This multidimensional
approach aims to understand how shifts in power relations in time and space can contribute to
fisheries collapses and also playa key role in rebuilding in the post-collapse period. Gaventa's
(2006) approach to power goes beyond attention to traditional state management practices, to
exploring opportunities and constraints on broader citizenry engagement for change, and is
informed by governance thinking that is inclusive and participatory. This works well with a
fisheries governance approach where governance is defined as "the whole of public as well as
private interactions taken to solve societal problems and create societal opportunities. It includes
the formulation and application of principles guiding those interactions and care for institutions
that enable them" (Kooiman et af. 2005: 17).
From a fisheries governance perspective, lentoft and Chuenpagdee (2009) argue that,
"[t]he process prescribed for wicked problems is one of interactive communication and learning
amongst stakeholders, where norms and values are played out and where different ethics,
ideologies, and epistemologies are active" (2009: 555). Because of diverse interests and values
associated with fisheries resources, they argue for an argumentative approach that is inclusive of
the collective judgments of stakeholders and contributes to making hard and soft choices. We
draw on this insight and on the literature on clumsy solutions (Verweij and Thomson, 2006), to
explore options for rebuilding collapsed fisheries taking into account social power and
institutional innovation. The clumsy options incorporate insights from four fundamental
perspectives on resource management problems; including individualism, egalitarianism,
hierarchy, and fatalism (Rayner 2006). Individualist perspectives are based on rational choice
arguments including those for privatization such as adopting individual transferable quotas (ITQ)
within fisheries (Scott, 1996). Egalitarian perspectives are based on the underlying assumption
that resources are common property and individuals can self-organize to manage their resources
sustainably for the benefits of their communities (Ostrom, 1990). Those adhering to egalitarian
perspectives within fisheries would tend to support community-based management approaches
that place emphasis on the adjacency principle and on social justice for coastal communities
(Jentoft et aI., 1998; Wiber et aI., 2004; Hernes et al., 2005). The hierarchy perspective favors
adopting a technocratic and top-down management approach to fisheries based on the
assumption that only the state can effect change (Hannesson, 1996). Finally, fatalists tend to
believe that irrespective of the approach that is pursued, crises in fisheries are inevitable with
huge ecological, social and economic costs (Garcia and Grainger, 2005).
Clumsy solutions can, when conditions are right, spring out of policy dialogue amongst
stakeholder groups with entrenched positions if supported by the creation of institutions
appropriate for resolving wicked problems (Verweij et aI., 2006). A clumsy solutions framework
works well with the governance approach to fisheries and coastal issues (Khan and Neis, 2010).
In contrast to fisheries management, the focus of which is often on state agency and technical
fixes, fisheries governance refers to the collective contributions of the state, the fishing industry
and civil society for successful outcomes (Gray, 2005; Kooiman et aI., 2005). Consistent with a
governance approach, in this chapter (as in earlier ones), we use a fish chain as an analytical
framework to better understand the social-ecological interactions that have influenced rebuilding
opportunities and outcomes from marine ecosystems to harvesting, processing and retail markets,
as well as amongst stakeholders. While these production stages are highly interconnected
through various stakeholder groups and actors pursuing social and economic activities at
multiple spatial scales (Johnson et aI., 2005; Perry et al., 2010), some actors may be dominant in
one or more production stages depending on their level of influence and power (Mikalsen &
Jentoft 200 I). Power relations are thus an important aspect of governance as they can mediate
outcomes through legal reforms or power brokerage and fostering resistance in the form of non-
compliance or conflict.
The next section of this chapter provides a broader theoretical discussion of governance
in rebuilding contexts focusing in particular on the essential role of power and equity challenges
within fisheries in contributing to the wickedness of rebuilding. These also play an essential role
in relation to the opportunities for clumsy solution options. Following a discussion of the
methodological approach, the chapter then shifts to the Northern Gulf case study and does two
things. First, it discusses, using insights from multiple sources, how institutional inertias and
relations of power along the fish chain contributed to the collapse of the stocks and have
mediated rebuilding options and outcomes showing that technical solutions and panaceas are not
capable of resolving wicked rebuilding problems. Second, it uses the perspectives and thinking
gathered in interviews with members of various stakeholder groups and other information
sources to devise some examples of potential clumsy solutions appropriate for helping to achieve
the rebuilding imperative in the Northern Gulf cod fisheries. The chapter concludes with
challenges and opportunities for clumsy solutions and some examples on mediating rebuilding.
Theoretical framework
The capacity to protect, preserve and rebuild fisheries for current and future generations is
mediated by social power within governing mechanisms and wider social relations (Cadigan
2004; Jentoft 2007). Although power and social relations amongst stakeholders are central to
governance they are often intangible and difficult to assess and are largely ignored by fisheries
managers. Moreover, power has received relatively little attention in research on governance for
fisheries rebuilding, and policy processes often lack the mechanisms and conduit to deal with
these challenges. Sinclair and Ommer (2006) define power as "the capacity to create (and to
some degree control) an outcome of behavior" (Sinclair & Ommer 2006: 16). According to
Gaventa (1980), power involves at least three dimensions. The first dimension refers to
differences in the ability of individuals or groups to control outcomes through greater access to
resources and bargaining positions. The second dimension of power relates to political processes
or 'rules of the game' that create institutional settings that benefit certain groups by limiting
access to decision-making arenas, thus permitting agenda setting and exclusion. The third
dimension of power relates to the impact of power exercised through the first two dimensions on
awareness or consciousness of an individual's or group's interests. Individuals or groups can fail
to recognize their own interests and act contrary to them in contexts where limited resources,
exclusion from decision-making arenas, and information management and other processes affect
how they think and how they respond to these options. This relates to a fourth dimension of
power, not incorporated in Gaventa's early model (1980) and relevant to rebuilding and clumsy
solutions. It draws on Foucault's notion of 'fields of opportunity' (Foucault 2003; Macdonald et
at., 2006) and stems from the assumption that power is not monolithic and resistance to power
signifies the multiple structures within which power is embedded (Foucault 2003; Sadan 2004).
Gaventa (2006) incorporates the 'fields of opportunity' dimension into his more recent
iteration of power theory for which he uses the power cube heuristic device, as shown in Figure
I. The power cube is an analytical tool that researchers and activists can use to understand not
only how to engage, but where and when to engage in order to increase the potential of achieving
appropriate governing interactions such as those supportive of rebuilding. In this recent work
Gaventa notes that "simply creating new institutional arrangements will not necessarily result in
greater inclusion or pro-poor policy change. Rather, much depends on the nature of the power
relations which surround and imbue these new, potentially more democratic spaces" (Gaventa
2006: 23). As shown in Figure I, the cube consists of various levels, spaces, and forms of power
dimension.
Figure 1: The 'power cube' showing the levels, spaces and forms of power (Gaventa 2006)
The levels can be global, national or local; the spaces can be closed, invited, claimed or created;
and the various forms of power can be visible, hidden or invisible. Spaces are "opportunities,
moments and channels where citizens can act to potentially affect policies, discourses, decisions
and relationships that affect their lives and interests" (Gaventa 2005: II). Following Cornwall
(2002), Gaventa argues that spaces are not neutral; rather, they are shaped by the power relations
that surround them, set their boundaries and enter them. Spaces can be 'closed' as in certain
bureaucratic processes, 'invited' as in stakeholder consultations or opinion polls, and 'created' as
when community groups establish an informal forum for dialogue and discussion. Boundaries
influence who can enter certain spaces and what identities, discourses and interests are
acceptable within them. Power can also be seen "as the network of social boundaries that delimit
fields of possible action" or fields of opportunity (Hayword 1998 as cited in Gaventa 2005).
Spaces for action can be found in multiple levels from local to global and, in the case of
fisheries, we would argue, along any of the three production stages in the fish chain. Relevant
local spaces for dialogue and engagement, or the blocking thereof, might be located within
households, enterprises or municipalities; relevant national spaces might be found within
company head offices or in national government departments; and relevant global spaces might
include negotiating trade barriers. Within these place-embedded spaces, power can take many
forms; it can sometimes be 'visible' as in the case of formal rules and institutional mechanisms.
It can also be 'hidden' through political processes that allow for agenda setting and the exclusion
of certain groups and issues as in the case of, for example, regulatory capture by powerful groups
with substantial lobbying or corporate power. Lastly, power can be 'invisible' as can happen
when it is part of "processes of socialization, culture and ideology" that "perpetuate exclusion
and inequality by defining what is normal, acceptable, and safe" (Gaventa 2006: 29).
Understanding the interrelationship between the various forms, spaces, and levels of
power can contribute to our ability to explain stock collapses and post-collapse rebuilding
challenges. It could create better opportunities for change by combining all dimensions and
helping us identify new spaces for strengthening institutional mechanisms and partnerships
appropriate for rebuilding. Our recent documentation of the rebuilding imperative and
exploration of some of the factors that have contributed to failed rebuilding of collapsed stocks
points to the central role of power relations in those failures (Khan and Neis, 20 I0). [n James
Scott's critical analysis of why centralized state planning fails (exercising power in the first and
second dimensions of Gaventa original model), he emphasizes that: "it [the state] always ignores
essential features of any real, functioning social order" (Scott, 1998: 6). These overlooked
aspects of space and place include community capacity, local knowledge, and local creative
responses to decision-making. Some fisheries scholars have pointed to similar dynamics to
explain institutional and state management failures in fisheries (Cochrane 2000; Jentoft 2004;
Acheson 2006; Sutinen 2008).
Conversely, collapses and failed rebuilding can be attributed to various forms of power
structures such as weak approaches to leadership on the part of the state and related agenda-
setting by industry groups. [n the US for instance, there are reports that access to decision-
making platforms by industry groups through regional fisheries management organizations and
lobbying expenditures to politicians have often tended to favor those who support on-going
commercial fishing activities despite stock collapse and the need for conservation policies
(0key, 2003; Sutinen, 2008). Similarly in Newfoundland, early signs of stock recovery led to
successful pressure from stakeholder groups (for instance, fish harvesters) to reopen the fisheries
and increase quotas despite scientific advice for complete moratoria in several instances (Rice et
at., 2003; Best, 2009). Unequal access to resources and agenda-setting can work together to
constrain not only who is at the table but also the space available for action, including what kinds
of interests or discourses make it to the table, thereby shaping decision-making outcomes.
Debates about fisheries management and rebuilding that are limited to the concerns of
government managers and that take place with particular industry segments often exclude not
only other stakeholders (owners of bigger vessels, skippers versus crew, men and not women)
but also their concerns, and can limit awareness of the full range of options available for
rebuilding. These other stakeholders might include plant workers, coastal communities,
conservation groups, youth, and the general public (see Lowe and Caruthers 2008; Wiber et al.,
2010). In addition, distributional and procedural equity concerns are paramount during
rebuilding in particular for small-scale fishers and adjacent communities in the face of
government funded restructuring programs that are top-down and often favor offshore mobile
commercial fleets (Holland et aI., 1997; Woodrow 2003). Similarly, disciplinary silos and the
exclusion of some disciplines and types of knowledge from fisheries management and rebuilding
efforts can limit options. Issues of legitimacy, compliance and stewardship are strongly
embedded in social capital and community networks that are often underrepresented in
management science (see lentoft et at., 1998; Degnbol et at., 2004; lentoft, 2004; Ostrom et aI.,
2007). In contrast, knowledge synthesis and interdisciplinary scholarship that builds upon the
social sciences can help overcome management failures and open up spaces for overall improved
governance (McCay 2002).
As argued by Gaventa (1980), a historical approach to past experiences can help us
distinguish between quiescence that is the result of power inequalities rather than shared interests
by drawing our attention to what happens in the context of social change. When social change
leads to a shift (temporary or permanent) in the balance of power, as often happens with
collapsed fisheries, protests, social unrest and new institutions frequently emerge. These new
institutions and engagement can change the consciousness of different stakeholder groups, lead
them to formulate new strategies, and change the boundaries and spaces available to them to
bring about change. For instance, the lack of scientific consensus on factors that contributed to
stock collapse and industry's persistent refusal to acknowledge the effects of overfishing delayed
the development of rebuilding plans in the California sardine fisheries and in eastern Canadian
groundfisheries (McEvoy 1986; Charles 1997).
In the case of the California sardine fishery, post recovery activities included the
development of a public-private partnership between the fishing industry and academia that
resulted in the formation of the California Cooperative and Oceanic Fisheries Investigations to
investigate factors that caused the stock collapse. Scientific findings indicated that while
overfishing was the primary factor, environmental change (particularly EI Nino) exacerbated the
conditions for collapse. These scientific debates created the necessary spaces for hypothesis
development and the institutional partnership and legal codes and Acts essential to rebuilding
these fisheries. The sardine fishery moratorium was lifted in 1986 and by the year 2000, the
stocks had recovered fully. This example illustrates the central role of multidimensional power
relations in contributing to the sardine fisheries collapse and in constraining or potentially
opening up new spaces and possibilities for rebuilding.
Although power, equity, and justice are highly intertwined (Gaventa, (980), these
interlinkages are rarely considered in the assessment of rebuilding initiatives for commercial
fisheries (Sinclair & Ommer 2006; Khan & Neis 2010). Equity is defined from a sustainability
perspective within the context of just and distributional procedures (Solow 1991; Gray 1998;
Sutinen 2007). Whilst distributional equity considerations mostly stemmed from Rawls's
difference principle (Sumaila & Bawumia 2000), procedural equity primarily lies with Nozick's
entitlement theory (Graafland 2007). Equity can also be defined in terms of intergenerational
concerns mainly for the restoration of long-lived species and benefits to future generations
(Sumaila 2004; Sumaila & Walters 2005).
The remainder of this chapter uses a power analysis of the Northern Gulf cod fish chain
showing how the pre-collapse fields of opportunity and related power relations fuelled the
expansion of unsustainable and poorly documented overfishing dominated by one sector, and
muted public discussion of this overfishing. The post-collapse analysis shows how, despite post-
collapse shifts in the balance of power, the continued dominance of some groups and a related
panacea approach to fisheries management have constrained rebuilding options, contributing to
the stalled rebuilding of Northern Gulf cod fisheries. These discussions help to make visible the
role of power in fish chain dynamics amongst stakeholders. The last section of the chapter uses
our case study findings to inform a discussion of alternative rebuilding options we refer to as
'clumsy solutions' that we hope will raise awareness and change the space for action around
rebuilding in the Northern Gulf. This entails supporting the integration of multiple and diverse
stakeholder interests and viewpoints in an effort to resolve wicked rebuilding problems as
discussed in Khan and Neis (2010). This approach requires taking into account governing
principles such as efficiency, equity, legitimacy, respect, and the need to create new spaces and
stronger institutions for change (Kooiman et al., 2005).
Methodological approaches
As with earlier chapters, this chapter draws on data gathered along the fish chain using two main
methods: i) a literature review and document analysis related to Northern Gulf cod fisheries; and,
ii) multi-stakeholder key informant interviews. The document analysis relied on existing and
historical documents, policy and legal statutes, scientific reports, statistical information, market
and trade reports, and government commissioned reports spanning four decades from the 1970s
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to the present. These documents were used to track fish landings by taxa and species, price and
landed value, fleet size and fishing operations, changes in fisheries policies, restructuring and
social adjustment programs, conflicts, price-setting mechanisms, consumer preference, consumer
markets, and trade flows. Semi-structured face-to-face and phone interviews were conducted
with fifty key informants in addition to ten informal discussions with representatives of diverse
stakeholder groups along the Northern Gulf cod fish chain. The list of key infonnants was
developed based on background research during the document analysis research, as well as
through snow-ball sampling techniques. The key informants included:
A. Seven scientists and fisheries managers with experience on resource conservation policies
and ecosystem health;
B. Twelve resource users with historical and cultural experience in fish harvesting;
C. Eight entrepreneurs in the processing and retail sectors as well as plant works;
D. Seven municipal and community planners;
E. Ten bureaucrats and other decision-makers at organizational levels with emphasis on
federal, provincial, trade unions, and inter-governmental organizations; and
F. Six research analysts from consulting and academia, in addition to other civil society
representatives such as the media.
Some interviews were conducted throughout northwestern and southwestern Newfoundland in
the 4R3Pn gulf region in the fall of2009. Additional interviews with regional fisheries managers
and policy makers in St. John's (NL), Mont Joli (Quebec), and Ottawa (Ontario) were
undertaken in the winter and spring of 2010. The interview sessions lasted an average of two
hours. They focused on understanding the policy process and decision-making approaches to
governing challenges and rebuilding opportunities. Information in the interview transcripts was
arranged and coded by themes to identify issues around which there was a general consensus, as
well as those where there were disagreements and some heterogeneity in the responses,
especially in relation to assessments of rebuilding challenges and opportunities. The analysis of
documentary evidence and key informant transcripts for this chapter focused on several
interview themes relevant to power dynamics including space, level or place (geographical
scale), social organization and management and forms of power as shown in the power cube.
Central to the analysis are factors such as indications (or the lack thereot) of agenda setting
linked to the design of governance institutions and the inclusion/exclusion of groups and
perspectives; the presence and/or absence of diverse perspectives and concerns across
stakeholder groups is also considered. These different perspectives might support opportunities
and an argument for clumsy solutions, in addition to suggestions for organizational and policy
change that might introduce new participatory spaces that could help improve the balance of
power and increase the likelihood of rebuilding that is socially just and equitable.
Results
Power andfishery collapse in the Northern Gulf
In this section, we first provide a short brief overview of key features of the fishery in the pre-
collapse period. We then argue that the geographical distribution of the Northern Gulfcod stocks
and their migratory behavior in relation to adjacent communities produced a unique management
challenge that was exacerbated by the spatial scale of management in place after 1977, and
related development ofa mobile 65' dragger fishery for cod.
The coastal communities in the GulfofSt. Lawrence, in particular on the Great Northern
Peninsula and in the Port aux Basques area, were heavily dependent on the groundfisheries
resources in the past (Felt and Sinclair, 1995; Hamilton and Butler, 200 I; Hamilton el aI., 2004).
Cod was the most important of the groundfisheries, in addition to redfish, turbot, plaice and
halibut. In addition to groundfisheries, salmon, herring, shrimp, scallops and lobsters were fished
commercially, and incomes were often supplemented with other resource activities such as
lumbering and small-scale farming (Sinclair, 1985). In the pre-collapse period in the 1980s,
fisheries contributed about 75% or more of total employment throughout this region especially in
larger communities such as St. Anthony, Port Saunders, Port aux Choix, Rocky Harbor, Norris
Point and Cow Head; in addition to regions in the Port aux Basques-Channel region, the Port Au
Port Peninsula, and Codroy Valley (Figure 2).
This constellation of factors plus the introduction of an enterprise allocation system in the
early 1980s, a form of quota system allocated to individual boats, now referred to as ITQs,
changed the field of opportunities to benefit one particular group (i.e. the dragger offshore fleets)
within the Northern Gulf. This change was made possible by augmenting the resources and
power of the dragger fleets relative to fixed gear harvesters and undermining state capacity to
protect the interests of inshore harvesters as well as to protect the Northern Gulf cod stocks from
overfishing. Opposition to this shift in the balance of power and open concerns about its impacts
were greatest in the Port aux Basques region among affected hook and line fish harvesters and
processing workers. It was more muted in the Port aux Choix region and further north where the
dragger fleet originated because of the relative importance of these fleets to the local economy
and familial employment links (Palmer and Sinclair 1997).
The development of an industrial union in the NL fisheries in the 1970s and 1980s shifted
the balance of power between processors and harvesters as they participated in policy decision-
making. Most of the contention was to improve the collective bargaining power of the union
through negotiations with processors and merchants regarding fish price and revenue distribution
along the marketing chain as discussed in Chapter IV. This, however, did not prevent the
overharvesting of the northern Gulf cod stocks. This is partly because the union represented all
of the different fleet sectors and the Port au Choix dragger skippers were particularly powerful
within the union at least in its early years (Inglis 1985).
Figure 2: Northern Gulf Cod fishing regions and communities in Newfoundland and Labrador in
2009 (Adapted from McManus, 1991 and Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture Annual
Seafood Report 2010)
Decision-making structures in the pre-collapse era contributed to power differentials and
regulatory failure by providing more resources to the offshore dragger fleets through capacity
enhancing subsidies as well as allocation mechanisms for boat quotas under the enterprise
allocation system (Sinclair 1986).
In the Northern Gulf, as with other parts of Eastern Canada post 1977, fisheries science
and management were the responsibility of the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans
(DFO). Cod were managed at large spatial scales bounded by the Northwest Atlantic Fishery
Organization (NAFO) regions that did not correspond fully to stock structure and migration
patterns or to underlying fleet complexities (Bavington 2010). Decision-making was very top-
down and scientific advice on stock abundance and projected biomass were obtained from the
Canadian Atlantic Fisheries Scientific Advisory Committee. Management measures were largely
guided by the establishment of total allowable catches (TACs), allocation of the TACs and, over
the course of the 1980s, control measures related to access and fishing effort. In the Northern
Gulf of St. Lawrence, although all cod in 4R3Pn were managed as one unit, there was limited
knowledge of stock migration patterns at that time. It is now known that some portion of the
stocks actually migrate outside of 4R3Pn in the spring (DFO 2010a), with concerns about
institutional fit to ecosystem boundaries. These stocks migrate south eastward into 3Ps (this may
or may not be a recent development) and there is another stock that remains in the 3Pn area year-
round (see Figure 2 in Chapter Ill). The main body of the stock has historically migrated north
from the Port aux Basques area to feed in the summer, with some of it entering the 4S region and
sometimes crossing the boundary into 3L north of the Strait of Belle Isle. Some parts of the stock
travel into White Bay on the east side of the Northern Peninsula before returning to the 3Pn
region to overwinter (Murray et aI., 2006). Furthermore, some cod do not migrate but remain in
3Pn and other areas along the coast (Methot et aI., 2005; Yvelin et aI., 2005). These mis-matches
in scale between ecological and management boundaries also raise questions about risks and
habitat protection requirements for eggs, larvae and juveniles, but also for adults and spawners.
This migration pattern meant that fixed gear fishers who did not follow the migrating
stocks to any significant degree could only access these cod during limited periods. rt also
resulted in different patterns of seasonality along the coast with harvesters in 3Pn and the
southern part of 4R engaging primarily in a fall and winter fishery and those further up the coast
intercepting the cod often for relatively short periods of time as they passed through the region in
the summer. These 'closed' spaces of power related to the misfit between the management zones
and the underlying stock structure in addition to the lack of resources for some groups to fully
participate in decision-making led to stock collapse.
The TACs were set (starting in (977) based on the results of largely offshore trawl
surveys, information on landings (fishing mortality) and stock status based on statistical
estimates and modeling (DFO 2010a). Here, as with Northern cod (Finlayson (994), there were
overly optimistic stock assessments linked to problems with the reliance on commercial trawler
catch per unit of effort as an index of abundance, the tendency of non juvenile cod to aggregate
as abundance declines (Bennett, 2008), and under-estimates of fishing mortality exacerbated by
un-reported discarding, high grading and under the table sales (Palmer and Sinclair, (997). These
led to expanding TACs that were, in tum, surpassed by reported landings by 5 to 20% each year
between 1978 and 1984 (DFO 2010a). With increasing recognition of the impending collapse,
TACs were reduced substantially starting in 1990 and were cut to about 18,000 tonnes in 1993
compared to a peak of 100,000 tonnes in 1984 as shown in Figure 3. Two short moratoria on
directed fishing for cod were implemented between 1994 and 1996 and in 2003, and by-catch
restrictions on cod (DFO 20 lOa). rn the intervening years after the collapse, the TACs varied
between 3,000 and 7,500 tonnes. DFO (2010a) assessment now indicates these TACs were too
high to support rebuilding and it has reduced the TACs again in recent years (4,000 tonnes in
20 I0 and 2,000 tonnes in 20 II).
Figure 3: Trend in landings, quota allocations, and TAC in Gulf of St. Lawrence (source: DFO)
Prior to 1976 and extended jurisdiction, the foreign fleets obtained about 50% of the reported
catch. After 1976, the foreign quota was reduced to about 10 to 20%. According to one
informant, between 1977 and the present (2011), about 3% of the Northern Gulf cod quota
allocation has been reserved for the large French trawlers out of St. Pierre and Miquelon but
foreign and mobile allocations have been reduced to nil until the quota exceeds 9,000 tonnes
after which they are scheduled for gradual reintroduction.
The original share of the offshore TAC that was allocated to the <65' dragger vessels,
most of which originated in Port Aux Choix, Port Saunders and Anchor Point on the Northern
Peninsula, was approximately 40% in the pre-collapse periods. This fleet expanded from less
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than ten to a peak of 75 vessels in the 1980s (palmer and Sinclair, 1997). There was also an
inshore fixed gear allocation harvested by small boat fish harvesters using hook and line in the
Rose Blanche to St. George's region; and using cod traps, gillnets and hook and line further
north. They were originally allocated about 40% of the TAC. However, during this pre-collapse
period, any quota not caught by the fixed gear fleet by the end of their season was transferred to
the <65' dragger fleet. As a result, whereas "in the 1960s to the mid 1970s, the fixed gear sector
accounted for approximately 80% of the total cod landings in the 4R3Pn fishery ... [in the late
1980s' and early 1990s] less than 30% of the total cod landings in the 4R3Pn [came] from the
fixed gear sector" (as cited in Palmer 1992; see also DFO 20 lOa). If we incorporate unreported
landings and discards for all sectors, the percentage was probably even lower. [n the early 1980s,
the <65' mobile gear allocation was converted to Enterprise Allocations (a form of vessel quota)
and then to individual transferable quotas (lTQs) in 1987 (Palmer, (992).
Although the role of the French trawlers in the collapse of the Northern Gulf cod stocks
has not been fully documented, there is ample evidence to suggest that the <65' draggers took
advantage of the field of opportunity created by their mobility and fishing power, the spatial mis-
match of management to fishing activities and stock structure, the enterprise allocation system,
and the absence of any effective monitoring, to advance their own interests. " ... Whereas the
offshore [65' boats] can go out to the fish ... I'm in a little 20' boat, and I'm fishing from Woody
Point, say here, and the fish don't come in. What do you get? Nothing." The mobile draggers
intercepted migrating fish that would, in the past, have been caught by inshore harvesters. The
increased power of this mobile fleet was reflected in a fishery boom called the 'glory days' for
those involved with the dragger fishery in communities like Port au Choix (Sinclair 1985; Palmer
and Sinclair, 1997).
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Furthennore, as predicted by Copes (1986), the introduction of Enterprise Allocations
and, as with other fisheries, the declining size of fish due to overfishing, combined with the
absence of any onboard or dockside observers in the fishery, produced high rates of discarding
that escalated as they sought to sustain trawler catches as abundance declined, 'net lining' and
'under the table sales' (Palmer and Sinclair 1997; Hamilton et aI., 2004). These unsustainable
practices led scientists to underestimate fishing mortality and overestimate stock abundance, as
commercial catch per unit of effort was used, inappropriately, as an index of abundance and
landings data were used to estimate fishing mortality. The result was data fouling and an over-
estimation of stock abundance with inflated TACs contributing to overfishing (see Finlayson
1994; Wemerheim and Haedrich, 2007). This infonnant describes what this fishery looked like
and its dynamics, including the 'under the table sales' that became the norm in the industry in the
1980s.
Respondent: Well like you know, back when there was lots of fish; thousands of fish
before the moratorium.... They [draggers] come here to Port Aux Basques, ... there's,
one, two, three, four, they even got pumps ... up to the Marine Atlantic port, pumping
cod. Supplying all Newfoundland, biggest part of Nova Scotia, and we couldn't get any
cod ... because ... if you come in with 100,000 they used to mark down 50 and pay you
cash for the other 50.
Interviewer: What did people think, with all the draggers coming? Were people here a
part of those who owned the draggers or was it mostly other people from other places?
Respondent: No, it was only about a half a dozen draggers located here. The biggest part
of them used to come down from Port Au Choix, Anchor Point, and Englee, all them
places. My opinion, that's what got this industry in the mess that it's in to today. Maybe
that's if you want to look at the real problems that we got. Maybe that's why the fish is
not stopping here to migrate. Let's face it ... if this is your backyard here, and if I comes
in to here with a tractor, ... takes one of them nets that we're using out there to tow back
and forth that bottom, goes over grass once a day, at the end of the week, it's not looking
very good, is it? You got a hundred draggers out there going back and forth, back and
forth, in the main body of fish, where all the fish was, going over the bottom, over the
bottom, over the bottom every day with this big net and those big doors go back and
forth. Jesus had to [do] something.
There were growing concerns among small boat fishers and others as their catches and incomes
declined and as they witnessed unsustainable fishing practices (Palmer 1992) but often seem to
have felt very 'powerless' to do anything about it. During the 'glory days' of high landings and
intense resource exploitation, Palmer and Sinclair (1997) documented quiescence in many places
on the Northern Peninsula. As argued by Gaventa (1980), peaceful social relations are not
necessarily an indication of equity and exemplify the complexity of power relations. Some
informants suggested that one reason why so little was said and done about the problems with net
lining, discarding and under the table sales in particular was because many fish harvesters and
buyers were involved. If a skipper chose not to line his nets, his crew would pressure him to start
doing this. If a buyer was not willing to engage in under the table sales, a skipper would stop
selling to him until he caught on and joined in.
Protests from small-scale fish harvesters and others seriously affected by the overfishing
prior to the collapse took place along the coast but appear to have been stronger in the Port aux
Basques region than further north, near Port au Choix. The protests and conflict centered around
three main issues: discrepancies in earnings and access to fish; illegal fishing activities; and
concerns about overfishing and stock decline (Palmer 1992). As noted by a former civil servant,
"[t]here [was] tension between inshore and offshore in the 1980s, incredible friction between
these two groups. What it reflected was really this new phenomenon of haves and have not's."
And, as noted by Palmer, "although the silence enables social life to continue, it greatly
diminishes the possibility of fishers having meaningful input into the resolution of the conflict"
(Palmer 1992: 27). One result of the Port aux Basques region protests was the eventual
establishment of a buffer zone in the late 1980s called the '100 fathom edge' mainly for
exclusive access by inshore fishers and habitat protection for inshore cod in the region (Palmer
and Sinclair, 1997). However, by the time this was implemented, cod had largely ceased to
migrate inshore perhaps due to low stock abundance and related 'spatial contraction' due to
density dependent factors (Bennett 2008).
One of the potential spaces for increased equity and positive social change, including
better access to decision-making for all fish harvesters, was associated with the unionization of
harvesters and some processing workers starting in Port au Choix in the early 1970s and
spreading to other parts of the province by the 1980s (Inglis 1985). Such participation in new
social relationships including gaining access to decision-making arenas can raise the awareness
or consciousness of a group's interests (Gaventa 1980). Historically, disputes in the fishing
industry primarily focused on merchant control over the fishery (Wright 2001), related equity
issues of fish price, gear conflicts and, after 1955, the effects of foreign fleets and the need for
greater Canadian and NL control (Government of Newfoundland, 1978; Macdonald 1980). Poor
social relations between harvesters and merchants/processors have been identified as one main
reason for the establishment of the Newfoundland Fishermen, Food and Allied Workers Union
(NFFAWU) founded in 1969 with strong leadership from Port au Choix fish harvesters (Inglis
1985). By 1987, it was a province-wide entity with links to other trade unions across Canada and
internationally.
The NFFAWU and its successor, the Fish, Food and Allied Workers (FFAW) union, have
played a key role in policy developments leading up to the collapse of the Northern Gulf stocks
and in events and decision-making since the collapse. The current FFAW union membership
includes both skippers and crewmembers, and encompasses the inshore, mid-shore and offshore
vessel types as well as plant workers. Institutional mechanisms for collective bargaining, better
labour relations, and social welfare are among the major benefits it has brought to union
members (Vardy et al., 1998; Jones 2003). The FFAW's motto is "Fighting Back Makes a
Difference" and it has often 'created new spaces' for negotiation and power brokerage with both
the federal and provincial governments as well as with processors and their associations.
However, the focus of the union in the pre-collapse period was on redistribution of wealth
between merchants, workers, and fish harvesters, and improved state programs, not on the
problem of overfishing.
Also important in terms of power structures was the former Fisheries Association of
Newfoundland and Labrador (FANL), a trade organization of fish processors and buyers. This
association represented large and small fish companies including companies with their own
rapidly expanding offshore trawler fleets and, by the early 1980s, Enterprise Allocations. Some
smaller processing companies along with fixed gear fish harvesters challenged cod stock
assessment and supported changes to fisheries management (Finlayson 1994). However, they
were less powerful within the pre-collapse institutional structures and had much less room to
maneuver than the larger fleets and seafood processing companies (Dean 200 I; Bavington 20 I0).
While the large Canadian companies with their own fleets were less engaged in the Northern
Gulf fisheries, they owned some plants in the area and local smaller processors that depended on
the fixed gear fishery.
In summary, the power dynamics along the fish chain in the northern Gulf fisheries
between 1977 and 1994 contributed to management failure and ultimately to stock collapse. It
also created closed spaces for policy making and a related field of opportunity that encouraged
and benefitted the mobile sector more than the fixed gear sector in the short term (although
everyone lost in the end). The TAC system and the effectiveness of centralized management
depended on robust science that, in tum, depended on accurate reporting of fishing mortality and
informed understanding of the behavior of fish and fishers and how these might influence
catchability and reported landings. None of the institutional mechanisms existed to remedy the
unsustainable fishing practices and to promote stewardship amongst the mobile fleets. In their
absence, fishing mortality grew rapidly in a largely uncontrolled fashion but not all sectors were
equally responsible for the decline. TAC allocations, delay or non-action on the part of
government also benefited some groups at the expense of others and society as a whole in both
the short and longer tenn. Of course, all of this is clearer in hindsight with better science and
clear evidence of collapse (Walters and Maguire, 1996). At the time, with Northern Gulf cod as
with other eastern Canadian cod stocks, there were indications that the fish had migrated rather
than collapsed, limiting immediate policy action but also providing opportunity for research
(Smedbold el aI., 2002).
With science and management resources centralized in DFO offices in Ottawa, and Mont
Joli, far away from what was happening on the ground in Newfoundland; a union membership
that included multiple sectors with conflicting interests; a processing sector focused on
marketing and dominated by big integrated companies with trawler fleets of their own; familial
and other social ties between fishing sectors; weak to nonexistent enforcement and increasing
collusion across groups in quota busting, the space for claims about overfishing and resources for
moving that agenda forward were highly constrained and contributed instead to quiescence.
Where protests were overt and sustained, as on the southwest coast, these were addressed
through incremental management changes that were too little, and too late. While concerns about
stewardship and equity were sometimes openly articulated, the spatial, social and scientific
dynamics of the fishery tended to 'close off spaces' for promoting stewardship initiatives and
responsible fisheries that could have prevented collapse in the first place. These closed spaces for
policy reforms and the lack of government intervention to rectify allocation concerns and prevent
abuses such as data fouling and discarding contributed to the fisheries collapse.
Power, stalled rebuilding and emerging governance thinking
The rebuilding of the Northern Gulf cod stocks has stalled despite two moratoria, more than a
90% quota reduction in TACs, and huge investments of public funds, particularly in the form of
capacity reduction and adjustment programs as discussed in Chapter III. The current stock status
is below conservation reference points as the standing stock biomass is about 10% of its
historical levels (DFO 20 lOa).
As discussed in Chapter Ill, stalled rebuilding has occurred despite extensive
consultations with stakeholders and stewardship mechanism, some institutional refonns
including the introduction of dockside monitoring, a sentinel fishery to provide inshore data for
stock assessments; and a substantial shift in effort towards high value shellfisheries and, until
recently, towards the seal hunt. Post-collapse management measures such as those to reduce
capacity contributed to hardship and loss of livelihoods for some, while others sometimes
became wealthy. Some have criticized the adjustment and social welfare programs for creating
dependency and discouraging entrepreneurship because of the lack of local development
initiatives. Others have emphasized the role of centralized management and narrow sectoral and
disciplinary-based approaches to complex social-ecological problems in creating ongoing
poverty and stalled rebuilding of these fisheries (Shrank, 2005; Ommer et 0/., 2007). They
suggest that adjustment programs have been reactive and have undermined, to some degree, the
human and institutional capacity of fishing communities particularly those with an aging
population and with intergenerational concerns about who benefits when the stocks are rebuilt.
Most key informants in the fishing industry and coastal communities expected OFO to
use its constitutional power to act and resolve some of the on-going fisheries challenges in NL
and eastern Canada. One key informant underscored this by perspective by saying: " ... 1 mean
scientists can say what they like. Fishermen can say what they like ... fish managers say what they
like. All of it rests with the Minister of Fisheries." A senior OFO scientist further explained the
Minister's role in policy decision-making:
'In terms of doing the cod assessment we do the advisory document and which says
essentially, what the status of the stock is, and what the risks of different catch levels are.
And ultimately it is the minister who makes the decision on the quota.'
The viability of the NL west coast fishing industry and of some fishery-dependent communities
is quite marginal (Sinclair and Neis, 2008), including many communities where plants have been
closed (as shown in Figure 6, Chapter IV). Many of the alternative fisheries are experiencing
serious challenges related to rising costs and low prices (OFO 2007; Khan 2010). These
challenges have been exacerbated by recent reductions in crab and shrimp quotas and, in regions
like St. John Bay, by overfishing of lobster (Whelan 2005). As a result, many fishery-dependent
households and some processors in the region are struggling to survive, including particularly
those most historically dependent on the cod fisheries (such as on the Great Northern Peninsula
and parts of the Southwest coast). In these areas, inshore fish harvesters often have limited
access to other species and other resource-based industries such as forestry are in decline
(GNPFT 2006; Sinclair and Ommer, 2006). As a result, permanent and temporary employment-
related mobility away from the region are quite common among both young people and people
with families (Jackson et aI., 2006).
What, if any, is the current relationship between power and stalled rebuilding in the
Northern Gulf fishery? Clearly, the field of opportunities has changed since collapse. There have
been important improvements to stock assessment science and fisheries management with the
collaborative sentinel fishery and better landing data (CPUE) for statistical analysis in
determining future harvest rates. Scientists no longer rely solely on commercial catch per unit
effort (CPUE) as an index of abundance. Besides, data on fishing mortality and fleet monitoring
are better than in the pre-collapse era, due to the introduction of logbooks, at sea observers,
dockside and vessel monitoring systems (DFO 20 lOa). However, the capacity of scientists to
protect fish stocks has been constrained by a relatively strong requirement for accurate science
that has been difficult to achieve. This is partly due to limitations in the Species at Risks Act
(SARA) for not stipulating rebuilding targets, and relying on a narrow cost benefit analysis that
is beyond the mandate of COSEWIC as discussed in Chapter III.
Another constraint on stock protection and a basis for fatalism is an ongoing sense of
injustice and who should pay for the cost of overfishing, particularly amongst small boat
harvesters in the Port aux Basques area, regarding a perceived change in cod spawning migration
and the possibility of winter fishing in the 3Pn region. There are ongoing issues related to
mismatch of management jurisdiction, stock migration patterns, and its relationship to the ability
of different fleets to access the resource as the TAC increases to accommodate the entry of
mobile fleets. According to one key informant in the processing sector: "history may repeat itself
again" if the mobile fleets were to take part in the fishery.
One important conservation initiative led by fishers and implemented by DFO was the
identification and closure of a groundfisheries spawning area in the Bay St. George region in
southwestern Newfoundland in the early I990s. Related to this, the fish harvesters interviewed
were generally proud of their conservation initiatives and stewardship ethic, and presented
examples of other locally led management initiatives such as in Petty Harbor, Gilbert Bay, and
the Eastport Peninsula. A senior FFAW officer identified important milestones in knowledge
mobilization for policy decision-making since the cod stocks collapsed, and a positive shift in
social relations:
'There were a lot of disputes between harvesters and science [on crab surveys and other
stock assessments methods]. ..Over a two year period we sat down with scientists, we
used fishermen and the scientists and we developed a crab pot survey. Solid scientific
protocols behind it yet with the knowledge from harvesters ... This year will be the eighth
year of the survey. I think the development of that survey, the fact that the harvesters
involved with carrying out the survey, they're involved in assessing the results of the
survey... for management decisions to be made .. That's the most solid collaboration that
we've got here.. .'
[n the post-collapse era, DFO has established two sentinel fisheries that provide supplementary
data for trawl survey stock assessments related particularly to nearshore and inshore distributions
and abundance of cod. The sentinel fishery was implemented by DFO to include fishers'
knowledge and perception on the status and abundance of fish stocks and to deal with any
resulting discrepancies. One of these fisheries is carried out by nine mobile sentinel vessels and
by several fixed gear harvesters using gillnets and long lines that are spread along the coast
(DFO 20 lOa). According to key infonnants in the harvesting sector, the sentinel fisheries provide
extra income and fishing time for those involved, and participation in this fishery is not rotated
because of concerns about possible consequences for data quality. However, the absence of a
rotation system has led to concerns about fairness and equity among those who are not part of the
system, and charges of nepotism and cronyism on the part of some. Several key informants
recounted issues of poor fish prices and the lack of outside buyers. The on-going needs of
inshore fish harvesters have fuelled some divisions as reflected in efforts to fonn a competing
organization to the FFAW representing inshore fish harvesters only.
Some changes have been designed to address legitimacy concerns related to stock
assessment and fisheries management that, during the pre-collapse period, took place behind
closed doors. Thus, in the early 1990s, the Canadian Atlantic Fisheries Scientific Advisory
Committee (CAFSAC) was disbanded and replaced by the Fisheries Resource Conservation
Council (FRCC) with appointed representatives from government, academia and industry. With
this shift, decision-making became more open and somewhat more transparent (Finlayson and
McCay, 1998), although the FRCC has been convened to work on groundfisheries only
sporadically in recent years. The early work of the FRCC focused on scientific advice and
conservation proposals for fish stocks; a more recent set of meetings focused on rebuilding and
encouraged broader regional community engagement with policy recommendations for
groundfisheries rebuilding. 24 Their last publication before being disbanded in October 2011 was
entitled Towards Recovered and Sustainable Groundfish Fisheries in Eastern Canada. It
documents the history of efforts to rebuild these fisheries (with a focus on stock recovery) and
24http://www.fi·cc.ca/Press7.htmlastaccessedJuly30th201I.
outlines approaches necessary to achieve recovery, including ecosystem-based and precautionary
approaches, culling of seals, and the potential role of governance and seafoo~ market
considerations (FRCC 2011). The establishment of the FRCC was designed to deal with the
'hidden aspects of power' in the pre-collapse era such as documented problems with government
information control, state intervention in science (Hutchings el aI., 1997), and concerns about
closed door negotiations with industry (Finlayson and McCay, 1998). Despite their role and
influence, the FRCC has been disbanded as part of a round of funding cuts by DFO, which are
raising widespread concerns about the future of fisheries conservation and environmental issues
acrossCanada25 .
There are, however, on-going concerns about spaces for influencing decision-making
through lobbying and self interest that are not accessible to all in the industry. For instance, the
'special committee for the return of the mobile fleet' by the Groundfish Enterprise Allocation
Council, established in 1997, represents offshore groundfish fleets. A key purpose of this
organization, based in Ottawa, is to lobby decision-makers in Ottawa to protect historical
allocations of groundfish to the larger fleets especially greater than 100'. This is illustrated by the
organization's 2001 response to a DFO Policy Document on management of fisheries on the
Atlantic Coast. In their response, it was argued: "Unless the new Policy Document confirms
long-term percentage allocation shares to be used in 'established fisheries' like groundfish,
prescribing continuation of the most recent allocation shares in all groundfish stocks in clear and
unequivocal terms, then the Policy Review will be a failure!" Concern among fixed gear
harvesters in the Northern Gulf about the committee is related to the plan to allow the draggers
back into the fishery once the quota reaches 9,000 tonnes.
2Shltp:llgreenparty.ca/1lledia-release/2011-IO-18I1isheries-resollrce-conservation-collncil-disbandedlastaccessed
Decemberl5th2011.
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Although fisheries science and decision-making have become somewhat more inclusive
and transparent in the post-collapse era, there are diverse interests along the fish chain and
limited opportunities for formal stakeholder input into decision-making at local and regional
levels. Evidence of these diverse interests and lack of participation is ongoing protests and, for
some, a sense of fatalism. An example is an incident in the summer of 2009 when harvesters
protested and shut down the DFO office in Comer Brook because of the federal government's
inaction on the poor price of fish: "Usually if you got the guts to go out and shut down a
building, get the meeting in, voice your concerns, usually it ends up in your favor." The protest
provided an opportunity to open 'closed spaces' for the reformulation of issues and strategies. As
underscored by a union representative, such opportunities require common grounds and inclusive
decision-making:
Most times it's in terms of finding that common grounds. One of the biggest transitions
we went through in this province was when groundfish went and shellfish came. We
shared with many. We did it. Through a lot of internal debate, we managed to lead our
communities through it. So how do you take the same thing? You got a diverse group of
interests. How do we create some kind of structure so that we work it out in a group?
They are forced to find a common ground as a community. Something got to push it in
that.
However, some fixed gear harvesters remain convinced that the government is conspiring to
eliminate them from the fishery: "the government doesn't want the small boat fishermen; they
are a cost, not an asset ... [b]ecause we fish for six months of the year. The other six months
we're drawing unemployment [insurance] ... They want a 100' dragger; when he comes ashore
they fire it up on a truck and sends it to the marketplace ... it is the bureaucrats that got the
fishery in the state that it is today." A harvester in southwest Newfoundland saw the policy
process as skewed against the fish as well. He talked about how he saw difficulties reconciling
different agendas as linked to the stalled rebuilding of the stocks:
'There's politics at play [t]here; scientists have their agendas and the politicians have
their agendas and the fishermen's union has their agenda and the fishermen have their
agenda... [They] can't get together because their agendas are not being met [and
deliberated]. Fishermen want a larger quota, scientists ... they don't want to move out of
their office but they want all the information. They don't want to go and collect it. .. And
then the politician, his agenda is to get voted, to get elected. And then you got the
managers... they need to get their years in and get their pension. The interaction between
these four agendas...usually what loses is the fish. The fish usually loses ... '
Prolonged or stalled rebuilding (which in and of itself can fuel distrust of science and
management and internal divisions) and related livelihood challenges are affecting power
relations in the post-collapse era in another, more indirect way. Only those enterprises that are
able to survive until the cod stocks recover will benefit from the effort invested in helping them
to rebuild. This relates to the larger question of 'rebuilding for whom' or, to use Gaventa's power
cube (Gaventa 2006), the question of who will occupy fisheries space in the future. Although
temporarily excluded from the cod fishery, the <65' mobile vessels in NL with shrimp licenses
have been given access to larger shrimp quotas including some in area 2J and 3K whereas fixed
gear west coast NL fish harvesters have been excluded from access to Northern Gulf shrimp and
those in the northern part of the Gulf do not have access to snow crab.
There are ongoing concerns about inequity, particularly from small boat harvesters who
are struggling to survive and the loss of a cultural heritage if future spaces are not negotiated for
youth involvement. Furthennore, much of the remaining Northern Gulf cod quota is managed as
a competitive quota; unlike regional quotas in the 4S region in Quebec and the use of individual
quotas in 2J3KL region in eastern Canada. The competitive fishery consists of limited fishing
periods per week with different quotas for the different fleets. Given the timing and direction of
summer cod migrations in 4R3Pn (from south to north), harvesters in 3Pn and the southern part
of 4R have the potential capacity to catch much of this quota before it arrives in more northern
regions. This has been a source of conflict among fixed gear fish harvesters in the region. [n the
short tenn, this can give the southern fixed gear fish harvesters' better incomes than further north
with ramifications on the value of licenses and livelihood options.
As fixed gear landings declined prior to the collapse and with declining opportunities for
fish processing work along the coast, fish harvesting households attempted to improve their
livelihoods by incorporating the wives of harvesters into enterprises (Grzetic 2004). This had the
advantage of concentrating dwindling harvesting income and related Employment Insurance in
fewer households. It laid the basis for a somewhat different kind of enterprise with somewhat
more balanced gender relations. As remarked by one female harvester, some enterprises are now
owned by husband and wife, with full partnership and are family run businesses. "It's different
now because a woman can go out in a boat with her husband and they have hauler motors, and
everything is just brought up and brought in. It's easier, it's so much easier now [compared to the
labour intense cod trap era)." However, this strategy displaced crewmembers from other
households and limited the space for the entry of owners' sons and daughters into the fishery
thus sacrificing future recruitment. Plant closures and downsizing had a similar effect as younger
women and men with less seniority lost their positions. As a result, the current fishery labour
force is aging, as are fishery dependent communities. The virtual absence of young people from
the fishery also raises questions about who will occupy future space in the fishery and benefit
from rebuilt stocks- should the stocks recover.
Fishery-dependent communities and regional development agencies have had no direct
role in fisheries in the post-collapse period despite heavy dependence on the industry in most
areas and thus vulnerability to industry and policy changes. The establishment of twenty regional
economic development boards (REDBs) post-collapse was primarily designed to address
livelihood concerns, labour market needs, and to coordinate community development enterprises
across various federal and provincial agencies and departments (Belbin 2007). However,
communities and REDBs were given no fisheries-related mandate in the post-collapse era and
have been somewhat information-starved. Key informants highlighted challenges with their
exclusion from fisheries-related decision-making and related limitations in their own technical
resources and institutional capacity to make sense of and influence fisheries developments.
The main policy focus since the collapse (other than stock recovery) has been on
downsizing - i.e. reducing the numbers of harvesters, processing plants and buyers in the
industry (Ruseski 2007). Downsizing has the potential to improve industry resilience but it is not
sufficient to achieve the rebuilding goal and this kind of policy approach neglects other issues
such as constraints on marketing options for harvesters that might allow them to maximize the
wealth they can generate from small quotas, as well as intergenerational equity, and community
and other impacts that relate to the ongoing power issues discussed above. One reason for this is
the risk that downsizing will lead to corporate concentration (Dean 2001), reduced bargaining
power among the surviving harvesters and plant workers and thus lower prices and wages. As
explained by a fonner public servant:
'[ think corporate concentration will become a big issue because what you're going to see
out there now, more consolidation, and a strong tendency for certain key companies to
grow. The Barry Group, Quinlans, the Daley Group, Chess Penney are big players ..
those companies with strong access to capital will take advantage of this situation to
extend their power; probably more monopsony. That will make it more difficult actually
for independent price setting and makes it more difficult for an auction [an alternative
option to the current collective bargaining model].'
The on-going equity and governance challenges associated with policies that focus exclusively
on downsizing were evident in the provincial government's response to a recent provincial report
based on a Memorandum of Understanding (MOD) between key players in the fishing industry
(the FFAWand Association of Seafood Processors - large processors) and the Provincial
Government of NL. The MOU, signed in 2009, was designed to address stakeholders' concerns
about resource supply and fishing capacity, changing global seafood markets, low returns, and
implications for future restructuring programs. Several proposed action plans, working groups,
and steering committees eventually resulted to the final report by Clift and Team (2011). The key
policy recommendations in this MOU included: i) a reduction of about 30-80% of the inshore
fishing fleet primarily on the northeast and west coasts of Newfoundland and in southern
Labrador; ii) a reduction of up to 50% in the nearshore fleet sectors mostly affecting northeast
coast of Newfoundland and southern Labrador; and, iii) a 30% reduction by volume in the
current crab and shrimp processing sectors to try to achieve profit margins that are at par with
other provincial seafood producing sectors in Canada. To achieve these downsizing goals, the
authors of the MOD indicated the government would need to inject 450 million CAD into the
industry.
The MOU recommendations, if implemented, would have huge implications for plant
workers, some harvesters, and for fishery-dependent communities on the west coast's Great
Northern Peninsula, the most fishing dependent region in the province. Although provincial
government funding paid for the development of the MOU, the government rejected the
recommendations. In his response, the Minister said that the MOU " ... does not bring into play
how the industry is going to be shaped differently so, basically, what is being requested is that
we will downsize and hope things will get better. You are going to make the problem smaller,
but the issues are still going to be there" (The Coaster Newspaper July 12,2011 as cited on the
CURRA discussion forum 26). In the words ofa key informant:
The MOU is a politically charged, interesting, process. Reduction in the number of
communities, quotas transferred, people are going to be really mad...The whole idea was
to set rules so that the community could have input. [Instead] the only people to make
decisions are government and industry; when they screw up they inject political money
and consideration. You want to get an option that is the best case for the society. The way
things have been organized in NL for the last few years, they've been trying to keep the
communities out. ..
This concern about the marginalization of the interests of fishery-dependent communities in
fisheries decision-making was reflected in the comments of another key informant with
responsibility for regional development:
'The fishery is the core industry of most, of all, of our rural communities, our coastal
communities; it's still a very large percentage. That's not going to change. You will
have communities that exist today, that yeah, will fade into the sunset, as we call it. But
you will always have a certain number of communities around coastal communities.
26 hltp://www.curra.ca/tishery MOU.htm last accessed July 11th 2011.
They will always be dependent on the fishery .. and we have got to come to terms with
this.'
In many regions of Newfoundland and Labrador, including parts of the Northern Gulf, the
Newfoundland fisheries are very fragile, as is the future of most fishery-dependent communities.
One key informant blamed this situation on a tendency to focus narrowly on economic efficiency
and, related to this, on downsizing in the post-collapse era. He said: "How do you manage
without taking into account social issues, how do you decide this community is going to survive
and this one isn't. You're ignoring the fact that it's a human activity, the concept of
embeddedness. A fishery is embedded in a society. The economic part is only one part."
There has been some attention to other issues since the collapse. Concerns about equity
have been largely addressed by giving those in the <65' fleet range to access new quotas of crab
and shrimp associated with expanding populations and, for now, pretty well all of the cod quota
goes to these harvesters. However, these fleets are last into the crab and shrimp fisheries and the
current policy requires them to be first out in the event of quota cuts which are now happening in
these fisheries. There has thus been no fundamental redistribution of rights within these fisheries,
and fisheries are not a core part of regional development strategies on the Newfoundland west
coast (or elsewhere) even though other regional industries, such as tourism, rely on the presence
ofa vibrant fishery.
In the pre-collapse era before 1977, responsibility for science and management was top-
down in the sense that it was a federal responsibility, but the system was poorly regulated and
weakly enforced. [n the post-collapse period, top-down management in terms of regulation
(quotas, licensing and licensing requirements) has increased, with some responsibility (for
paying for dockside monitoring for instance) and opportunities for input delegated to lower
levels such as to the union, industry, or groups of fish harvesters. Some key informants think
there needs to be stronger government regulation, while others have argued for reduced
government engagement and more industry self-regulation, which may run the risk of regulatory
capture. The state is, however, not a neutral umpire, as it often supports one group over the other.
In the Northern Gulf, this is evidenced by the support for dragger fleets through various subsidy
programs and the higher quotas that led to unsustainable fishing practices and overfishing in the
1980s (Sinclair 1986; Palmer and Sinclair, 1997). Furthermore, even those who argue for
reduced government intervention have also asked for financial support from government to
achieve their goals as with the recent provincial government MOU Report that asked for 450
million CAD in state funds to pay for further downsizing of the harvesting and processing
sectors (Clift and Team, 2011).
This analysis of the post-collapse period suggests that power dynamics (among other
factors) have contributed to stalled rebuilding in part by constraining the space for effective
consideration of alternative options and approaches that might have addressed multiple ongoing
concerns. Lost spaces for legitimate action and collective decision-making in the post-collapse
era have, in other words, constrained fields of opportunity for imagining, designing and
implementing institutions and strategies required for the rebuilding of both fish stocks and
fishing communities. Related to this is the potential for a more equitable and sustainable future
for the region, with the cod and other fisheries playing a central role in that future. Enhancing the
potential for alternative 'clumsy' solutions that tap into the wisdom of stakeholder viewpoints
and bring together these groups for dialogue and negotiating new spaces for collaboration is an
option for the future that might help address these issues. This is the focus of the final section of
this chapter.
Constraints and opportunities for clumsy governing options
From the point of view of clumsy solutions researchers (Verweij and Thompson, 2006; Rayner
2006), there are four primary stakeholder perspectives in most social situations for resource
management that may have impact on all three stages of the fish chain. Clumsy solutions have
the potential to create new prospects or enhance existing "fields of opportunity" for the
development of options and institutions and potentially, for shifting the balance of power along
the fish chain. According to Rayner (2006), one of the key prerequisites for clumsy solutions is
the 'law ofa minimum of three', which speaks to the need for a diversity of agendas or interests
and for deliberations that go beyond mere participation to generating imaginative solutions
involving these various stakeholder groups (see Douglas and Wildavsky 1983). Two main
requirements for clumsy solutions in multi-stakeholder contexts include: i) an appropriate
institutional framework; and, ii) stakeholder partnerships. Trust is very important for workable
clumsy solutions; not only personal trust but also trust that is supported by institutional design
and facilitated by human agency through cordial social relations and good leadership. Oliver
Williamson argues that the twin of trust is 'betrayal' and that trust can be facilitated through
institutional mechanisms that govern social relations (Williamson 1996).
As reflected in our discussion of post-collapse developments, while one perspective- a
focus on individualism and economic efficiency (to be achieved through downsizing and
privatization) has dominated policy and public discussions in the post-collapse era, there has
been some attention as well to redistribution (focused on facilitating access to 'new' resources)
and to shifting from command and control management to more local or at least industry
involvement. In the post-collapse period, new policies for monitoring and surveillance include
log books, dockside monitoring, at-sea observer programs, by-catch limitations (10% by-catch
limits while directing for cod), and the adoption of vessel monitoring systems (DFO 2010a). For
some stakeholder groups such as fish harvesters and processors, authoritative state power is seen
as one mechanism to support rebuilding but also as a problem. For instance, equity and
allocation concerns are paramount in the context of resource constraints and decision-makers
tend to go for quick fixes and reactive policy measures that ignore the larger equity and political
economy issues (ponte 2007). Most key informants supported the need for participatory
governance and for nested institutions appropriate for different scales of governance to deal with
resource management challenges, coordination and equity concerns. According to a retired civil
servant and scholar:
.... put as much responsibility as possible on a localized idea. If you don't do that, if you
manage a fishery from a region, all the problems bubble up to that level. The higher up
they go, the more difficult it is to solve it, remoteness of the problem [emphasis added].
[At] a political level, you don't get a solution, the manager of Fisheries and Oceans
Canada doesn't have a good handle on what is happening in Rose Blanche [fishing
community). .. the more authority you have, the more accountability.'
The bottom-up approach as suggested by some key informants is crucial for local stewardship
such as protecting critical habitats in bays and for coastal area planning. But, whilst some
stakeholders were in favor of bottom-up and multi-level governance structures to sustain coastal
dependent communities, some other key informants suggested regionalization and downsizing of
communities. This quote captures one key informant's response: "Do we need rural
Newfoundland? There will have to be a downsizing of communities .. That means the Ships
Coves', Flowers Coves', Trepassey, all these small communities will have nothing to support
them. You will have one [community] in Port aux Choix, one in St. Anthony, and everyone in
between will have to go."
The growing use of such policy instruments as ITQs raises numerous distributional,
intergenerational equity and other concerns (Apostle et al. 2002), especially from the union
(FFAW, 2008). Downsizing has the potential to improve incomes and simplify management but
also has the potential to create intergenerational equity issues (the cost of future entry - i.e.
license purchase- can be too high for the next generation), particularly if downsizing relies on
individualistic strategies like license freezes. ITQs can enhance the general downsizing risks and
are associated with concerns about 'high-grading', discarding and under-the-table sales pointing
to the need for investment in often intensive monitory, the privatization of public resources, and,
related to this, the exclusion of adjacent communities as well as future generations from access to
the resource and the wealth it generates (Copes 1986, Apostle et al., 2002; Bromley 2009; Wiber
et aI., 2009; Sumaila 2010).
Some key informants especially municipal and local community stakeholders supported
bottom-up approaches through, for instance, community-based quotas and management. As
suggested by one respondent in St. John's with experience in natural resources management and
community planning: "There needs to be dialogue and discussion [on these issues]. If a
government wanted to solve a lot of rural problems, why couldn't some of the wealth coming
from the fish stocks come back to these communities?" However, those associated with this
perspectives have to confront the question of when and where these are appropriate or would be
accepted (harvesters in a community that has a natural or technological advantage in a
competitive fishery are unlikely to support a community quota system), concerns that non-
fishery community groups will use this as a way to gain access to fish resources, and the
opposing interests of large corporate offshore fleets (Dean 2001; Ommer et aI., 2007; Wiber et
al.,201O).
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Quotes from some key informants (mainly fish harvesters, processors, and community
planners) suggest fatalism is widespread. Those who are fatalistic about the future of the cod
fishery and the industry in general in the region are guided, to varying degrees, by a local and
larger scale sense of the ongoing fragility of the industry related to global markets, rising fishing
costs, etc (see Clift and Team, 20 II). This perspective is also framed by ongoing uncertainty
about 'if and 'why' the cod stocks are not recovering and concerns about ecosystem change and
political will. There are also misgivings that cod recovery could jeopardize shrimp incomes
(among shrimp harvesters) and about other equity and allocation issues. For some of these
pessimists, the best way to deal with high risk and uncertainty is through rationalization and
privatization. Others, while distrustful, would prefer changes more suited to local communities.
But even these proponents are aware that the virtual absence of young people entering the
industry will inevitably bring about the demise of the industry, as quota trading goes beyond
provincial and national jurisdictions.
The spaces and boundaries available for the formulation of clumsy solutions are strongly
influenced by social relations and, to be effective, clumsy solutions need to be sensitive to the
various dimensions and multiple forms of power and how they interact. Moreover, clumsy
solutions that encourage multi-level collaboration and governance networks amongst stakeholder
groups at various scales are essential for effective stakeholder partnerships (see Berkes 2002;
McCay 2002; Pascual-Fernandez et at., 2005; Hartley, 20 I0).
A clumsy solutions approach seeks to address issues of power and vested interest by
including and seeking to accommodate to some degree concerns of those with multiple
viewpoints. It seeks to create or enhance existing 'fields of opportunity' for collaboration and to
devise adaptive strategies appropriate for multiple scales through which it would be possible to
implement changes that are cost effective but also responsive to uncertainty and equity concerns.
Clumsy solution approaches are also relevant in order to reduce on the political risks that may
arise due to social injustice, marginalization, and inequitable distribution of resource benefits
through broader agenda setting. Through such an approach, scale mismatches in fisheries are
also dealt with through collaborative decision-making, knowledge sharing, and bottom-up
implementation strategies that may complement the top down approach. Policy formulation
towards rebuilding in this context strives to include diverse stakeholder values and to negotiate
hard choices especially for resource dependent communities. These deliberations need to
incorporate fundamental governing principles, such as fairness, legitimacy, efficiency,
effectiveness, and precaution. These principles are evident in the various cultural paradigms
associated with different schools of thought on resource management (individualism,
egalitarianism, hierarchy, and fatalism) and each has an element of wisdom associated with it.
The precautionary principle, as advocated by international policy instruments such as the Code
of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries is relevant in dealing with issues of uncertainties and
fatal isms not only in the ecological and economic systems, but also with institutional and
organizational structures.
Clumsy solutions that could be adapted/or fisheries rebuilding
In this section, we provide a few examples of potential clumsy solutions from Canada and the
US, based on community governance models that combine the basic governing principles of
efficiency, fairness, legitimacy, precaution, effectiveness, as well as stakeholder partnerships in
an effort to achieve sustainable seafood production, regional economic development, equity and
the capacity to deal with uncertainty. Although most of these examples are recent, they illustrate
the importance of institutional partnerships along the fish chain, in addition to an approach to
broader agenda setting that recognizes various stakeholder values. The governing options
associated with clumsy solutions speak to Ostrom's (1990) notion of self organization by
community partners in resource management. These new governance approaches thus recognize
the need to engage a wider set of stakeholders beyond fishing firms or industry groups and
including diverse community and regional interests as well as the need to develop institutions
with the capacity to adapt to uncertainty at various spatial, temporal and organizational scales
(Perry and Ommer 2003; Cumming et al., 2006).
Key informants identified accountability, transparency and trust as essential for
rebuilding not only at the local community level, but also at provincial and federal administrative
levels. Leadership and effective communication were additionally identified by some stakeholder
informants as necessary for local community governance and in long term planning. A fonner
civil servant observed: "There's absolutely no leadership left in the industry. That is not meant to
be critical, but what the industry needs is leadership. It's got to start with governance in a public
policy context."
In NL, the Saint Anthony Basin Resources Inc. (SABRI) is an example of a unique model of
community-based governance based on the principles of fairness, inclusiveness, efficiency, and
legitimacy that grew out of regional and federal level leadership. SABRI was fornled post-
collapse as a community-based organization in 1997 with a regional shrimp allocation quota and
a volunteer-run management board27 . The initiative behind SABRI was spurred by a quota
allocation by the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, that led to partnership arrangements with
seafood processing plants based on a royalty scheme. This regional quota allocation policy was
mandated to deal with fishing dependent communities and to empower local communities for
regional economic development. Through its shared partnership model with Clearwater Fine
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Foods (private industry group), and run by a volunteer board of directors, SABRI has invested in
its community through infrastructure development of cold storage and seafood marketing,
initiatives in support of fisheries development, providing income earning opportunities, in
addition to community enterprises in the region (GNPFT 2006; Sinclair & Neis 2008).
Additionally, SABRI strives towards capacity building and leadership training to respond to
labour market concerns and integrated management.
The North Pacific Fisheries Management Council in the US established the Community
Development Quota program in 1992, which allocated a fraction of the annual fish harvest
(mostly from groundfisheries, halibut and crab) to six mostly indigenous fishing villages in
western Alaska. After more than ten years, "the results include more than 110 million USD in
wages, education and training benefits for more than 25,000 residents, as well as new docks,
harbors and seafood processing centers (Ecotrust 2011:3). We argue that including the various
governing principles of equity, legitimacy, efficiency, effectiveness, and precaution in decision-
making especially for adjacent coastal communities that are marginalized speak to the premise of
clumsy solutions where diverse viewpoints and stakeholder partnerships are a win-win.
Stronger linkages between stakeholders in relation to efforts to identify local niche markets
and direct benefits to local economies are one potential way to promote rebuilding in the context
of resource constraint; by increasing the wealth generated from the fish landed, and through
direct community involvement. Stakeholder engagement and greater access to information and
knowledge along the fish chain mainly related to price and seafood market conditions are
required for the development of trust and coordination, and for developing new value addition
strategies. For example, stakeholder arrangements that grew out of community-based governance
initiatives were crucial in setting the stage for the development of 'harvest cooperatives' or
'sectors' after the collapse of the cod fishery in New England (Holland and Wiersma, 2010). A
notable example is in Maine, one of the first community-supported fisheries in New England.
This started as a fisher association in Port Clyde in 2007 and later became a cooperative called
the Midcoast's Fishermen's Cooperative in 2008. The cooperative consists of local small scale
fishers who have used their organization to gain more control over the marketing end of their fish
chain, i.e. to creating spaces for entrepreneurship from 'sea to plate' (Frazer 2009). The
cooperative promotes sustainable harvesting practices, the direct sale of fresh catch to local and
now more distant consumers, and also provides wholesale and retail services to other regions.
An example of a Canadian community supported fishery initiative that was developed after
and with input from the Port Clyde example is 'Off the Hook' in the Bay of Fundy in Nova
Scotia. Off the Hook is a good example of an institutional partnership between fish harvesters
and the community (and with support from an environmental agency - the Ecology Action
Centre). By providing a weekly share of fresh fish to local consumers at a premium price paid
prior to the season, is helping to support small scale fishers and, to some degree, local
economies28 . These and other fish harvesters who are interested in sustainable harvesting
practices, marketing their fish to local consumers, in addition to seasonal eco-tourism activities,
can use these approaches to promote stewardship, food security, and community development.
These and other new initiatives for partnerships, and new financial mechanisms such as
micro-finance and revolving loans, could change the field of opportunities for economic
diversification within fisheries and for promoting fishery tourism synergies which could
potentially sustain fisheries at the community level (see CURRA 20 I0). There would, however,
be longer term challenges including maintaining these new institutional structures, especially in
light of ecosystem changes, ongoing resource scarcity, and global seafood market fluctuations.
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The biggest problem with attaining clumsy solutions is probably constraints on the financial
and technical resources, as well as the influence of powerful groups, and the challenges
associated with dealing with a policy framework that is not well designed for such exploratory
solutions. If they are to become more widespread and models for sustaining fisheries, it is likely
that cooptation or other leadership and capacity building initiatives are likely playa key role in
outcomes. As underscored by one key informant, a community and regional planner: " ... You
can't have ten people in the room wanting ten different ways of doing something and expect to
get it. You [a]ll need to be at the table together and they all got to give and take."
However, one of the problems in the Northern Gulf fishery has been limited space at the
table for different perspectives and options. Drawing upon John Gaventa's multi-dimensional
structure (Gaventa 1980,2006), the state is not always a neutral player. As indeed documented,
the state has arguably not been a neutral player in the wake of the collapse of the Northern Gulf
stocks. But its new programs, new actors- like environmental groups - and changing markets and
local contexts have the potential to create spaces of opportunity for change that can, if conditions
are right, including leadership, could potentially start to create new coalitions and governing
options
Conclusion
The many examples of failed management leading to the collapse and stalled rebuilding of the
groundfisheries in Atlantic Canada (Wappel 2005; Best 2010; FRCC 2011), illustrate that the
central management model is incapable of dealing with human dimension concerns and the
multi-scale institutional mechanisms fundamental to rebuilding. The analysis of the Northern
Gulf cod fisheries pre- and post-collapse using Gaventa's power cube (Gaventa 2006) points to
the role of power relations in opening up and closing off spaces and creating fields of
opportunity for successful rebuilding strategies along various stages of the fish chain. Successful
rebuilding depends on certain conditions, including broad-based governing approaches,
stakeholder partnerships, and appropriate institutional mechanisms that go beyond management
panaceas to creating the spaces for clumsy solutions. In the case for Northern Gulf cod fisheries
rebuilding, the industrial model is the option that is on the table (with a combination of
individualism through ITQs and state intervention through downsizing) and there has been little
space to take into account community interests, rural development, and planning for the future
and intergenerational equity.
Findings indicate that the intergenerational question of 'rebuilding for whom' is
fundamental to local stewardship, secure access for community participation, and compliance.
Shared stewardship and community-based governance approaches were identified by
stakeholders as necessary ingredients for dealing with issues of scale mis-matches, stakeholder
resistance, and the high level of uncertainties in global markets and marine ecosystems.
Scientific uncertainty regarding stock migration and mixing, and the lack of rebuilding targets to
evaluate stock status necessitates governance arrangements and stakeholder collaboration on
shared principles and values.
Some examples that exemplify clumsy solutions in fisheries rebuilding include various
community supported fisheries, community catch shares, and quota allocation schemes as
practiced in different parts of North America (GNPFT 2006; Ecotrust 20 II; Holland and
Wiersma, 20 I0). Initiatives of this kind, with the exception of SABRI, are currently hard to find
in the Northern Gulf of St. Lawrence. These initiatives take the form of community-based
governance approaches that integrate principles of efficiency, equity, legitimacy and
empowerment in rebuilding and sustaining the resource. In addition, options exist to shorten fish
chains by creating new and different niche markets justified on the basis of promoting food
security and livelihood security in fishing communities as demonstrated by 'Off the Hook' in
Nova Scotia. Another option is to seek regional markets that entail value addition opportunities.
These options require that stakeholders be at the table to create new opportunities and contribute
to larger goals beyond fisheries rebuilding.
[n conclusion, attention to governance, including power relations, is critical to the
development of successful rebuilding strategies. One way to do this is through identifying and
experimenting with clumsy solutions. These solutions can take advantage of currently limited
fields of opportunity and have the potential to expand these fields and to create new ones. They
are however likely, at least in the short term, to meet substantial resistance from groups with
vested interests. These types of solutions can provide the basis for actions that are collective,
inclusive, transparent, equitable, and that allow for social learning and adaptive governance.
They are also essential for moving past stalled rebuilding towards sustainable and precautionary
fisheries especially for uncertain times.
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Chapter VI: A Fish Chain Analysis of Wicked Rebuilding Problems:
Synthesis and Policy Implications
Introduction 29
As argued in the preceding chapters, there is mounting evidence that fishery resources on both
local and global levels need to be better governed for ecological sustainability, socioeconomic
viability, food security, and for the cultural meanings they generate. Recent estimates from the
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations indicate that about 80% of
seafood production is coming from fully exploited and overexploited fisheries (FAO, 2010). This
status of global commercial fisheries presents a rebuilding imperative for current society-at-
large, as well as for future generations. Worm et at. (2009) estimated that about 67% of global
commercial species, including the Atlantic cod stocks (Gadus morhua) in eastern Canada,
require rebuilding. Despite several restructuring measures, none of the Atlantic cod stocks have
rebounded to historical catch levels, causing further concerns about fishing livelihoods and
coastal community survival.
This thesis commenced with a global review and synthesis of rebuilding challenges and
opportunities that highlighted the need for a rebuilding imperative. Examples of rebuilding
success and challenges illustrate that in addition to ecological constraints, socioeconomic and
sociopolitical issues are barriers to fisheries rebuilding. Rebuilding collapsed fisheries is a
particularly wicked problem because of the multiple interlinkages within these social-ecological
systems and the broader connections between the environment, the economy and society. Given
this complexity and the common reliance to date on management panaceas, it is not surprising
29 A version of this chapter will be submitted for publication: Khan, A.S (in preparation). Governing options for
Northern Gulf cod fisheries rebuilding. Fish and Fisheries
that the Northern Gulf cod have not recovered, and that only about I% of the world's fisheries
have been rebuilt (FAO, 20 I0).
The main body of the thesis (Chapters III to V) consists of a detailed analysis of the
collapse and stalled rebuilding of the orthern Gulf cod fish chain. I employ the 'fish chain'
approach to understand the various production stages and their interactions (Bavinck et aI., 2005;
Thorpe et at., 2005). The approach examines the whole production chain starting from marine
ecosystems at the pre-harvest, fishing activities, processing, marketing, to consumption, and
governing interactions across the chain. Moreover, comparing the fish chain pre- and post-
collapse provides an opportunity to assess ecological functions, socioeconomic impacts, policy
changes, equity and power dynamics, and current governing challenges and future options.
Empirical findings from the case study show that successful rebuilding will require not
only the monitoring of the marine ecosystem for stock growth but also attention to other
components of the fish chain. Ecological constraints in the pre-harvest stages can be mediated by
institutional mechanisms that foster compliance and stewardship through equitable allocation and
restructuring measures that are cognizant of social justice and coastal community needs.
Moreover, addressing by-catch and discards issues through stewardship and participatory
measures is necessary for sustainable gear use policy. Bottom- up initiatives and other
community-based governance initiatives can be useful at the local and regional level. For
example, regional quotas and stakeholder involvement through shared stewardship and
community development have paved the way for partnership initiatives such as SABRI in
Newfoundland, Community Development Quota programs in Alaska, and community supported
fisheries such as the Port Clyde harvest cooperative in Maine.
The main contribution of this thesis lies in the use of the interactive governance theory
and a 'fish chain' approach to develop a holistic perspective on fishery systems. I conceptualize
fisheries collapse and rebuilding challenges as wicked problems. According to Rittel and Webber
(1973), wicked problems are complex, persistent or reoccurring, often hard to detect and to fix,
partly because they are linked to- broader social issues. Ln fisheries and coastal zones, the
problems go beyond scientific and technical solutions and extend to socioeconomic and policy
issues (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009). Fisheries rebuilding is wicked and challenging because
they entail complex ecosystems, stakeholder interests, dynamic seafood markets, and multi-
scaled governing institutions. Rebuilding also necessitates consideration of current and future
generations, because of demographic changes, and the timescale for the recovery of long lived
species such as cod (see Hutchings, 2000; Sumaila, 2004). An analytical and methodological
approach that is holistic and systematic is necessary to understand wicked rebuilding problems
and to explore possible governing options.
Governance approaches, rather than management panaceas, have potential to deal with
rebuilding challenges, as they draw upon interdisciplinary scholarship and perspectives from
diverse stakeholders groups (Gray, 2005; Kooiman et aI., 2005; Dietz et aI., 2003; Folke et al.,
2005; Armitage et al., 2007; Ommer et al., 2007). Governance approaches are also central to
collaboration and inclusive decision-making, which may foster compliance, social learning, and
institutional innovation. The Northern Gulf cod case study substantiates that top-down
management and technical panaceas are inappropriate and have often failed to rebuild fisheries.
Fish chains for commercial species such as cod are highly complex and the production stages
spans beyond national jurisdictions to global markets, hence rebuilding requires holistic
perspective that are interdisciplinary, participatory, and involves both state and non-state actors.
This synthesis chapter provides a summary of the key findings along the fish chain for
Northern Gulf cod, starting with the pre-harvest, harvest and then post-harvest, and ends with
governing interactions. Recommendations for rebuilding Northern Gulf cod fisheries are
discussed and the chapter concludes with limitations and future work.
Summary findings
Pre-harvest stage
As discussed in Chapters III, key informants identified four main factors in the marine
ecosystems that potentially limit the recovery of the Northern Gulf cod stocks: i) low levels of
recruitment; ii) poor growth rate and low ecosystem productivity; iii) environmental changes;
and iv) shift in predator-prey relationships.
According to DFO (20 I0) scienti fic assessments, recruitment for the Northern Gul f cod
stocks for age 3+ cohorts have decreased from an estimated historical high of 206,000 tonnes in
1980 to about 13,000 tonnes in 2008 (DFO, 2010). Several scientific factors have been identified
that may have contributed to recruitment failure. These factors include poor breeding success
rates at lower populations because of density dependent factors (Bennett, 2008), ecosystem
changes that affect cod predation rates by seals (Morissette et al., 2009), and an increase in
predation rates on small target populations (see Liermann and Hilborn 2001; Walters and
Kitchell 2001).
Depensation effects or recruitment failure are a major limiting factor for stock recovery
(Rowe et al., 2004; Hutchings and Myers, 1994; Myers et aI., 1995). Additionally, genetic and
evolutionary effects may have negative implications for stock recovery as emphasized by one
key informant- a senior research scientist. Extreme cold weather patterns have been shown to
affect growth rates and the condition factor of fish in the Northern Gulf (Frechet, 1990; Hamilton
et al., 2004; Gailbraith, 2006). Moreover, regime shifts from cod-dominated food webs to
invertebrates tend to prolong recovery timeframes for groundfish species as these affect their
growth rates (Ratz et al., 2003; Bundy et aI., 2009; Morissette et aI., 2009). The increasing
abundance of seals and their high predation rates was another limiting factor highlighted by key
informants.
Harvest stage
Key limiting factors for rebuilding at the harvest stage can be classified into three main
categories, as discussed in Chapters 1II and IV: i) ineffective fishing policies that perpetuate
livelihood, social justice and dependency concerns; ii) continuous fishing mortality; and iii) by-
catch and allocation policies that have ramifications for resource sustainability and stewardship.
Analyses of both primary and secondary information showed that previous restructuring
initiatives have been ineffective and unsuccessful towards creating alternative livelihood
programs. These shortcomings in restructuring outcomes led to the termination of public funding
for adjustment programs as authorized by the Auditor General (Rice et al., 2003; ACOA, 2004;
Best, 2009). As discussed in Chapter III, restructuring programs such as vessel buybacks were
devoid of rural planning considerations, and targeted inshore fixed gear fleets, which have lower
fishing capacity and are more embedded in the local economy (Holland et aI., 1997). These
missed opportunities for developing equitable and effective fisheries policies have exacerbated
allocation concerns and created uncertainties for inshore fishers and fishing dependent
communities about what will happen in the event of full recovery.
In the pre-collapse period, allocation quotas and support were given to the mobile fleets,
providing them with opportunities to 'follow the fish' and to engage in unsustainable fishing
practices including high-grading and 'under the table sales' (Palmer and Sinclair, 1997).
Historically post 1977, about 40% of the TAC was allocated to mobile dragger fleets, and the
remaining 60% allocated to fixed gear inshore fish harvesters and a small fraction to foreign
fleets notably St. Pierre and Miquelon. As total allowable catch (TAC) quotas reached a
historical high in 1983 at 100,000 tonnes and steadily declined till the early 1990s, a complete
moratorium was instituted from 1994 to 1996 and again in 2003 (DFO 2010). This was followed
by a reduction in the TAC in the post-collapse periods for a small-scale inshore commercial and
recreational fishery. The TAC has ranged from 3,500 to 7,000 tonnes and is currently set at 2,000
tonnes for 20 II. There are stakeholder concerns that an increase in stock abundance beyond the
9,000 tonnes TAC may warrant new allocation arrangements to allow the mobile dragger fleets
to follow the fish through its spawning and feeding migration routes as in the pre-collapse
periods.
Youth involvement in the current fishery is central for local stewardship and addressing
the question of 'rebuilding for whom' and who would benefit when the stocks recover especially
with an aging adult population and current demographic trends. This was a major theme
identified by the various stakeholder groups along the fish chain, and a necessary consideration
for community stewardship and regional economic development. Additionally, the
Professionalization Act in 1997 has ramifications for distributional and procedural equity
especially for an aging adult population and for the 'rebuilding for whom' question. These
concerns are well captured by a key informant:
'Our [fisher] demographics now are 55 and older .. We have a real problem with that, we
have to find a way to get people back in to the boats. But how do you do it, what is fair?
Is it fair to say, say Peter's grandmother, at the end of it, gets nothing. She is going to
retire because the plant has closed up, that woman deserves Canada pension and old age
security... I think that there is an opportunity now for these older people; it's not going to
cost billions, just a [retirement] package. Then the bigger question is who is going to go
in there? We have huge problems with the fact that it's access to capital [for young
entrants] . .It's not only the cost of the boat, but you have to buy the licenses. If you are
talking about large boat crab, it's going to cost a million .. and you have to pay it back in
5 years, it's a lifetime investment.'
Most of the fish harvesters interviewed in the NAFO region 3Pn (about five in total),
underscored mis-matches in stock migration patterns, fishing activities, and spatial management
boundaries; another reason for stalled rebuilding. To illustrate, Northern Gulfstocks that migrate
to the 3Ps region may be susceptible to winter fishing as observed by both scientists and fishers
alike. These concerns have been reported earlier through knowledge mapping by Murray et af.
(2008) and tagging experiments by Yvelin et af. (2005) and Methot et af. (2005). These mis-
matches present scope for research and development through interdisciplinary collaboration and
knowledge mobilization that is essential for stewardship and rebuilding success.
AS discusses in Chapters III and N, gear impacts and by-catch issues remain by far one
of the most complex management challenges for cod fishery rebuilding according to key
informants (see DFO, 20 I0). Management measures for by-catch restrictions vary by gear types,
species targeted, and NAFO management areas in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Interviews with fish
harvesters on by-catch policies revealed that conservation incentives are necessary for accurate
reporting. Crew-sharing relationships with skippers have undergone changes; from more equal
sharing of revenue to wage labour that is unsatisfactory and often supplemented by government
transfers (Schrank 2005). According to key informants such as majors and fish harvesters who
live in fishing communities, these changes affect local capacity for rebuilding and also affect
labour market and youth retention in coastal fishing communities.
Post-harvest stage
Three rebuilding challenges were identified by stakeholders in the post-harvest stage. These
include: i) current seafood production chains are driven by consumers and retailers through eco-
certification and chain of custody rules; ii) product substitution and global seafood market
dynamics often mask resource supply constraints; and iii) institutional rigidities constrain policy
initiatives and stakeholder buy-in towards rebuilding strategies.
As discussed in Chapter IV, the supply chain has transitioned from state involvement
with seafood producers, to transnational retail stores through various consumer-based incentives
such as eco-certification schemes by the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC). One key
informant, a cod processor, emphasized the stringent chain of custody requirements that affect
price premium opportunities and consumer preference for cod fillets in the current UK markets.
Another processor of forage fish and shellfisheries, complained about the provincial minimum
processing requirement policy, which stymies product development and innovation for niche
markets. The shift in marketing power from producer-driven chains in the pre-collapse era to
consumer-driven chains and transnational retail stores in the post-collapse era require broad
based governance mechanisms for compliance and stewardship. [n addition, the certification of
Pacific cod (Gadus macrocephalus) by MSC, for instance, could affect market share for Atlantic
cod stocks upon full recovery. Since post-collapse, Alaskan Pollock (Theregra chalcogramma), a
certified fishery by MSC, has replaced the block cod market in the US, which used to be the
primary markets for Newfoundland seafood (Kirby, 1982; Wright, 2002). Key informants,
mainly processors and retailers, complained that most of the secondary processing for seafood is
outsourced to China, with little branding or marketing initiatives in the province (see Roche,
2008). Cheaper substitutes such as tilapia (Tilapia spp) have flooded the white fish market in
North America (Asche and Smith, 2010), which may affect the economic viability for cod and
other groundfisheries upon full recovery.
Changing market and macroeconomic factors such as tariffs, trade barriers, and
exchange rates impact global seafood trade and the viability of local fisheries (Moore et al.,
1993). Key informants in the fishing industry drew attention to several market factors that affect
economic viability including high fuel costs, debts, and inequitable distribution of revenue along
the marketing chain as shown in Figure 6 Chapter IV. Resource constraints for cod fisheries and
changing markets towards high value shellfisheries pose considerable challenge for long-term
investments in groundfisheries rebuilding. These factors highlight the governance challenges
along the fish chain and call for broader engagement for the fishing industry and civil society
groups in collective decision-making for economic viability and stewardship initiatives.
Yet, global seafood dynamics and market considerations have not been included in the
institutional and policy process towards rebuilding (OFO, 2010b). This lack of market
consideration in previous rebuilding strategies emphasizes the relevance of the backward
bending nature of seafood production, especially in the absence of effective institutions (Copes,
1970; Gudmundsson et al., 2006). Institutionally, the SARA process is devoid of non-market
valuation for ecosystem services and cultural benefits, which are essential for mobilizing broader
stakeholder support for recovery action plans. Various examples from around the world have
shown that non-market valuations are important considerations towards rebuilding strategies
(Sumaila and Suatoni, 2006; Ojea and Loureiro, 2010). These considerations may have an effect
on support from conservation campaigns such as SeaChoice3o, and influence consumer choice
towards eco-friendly products.
Governing institutions and their interactions
Despite the plethora of institutions and agencies responsible for fisheries rebuilding in the
Northern Gulf and eastern Canada as a whole, findings indicate that there are concerns about
poor stock status and corresponding livelihood security. Two main limiting factors can be
identified as discussed in Chapters III to V: i) poor institutional linkages and a lack of multi-level
governance arrangements; and, ii) top down management measures that are non-participatory
and lack regional economic development dimensions.
Although stakeholders along the fish chain are interacting on a day-to-day basis both
formally and informally, several policy concerns were identified regarding price setting
mechanisms, revenue distribution along the marketing chain, and multispecies harvesting. These
inconsistencies if unaddressed may have consequences for successful rebuilding and economic
viability. Moreover, there are disconnects between the federal SARA policy process, the federal-
provincial taskforce recommendations, and the regional taskforce initiatives. According to a
community planning and regional policy analyst: "What we need now is synergy, synergy in
terms of collaborative processes and partnership amongst institutions and multiple stakeholder
groups ... to share diverse views because none of the existing solutions will work". These
governing interactions in the midst of power imbalance are reflected in the persistence of protests
related to fisheries closures, reductions in TACs, and over the bargaining of fish prices. This
highlights the advantages of clumsy solutions, as they tap into these various perspectives, reduce
the risk of regulatory capture by powerful groups and can help to address equity and social
justice concerns. The clumsy solution approach advocates for broader agenda setting
opportunities rather than see stakeholder interests as conflicting objectives. The multiple
conflicting perspectives as practiced under the fisheries management paradigm; often lead to
equity concerns, the marginalization of some groups, and political risks in decision-making.
Key findings suggest that inclusive decision-making and multi-level governance
arrangements are critical to address scale mismatches and to foster new governing initiatives that
address sustainable fishing practices, distributional and intergenerational equity, and regional
development. However, poor responsiveness, lack of leadership, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and
poor stakeholder involvement at various scales along the fish chain were identified by key
informants as constraints on successful rebuilding. For instance, the capacity adjustment
programs implemented after collapse were devoid of long-term rural planning goals, community
involvement, and broader regional economic development considerations (ACOA, 2005; Sinclair
and Neis, 2008; Vodden, 2009). In addition, interview responses from policy-makers and
research analysts suggest that lessons from these past policy failures have not been fully
incorporated into present strategies, as reflected in the recent report on the Memorandum of
Understand (MOU) by Clift and Team (2011). This lack of synergy between rebuilding,
restructuring, and community planning is captured by this quote from a retired civil servant
discussing the MOU report of the provincial government: "the MOD process addresses itself to
capacity, reduction of capacity [only]. The big issue of rebuilding is put on the back
burner. .. You have to really look at the question of rebuilding. Clyde Jackman's MOU only deals
with one side of the equation. The experience that we've had in government with capacity
reduction is not good." These social learning opportunities for government from user
participation and institutional partnerships are relevant for public awareness and support,
industry buy-in, and collaboration of stakeholders and government agencies (Jentoft and McCay,
1995).
In comparison to other rebuilding efforts in Europe, Asia and Oceania, the recovery success
of four commercial species in the US reveals three critical features of fisheries governance. First,
there are clear legal mandates for recovery and rebuilding under the Endangered Species and
Sustainable Fisheries Acts, respectively (Wakeford et aI., 2009); in addition to other Acts such as
the Marine Mammal Protection Act and the Coastal Zone Management Act. Second, there are
harvest control rules and target reference points to monitor and evaluate stock rebuilding
performance, with various participatory mechanisms to address uncertainties especially from fish
harvesters and environmental conservation groups (Caddy and Agnew, 2005). Third, regional
management councils help to address spatial governance concerns through amendment of the
fisheries management plans (if necessary), dealing with socioeconomic and equity concerns, and
creating policy dialogue for buy-in and cooperation amongst stakeholders (NEFMC, 2008;
Hanna, 2010).
Recommendations for successful rebuilding
Rebuilding challenges are also opportunities for exploring governing options as discussed in
Chapters II to V. Based on the limitations identified in the previous section, four thematic
opportunities were recommended by key informants:
recommendations for ecosystem-based management approaches by research scientists
and fish harvesters;
II. recommendations for vertical linkages for economic viability by various industry partners
mostly by fishers, processors, and retailers;
III. recommendations for horizontal linkages and multi-level governance initiatives by
managers, community planners, and municipal leaders; and
IV. recommendations for institutional innovation and the creation of new fields of
opportunities by community planners, civil servants, managers, and members in the
fishing industry.
Ecosystem-based approaches to fisheries rebuilding
Key informants, especially managers and scientists, emphasized the benefits of ecosystem
approaches to fisheries, which entail multispecies approaches with attention to predator-prey
interactions, reliance on precautionary principles, stakeholder involvement, and adaptive
governance (Om mer et aI., 2007; Vodden, 2009). These considerations, in addition, to an
institutional design that considers stakeholder partnership are necessary to deal with ecological
constraints for the successful recovery of Northern Gulf cod fisheries as documented in various
task force reports (example Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2003). Key informants
highlighted the relevance of research and knowledge of harvest rates for cod, and on the
ecosystem role of capelin and herring in stock recovery. Empowering community partners
through active involvement of local stakeholders in stewardship as well as co-management
arrangements were proposed by key informants.
Ineffective restructuring policies (e.g. vessel buybacks and license retirement programs)
have implications towards livelihoods for fishing dependent communities and the sustainability
of the resource. These socioeconomic considerations are consistent with an ecosystem-based
paradigm and part of the social-ecological approach to rebuilding. Policy innovations on
proactive measures and long-term planning are recommended by key informants to counter the
reactive measures for regional economic planning, labour markets, and ecological resilience.
Monitoring fisheries rebuilding across the three stages of the fish chain is central to
successful recovery. In addition to standard stock recovery indicators such as spawning stock
biomass (see Froese and Proelb, 2010), considerations towards trophodynamic indicators are
essential for monitoring stocks and ecosystem restoration programs (see Pitcher, 2001; Cury et
aI., 2005; Pauly and Watson 2005). Moreover, broad sets of policy and governance indicators on
the economic, social, and cultural attributes are essential for effective feedback and institutional
responses. This broad set of indicators is useful in evaluating rebuilding along the entire fish
chain from an ecosystem-based perspective.
Knowledge gaps about stock migration patterns, critical habitats, and stock mixing in the
Northern Gulf region pose new research opportunities; and fields of opportunity for knowledge
synthesis and policies that are better suited to the natural systems. Fishers in the 3Pn region for
instance, have been very instrumental in management initiatives such as limiting harvesting in
their area to hook and line fishing gear, and implementing a seasonal closure in St. Georges Bay
to protect spawning cod stocks. Similar lessons have been learned from Gilbert Bay in Labrador
where local community partnership of fishers and DFO have led to protected areas for rebuilding
offshore spawning grounds (Wroblewski et af., 2005). Harvesters suggested ways their cultural
and historical knowledge of their lives at sea and fishing activities could contribute to data
gathering (catch-per-unit effort), fish tagging and recapture, sentinel fishery, stewardship
initiatives, and partners in decision-making. Finally, stewardship plays an essential role in stock
recovery (Blanchard, 20 I0), as demonstrated by various stakeholder responses for inclusivc
decision-making (mayors, planners, processors), and the sharing of cost and benefits especially
during the rebuilding transition period.
Vertical linkages for economic viability along the supply chain
As discussed in Chapter rv, seafood is the most traded commodity globally with dynamic and
competitive markets that are affected by both demand and supply factors. According to key
informants in the fishing industry notably fishers and processors, recovery initiatives that
acknowledge global market factors are likely to lead to industry buy-in. Besides, the
globalization of seafood prompts the need to re-examine interactions beyond the nation state, and
to foster institutional linkages and international partnerships for viable and sustainable trade
policies (Smith et aI., 20 I0).
Both producers and consumers influence markets through product differentiation, eco-
labeling, and sustainable fishing practices. Greater interactions and strong institutional
interlinkages between harvesters and their union, processor associations, brokers, wholesalers,
retailers, and other policy makers can facilitate effective communication and inclusive decision-
making (UNEP, 2009). Several 'focal points' along the fish chain are identified as important for
supporting resource sustainability initiatives and economic viability. In the context of fisheries,
these focal points include: TAC setting and allocation mechanisms, access niles, fisheries
closures, dockside price setting, and rationalization measures. These focal points create avenues
for protests and conflicts because of distributional issues and collective social dilemmas
(Ostrom, 2000). Focal points along the fish chain require improved social relations and
institutional interlinkages that might be achieved through negotiation and bargaining (see
Schelling, 1960). Moreover, institutional innovation and power brokerage through clumsy
solutions could remedy some of these challenges by improving supply chain coordination,
market access, and regional development.
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Decision making around these focal points may involve making hard or soft choices, and
developing appropriate conflict resolution mechanisms, and effective communication on values
and principles (Kooiman and Jentoft, 2009). Institutional partnerships are therefore necessary for
supply chain coordination amongst harvesters, processors, and retailers; in order to reduce on
transaction cost and enhance competitive advantage and value addition (van der Schans et aI.,
1999). Depending on the context, short fish chains may be more ideal for food security, local
retail markets, and community development; whilst longer chains for export and niche markets
may playa greater role in revenue generation. As discussed in Chapter V, emerging governance
models demonstrate that coastal communities are central to rebuilding and sustaining fisheries
for future generations. Inshore resident fishers in coastal communities by virtue of their local
knowledge of marine environments can be stewards, through equitable quota allocation based on
the adjacency principle, local seafood marketing for community development, as well as regional
initiatives that supports capacity building and integrated livelihood programs.
Horizontal linkages and multi-level governance
The complexity and dynamics of multiple stakeholder groups along the fish chain is further
exacerbated by diverse and various administrative and organization scales. Fisheries are
generally not isolated from other resource-based industries; they are linked to other maritime
industries such as shipbuilding, gear making, transportation, and seafood packaging (Dyck and
Sumaila, 2010). Hence there is a need for broader stakeholder collaboration through integrated
coastal and marine spatial planning strategies, to deal with scale mismatches between
institutional mandates to ecosystem and socioeconomic boundaries. Despite the recent budget
cuts, the Integrated Management program under Canada's 2005 Ocean Strategy and Ocean Act
provides a unique opportunity for such horizontal linkages and institutional arrangements.
According to key informants, these considerations are necessary for previous federal initiatives
for large-scale ocean management area (LOMA) and provincial coastal management area
initiatives. As mentioned earlier, the federal budget cuts that led to the disbandment of the FRCC
and non continuation of the LOMA initiatives brought protests from leaders of the Green Party
of Canada and other political entities.
The REDBs were identified by key informants as one of several initiatives that currently
explore alternative livelihood options by coordinating regional economic development through
various agencies and stakeholder groups. These livelihood strategies include strategic eco-
tourism opportunities, value-addition and secondary processing in forestry, agri-food production,
and small-scale manufacturing (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador 2003; RORB,
2008). According to municipal and community planners interviewed, the REDBs have huge
potential for economic development but require adequate funding and autonomous power to
implement programs and network with stakeholder groups. Key informants further emphasized
the role of local community leadership in recovery efforts and fisheries in general, multi-level
governance arrangements that recognize regional economic development, as well as encouraging
local participation through fishing access rights and stewardship responsibilities.
Institutional innovations,fields ofopportunity, and clumsy solutions
The various values and expectations of stakeholder groups along the fish chain call for effective
communication and inclusive decision-making on shared goals. To rebuild the Northern Gulf cod
fisheries and sustain them, more governing consideration will have to be given to power
dynamics, scale issues, institutional partnerships and linkages, and community governance
models for transitional livelihoods s and regional economic development. Applying Gaventa's
(2005) theoretical power cube framework provides a better understanding of the role of power in
the collapse and stalled rebuilding of Northern Gulf cod fisheries and also offers insights into
how stakeholders might create new spaces and 'fields of opportunity' for rebuilding. Power is
also central to clumsy solutions and governing options as some powerful and resourceful groups
have to give ground to allow the creation of new ways of doing things that are inclusive of other
viewpoints. Clumsy solutions draw on diverse stakeholder perspectives and prompt us to think
about inclusive decision-making, integrated livelihood strategies, equitable distribution, and
establishing effective institutional mechanisms.
Some key informants complained that the various governing institutions often work in
silos and are very rigid, highlighting concerns about policy coherence and synergy between
federal and provincial government agencies and various stakeholder groups. Decision-making
structures in the pre-collapse era, for instance, contributed to power differentials and regulatory
failure by providing more resources to the offshore mobile fleets through government subsidies
as well as allocation mechanisms for boat quotas that led to overfishing and unsustainable fishing
practices (Palmer and Sinclair, 1997).
Moreover, fostering participatory decision-making and institutional innovation are central
to the rebuilding imperative as discussed in Chapter II. This may require also paying attention to
governing principles, such as the principle of adjacency that may address community concerns
about livelihood, cultural heritage, and institutional capacity (see McCay and lentoft, 1995;
Davis and Wagner, 2006). However, current approaches that emphasize management panaceas
or 'one size fits all solutions' are inadequate to deal with the multifaceted problems associated
with wicked rebuilding problems. As argued in Chapter U and V, bringing together these isolated
ideas from stakeholder groups may provide broad participation and may necessitate 'clumsy'
solutions that tap into wider experiences. Examples of clumsy solutions that draw on diverse
stakeholder perspectives may include knowledge synthesis, integrated livelihoods, capacity
building, community governance initiatives, and public-private partnerships for seafood
production.
Various governance models are emerging to deal with resource collapse, community
viability, and the need for stewardship initiatives at various spatial scales. These emerging
governance models speak to a combination of governing principles that include efficiency,
effectiveness, legitimacy, equity and precaution that are often embedded in single management
paradigms. Some notable examples include Community Development Quota programs in Alaska
(Ecotrust, 2011), Cape Cod Fisheries Trust and Harvest Cooperatives (Holland and Wiersma,
20 I0; Ecotmst, 2011), regional quota allocations to the St. Anthony Basin Resources Inc.
(SABRI) towards regional economic development initiatives, and Community Supported
Fisheries such as Off the Hook as practiced in Nova Scotia. These community governing models
are instmmental in learning how to deal with resource collapse in the Northern Gulf, especially
with restructuring and equity issues, livelihood security, and fostering community development
and empowerment, and cultural heritage.
Limitations and future work
The research design for this thesis draws on the fish chain approach that considers local,
regional, and global perspectives on rebuilding options. The Northern Gulf cod fisheries provide
an exemplary case study of a collapsed fishery that has many stakeholder groups, and is
governed by multiple institutions including provincial and federal agencies and a regional
management organization. In addition to the policy document analyses and statistical data, the
key informant interviews were very important in highlighting management constraints and
potential governing opportunities for rebuilding.
A major limitation of this research however, is the inability to get key informants'
perspectives from the foreign fleet sector, international seafood retailers, and consumers.
Furthermore, it was difficult to interact with key informants in the foreign fleet sector and
international seafood retailers in the study region, except for interview responses and discussions
with key informants who have dealt with them in the past. The design of the research
methodology, in dealing with temporal time horizons in the pre- and post-collapse periods, also
limited the contribution of youths as key informants. This creates a knowledge gap on the
potential role they might play in community empowerment for fisheries rebuilding. The
unavailability of cost information incurred by processors, brokers and retailers was the biggest
setback in computing value-added benefits for the entire market chain actors.
Future research needs to pay attention to these limitations and to coordinate focus group
sessions and policy scenarios on governing options. These holistic approaches can provide a
platfonn to deliberate on varying harvest rates, predator-prey relationships in multispecies
fisheries, biophysical and climate anomalies. Exploring policy scenarios with stakeholders on
TAC allocation mechanisms, consumer markets, power arrangements, and choices of policy
instruments are necessary for effective buy-in and the negotiation of rebuilding tasks and
responsibilities across the entire fish chain.
Recognizing institutional inertia, power dynamics, equity, and trust issues amongst
stakeholders in the Northern Gulf region; how likely is it for alternative governing options to be
implemented for rebuilding? This is a question that warrants theoretical development and
empirical research. The interactive governance theory, upon which the fish chain approach was
drawn, provides future research opportunities for better understanding the challenges around
governing capacity, and the principles and values that guide stakeholders and decision-makers.
Theoretical reflections and lessons to share
The focus of this thesis has been on global fisheries collapse and the rebuilding imperative, and
relying on the Northern Gulf cod fisheries as a case study to understand the bigger question of
how to address wicked rebuilding problems and to sustain fisheries once rebuilt. It is a better
story to tell by also reflecting on the historical context of fisheries development and
management, and the profound changes in institutional structures, and global environmental and
economic changes in the past century. Conceptualizing fisheries rebuilding as wicked problems
highlight that there are no definite solutions to these problems, as they are persistent, multi-
faceted, and linked to broader issues that goes beyond ecological changes to economic, social,
political, cultural, and organizational dimensions.
It is interesting to remember that the collapse of herring fisheries in the North Sea in the
late l890s led to the formation of the International Council for the Exploration of the Seas.
However, this institutional initiative did not end overfishing and subsequent stock collapses)l.
Rather, we have witnessed in the past five decades the most unsustainable fishing practices in
human history, leading to a third of global fish stocks to be overexploited and depleted (Pauly el
01.,2002; FAO 2010). This highlights a rebuilding imperative and an alternative vision of what
sustainable fisheries should look like (see Bundy el 01., 2008), and to recognize not only
ecosystem functions and healthy oceans, but also to addresses issues of equitable distribution,
power imbalances and regulatory capture, and effective institutional mechanisms that foster
stewardship and sustainable livelihoods.
Today seafood is the most widely traded commodity globally, provides protein for more
than a billion people and livelihoods for about haifa billion (FAO, 2010). The growing reliance
on fisheries for consumptive goods and ecosystem services warrants a political mandate and
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collective action in sustaining human welfare. However, current and previous top down
management approaches practiced in many countries are highly flawed and needs rethinking
(Ludwig, 2001; Pauly, 2009). These is also a growing recognition that fisheries needs to be
studied through an interdisciplinary lens (see Jentoft, 2006), because of the multiple benefits it
provide human societies and their economies, and also due to the normative and methodological
aspects that needs to be reconciled (Song and Khan, 2011). The fish chain approach used in this
thesis was an attempt to bridge these methodological gaps through a social-ecological thinking,
as well as highlighting the theoretical contribution of governance approach in fisheries research.
This is especially essential in the context of conflicts and protests upon fisheries collapse
(Charles, 1992), and the transformative governance opportunities that emerge to do things
differently (Gilcich et al., 20 I 0), even if in a clumsy manner (Khan and Neis, 2010). The biggest
challenge is institutional rigidity in responding to these challenges, as evident by Newfoundland
and Labrador's provincial marketing policies, which prevent direct wharf sales to local residents
and institute minimum processing requirements despite increasing consumer demand and local
interests for potential niche markets.
Moreover, methodological developments that bridges the social, natural, and policy
sciences are highly desirable for wicked rebuilding problems, as well as taking an ecosystem
approach that places humans within their natural environment. Attempts have been made to
combine and couple ecosystem and value chain components into scenario modeling (Khan,
2009; Christensen et aI., 20 I0), in addition to stakeholder engagement and focus group
workshops. Analytical and participatory processes are both central to policy fonllulation, for
legitimacy and buy in from stakeholders, in addition to defining issues and goals that are socially
acceptable and fair (Garcia and Charles, 2008). In the case of migratory and shared fish stocks
such as tuna, this theoretical reflection highlights the merits of cooperation not only along the
fish chain, but also amongst states (Munro et at., 2004; Bailey et aI., 2010, 2011). Moreover,
genuine partnership that emphasizes institutional mechanisms and power sharing models that
address equity issues and multiple fisheries objectives may lead to long term resource
sustainability (Petersen, 2006).
Behavioral changes through consumption patterns, education and awareness, seems to be
playing a major role especially by conservation groups through seafood guides. The oversight of
these efforts in rebuilding strategies is crucial to note, especially in the case of NL. The key
lessons from this case study are manifold, and are worth sharing. First, it underscores not only an
interdisciplinary approach to fisheries research but also taking broader governance approach that
is inclusive and participatory of stakeholder groups. Second, the fish chain approach is ideal in
dealing with scale mismatches, by tying in adaptive capacity and leadership needs at various
spatial scales, and linking fisheries and seafood trade to broader regional contexts of integrated
management and livelihood security. Recently, Gutierrez et aI., 2011 argued that leadership and
social capital are key criteria that make co-governance fisheries models successfi.lI, this is even
more necessary in regions with severe financial and technical constraints. Third, these lessons
are not only for fisheries rebuilding initiatives in Canada, but are relevant to other regions where
natural resources need to be conserved for the benefits of both current and future generations; as
well as considerations for the small scale sector that are linked to community viability. Examples
of best practices around the world on sustainable fisheries also underscore these characteristics,
as evident in community based fisheries (Cunningham and Bostock, 2005; Hilborn et at., 2005),
co-management arrangements (Pomeroy et aI., 200 I; Khan et aI., 2004; Gutierrez et aI., 20 II),
as well as quota schemes and catch shares (Costello et at., 2008). These examples also buttress
the need to be clumsy in our approach to governance, in order to reduce on the risk of political
and institutional failure, as there are no technical fixes or easy solutions to wicked fisheries
problems. Fourth, context and place matters, as what may work in one region may not necessary
work in another, due to limitations in governing capacity, institutional structures and legislations,
and the ability to be adaptive, flexible, and precautionary in the face of uncertainties.
Conclusion
Fisheries rebuilding requires not only temporal and spatial considerations in terms of ecosystem
changes and institutional mechanisms, but also an understanding of the impacts of fishing
activities and globalized seafood markets, and the role of power in creating spaces for governing
options. For the Northern Gulf cod fisheries, efforts such as the Canada-provincial Cod Action
Teams, industry renewal initiatives, regional taskforces, shared stewardship initiatives that
include sentinel fisheries and tagging research, are all essential inputs for successful rebuilding
and a sustainable industry but surely not enough in addressing issues around equity and the
'rebuilding for whom' question.
Various governing arrangements including bottom-up community initiatives, public-
private partnerships, co-management, and federal-provincial partnership agreements hold
promise for designing mechanisms that promotes compliance, stewardship and cooperation
towards rebuilding efforts. Moreover, institutional innovations with various policy instruments
that foster trust, legitimacy, inclusiveness, effectiveness, efficiency, and equity are central for
rebuilding success as 'one size fits all' solutions are incapable to address these multifaceted
challenges. Vertical linkages through value addition and marketing along the supply chain; and
horizontal linkages through integrated coastal management and marine spatial planning are
strategies that are useful to address policy disconnects and scale mis-matches.
In summary, governance mechanisms and institutional innovation are key tools to
achieve the rebuilding imperative in fisheries. The fish chain provides a holistic approach for
understanding rebuilding opportunities and challenges through various stakeholder perspectives
that provide policy inputs for clumsy governing options. Further, a pre- and post-collapse
analysis along the fish chain provides insights into ecological constraints, policy changes,
stakeholder concerns, and governing options that tie in with integrated livelihoods strategies,
community planning, institutional partnerships, and shared stewardship initiatives. The lessons
from this case study emphasizes an inclusive and participatory approach to resource governance,
as well as an interdisciplinary approach to fisheries; as stakeholders hold diverse interest, values,
and knowledge that need to be understood and place on a broader agenda for policy
deliberations, and for policy choices that are ethical, just and equitable.
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Appendices
Appendix I: Interview schedules
PARTY
Demographic and background information
I. Age__
lI. Gender M_ F _
HI. Formal education
IV. Place of residence Residence during the 1980s _
V. Current Profession / occupation _
PARTH
Section A: Status and prospect of restored Northern Gulfcod fisheries (for all key informants)
I. Describe your career/association with the Northern Gul f cod fishery/fishing industry in
WesternNL
a. When did you start,
b. What jobs have you held,
c. When did you hold each of them,
d. Where were you based
e. What did each of these jobs involve?
2. Based on your experience, describe the Northern Gulf cod fishery as you knew it in the
period between the late 1980s and the closure of the cod fishery in 1993
3. Based on your experience, describe it today (focus on those parts of the fishery with which
you were and are most familiar)
4. What in your view has changed since the closure? What has stayed the same?
5. Describe your understanding of the current status of the Northern Gulfcod stocks?
6. Describe your sense of the extent and nature of any recovery that has occurred to date
7. On what do you base your sense of the current status of these stocks?
8. Based on what you have seen, what has supported the recovery of the stocks? What has
impeded it?
9. Describe your observations and perceptions of the current status of those other parts of the
industry with which you are most familiar (harvesting, processing and marketing).
10. What would a restored fisheries look like?
Section B: Scientific information and management efforts (for managers and scientists only)
II. What are the key scientific criteria for stock recovery?
12. Are there rebuilding targets and timeframe, ifnot, why?
13. Are there any rebuilding target considerations to set quotas over the past decade or so?
14. In your opinion, has enough consideration been given to protecting older more fecund cod in
current management initiatives?
15. What about fish larvae and juvenile cod?
16. In your opinion, how might the abundance of seals have affected recovery to date? How
might it affect future recovery?
17. What about the abundance of capel in, herring and other forage fish?
18. In your opinion, are there particular kinds of habitat in the Northern Gulf that are particularly
vital for cod recovery? What kinds? Do you see this habitat as threatened/in need of
protection in any way?
19. When, if ever, do you expect recovery to reach historical levels (1980s)?
20. What is the extent and nature of any recovery that is likely to occur in the next 10 years and
why?
21. What opportunities do you see that might help promote recovery of the stocks?
22. What barriers do you see to recovery?
23. What do you think about the stocks migrating and mixing with in other regions such as in
3Ps region in southern Newfoundland?
24. How might environmental changes such as climate change in the Gulfbe affecting cod
survival and recovery prospects?
25. What would happen if the water column gets too cold or too warm for cod survival?
26. What if the water column gets too acidic?
27. How are quotas set for the small-scale and recreational fisheries? Would the amount affect
recovery?
28. In terms of priority, what should be the top on the agenda for recovery of Northern Gulf Cod
stocks?
29. What management measures have not yet been explored since collapse?
30. How does by-catch of cod in other groundfisheries affect its recovery?
3 I. Are the catch adequately reported now?
32. How does the vessel and catch monitoring system works?
33. What are the key uncertainties and risks involved for fisheries recovery?
34. How possibly could they be addressed?
35. What would a recovered (sustainable) Northern Gulf cod fishery look like to you in terms of:
a. Access and quota allocation (small boats or large boats, local or foreign licenses, etc)
b. Participation and employment level (young, old and lor mid career fish harvesters)
c. Markets (local, regional or international)
d. Price, quantity and quality
e. Other _
36. What would it take to get there? Prompt:
a. From a local, regional, provincial and federal perspectives
37. What would be the benefits of recovery and who would share in those benefits?
38. What costs are essential to recovery?
39. Who should pay those costs?
40. Who would be part of this recovered fishery, planning and implementation? Prompt:
Section C: Socio-economic and livelihood concerns (for resource users only)
41. How important are the fisheries to you and your community
42. Do you wish for Northern Gulf Cod to recover?
43. How do you cope with the changes in the fishery since the groundfishery collapsed?
44. Have you change fishing locations or target species over the past 20 years?
45. Do you think that cod fish would come back?
46. Some people think because crab and shrimp are plenty, cod may not come back: what do you
think?
47. What about capelin, which is food for cod; and seal, which eats cod? Do you think they may
influence cod recovery?
48. How about climate change? Do you think it will affect fish migration, fish abundance or
where you may fish?
49. Where do you normally land your catch and why
50. Do you get by-catch? What kind of by-catch? What do you do with it?
51. What is the percentage of crew or labour force that is part of your community, kingship and
family?
52. In your opinion, how dependent are community residents on the fishery and their
involvement in your enterprise?
53. Are there any education and training program available for employees?
54. How different is the share system now compared to 20 years ago?
55. How do you sell your catch?
56. Do you always report your catch?
57. How does the dockside monitoring works?
58. Is there good relationship with your buyer? For how long now?
59. How do you set price for your catch?
60. How have this changed over the years?
61. Are there options for credit within the fishery or other livelihood occupations since the first
moratorium?
62. For your fishing business: do you break even, ifso, what is the % of your profit margin?
63. What government interventions and policy measures benefit your livelihood?
64. What government regulation and policy measures have a negative impact on your livelihood?
65. What are the main curing methods for seafood products and where are the markets located?
66. What percentage of product supply is value added?
67. How do things work in the fish plant? Who gets assigned to do what and when?
68. Do you get to work with other fish plants or fish plant workers in other regions?
69. What percentage of the product input is trashed, wasted or of no use?
70. What are the key factors that affect distribution of seafood products?
71. what is the scale of your processing and marketing channels
a. before collapse
b. after collapse
72. How does the final seafood product get priced?
73. Do you collaborate with others in the fishing industry?
74. Are you a member of an association or union, how does it benefits you?
75. What are the current challenges in the fishing industry?
76. What kinds of government interventions may help you cope during recovery period?
77. How would fish trade and sustainable certification schemes affect cod recovery prospects?
Section D: Organizational decision-making (bureaucrats and decision-makers at institutional
level)
78. How important are the fisheries to you and your organization/agency
79. What are your agency mandates or main aims,
80. How would your mandates affect recovery?
81. Do you think that cod fish would come back?
82. What do you think are the current challenges in cod recovery?
83. When do you expect recovery to historical levels?
84. Some people think because crab and shrimp are plenty, cod may not come back: what do you
think?
85. What about capelin, which is food for cod; and seal, which eats cod? Do they influence cod
recovery?
86. Do you think by-catch would affect recovery? If so how?
87. How about climate change? Do you think it will affect fish migration and fish abundance?
88. In terms of priority, what should be the top on the agenda for recovery of Northem Gulf Cod
stocks?
89. What management measures have not yet been explored since collapse?
90. What are the key uncertainties and risks involved for fisheries recovery?
91. Are there options for credit within the fishery or other livelihood occupations since the
moratoria?
92. In your opinion, what are appropriate coping mechanisms during recovery period or
restructuring?
93. What govemment interventions and measures benefit your organization?
94. What regulations and policy measures have a negative impact on your agency (or
organization)?
95. Do you collaborate with other agencies or organizations in the fishing industry?
96. What is your relationship with other stakeholders and organizations?
97. What is the level of power amongst stakeholder groups and organizations in recovery
planning?
98. Who is actively involved and who is left out?
99. Do you get any challenges in getting across important inputs or opinions on recovery?
100. What are the current challenges facing your agency or organization?
101. Are there any education and training program available for your members and affiliates?
102. How would fish trade and sustainable certification schemes affect cod recovery
prospects?
Section E: Attitudes and stewardship values towards recovery (for all key informants)
103. Stewardship has been identified as a key factor in resource management and recovery
efforts, where stakeholders take care of the resource for present and future generations.
a. What does stewardship means to you?
b. Ln your opinion, what role, might stewardship play in recovery of the northern Gulf
cod stocks?
c. What would a well-stewarded fishery look like?
d. What would it take to achieve good stewardship?
e. Who would be the primary stewards?
104. Ln your opinion, which of the following play an important role in influencing stewardship
a. Education and awareness
b. Lncome levels
c. Sense of ownership of resource
d. Economic incentives
e. Participation in management
f. All of the above?
g. Other
105. Which of these conservation topics concerns you? Choose all that apply
a. Healthy fish population
b. Critical habitat protection
c. Market factors and globalization
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d. Overfishing
e. Sustainable fishing practices
f. By-catch and discards
g. Other Reasons/comments _
106. What types of incentives in your opinion would promote compliance with regulations?
107. Choose from a scale of strongly disagree to strongly agree on the following sets of
statements about cod recovery:
I am willing to accept any management
measuresforrecoverysolongaslam
consulted
I am willing lo accept any management
measures for recovery so long as I get to
artici ateinthedecision-makin
I am willing to accept a moratorium on
directed fishing for cod
I am willing to accept a moratorium on
codb-catch
I am willing to accept closed areas for
nursery, spawning and breeding stocks for
cod recovery
I am willing to accept closed seasons on
directedfishin forcodrecovery
A closed and protected area in Bonne Bay
(or any major fishing area) is useful for
protecting critical habitats and inshore cod
stocks
Some closed areas may threaten other
I would prefer to consume, harvest or sell
another whitefish similar in price and
ualil tocod
Neutr
al
Agree Strongly Comments
ifanvl
Section F: Information requirements for recovery (for all key informants)
108. What types of information are necessary for successful future cod industry recovery
efforts (check all that apply)? Information on-prompt:
a. Biology of cod fish
b. Capelin and seal abundance
c. Critical habitats
d. Fish migration patterns
e. Environmental change
f. Discards and by-catch
g. Fishing mortality
h. Illegal, unreported and undocumented fishing
i. Local ecological knowledge
j. Fleet size and capacity
h. Labour market & demographics
i. Policy instruments and their effects on behavior
j. Sustainable fishing practices
k. Markets, marketing opportunities & supply chain information
I. Consumer preference and taste
m. Food quality and inspection
n. Marine stewardship certification
o. Ways to improve transportation efficiency and effectiveness
109. In your opinion, is the information currently available adequate for recovery? Ifnot,
where, in your opinion, are the most important information gaps?
110. Are these types of information easily accessed by various stakeholders such as fish
harvesters? If not, where do you see the greatest challenges/opportunities for improvement?
Ill. Which of the following agencies have played an important role in providing infonnation
essential to recovery? Prompt:
a. Governrnentagencies
b. Fishing industry
c. FFAW
d. Universities
e. Environmental NGOs
f. Community sources
g. International agencies
I 12. Which could and should playa stronger role in the future?
113. What are the challenges for sharing infonnation and integrating knowledge amongst
managers and resource users? Prompt
a. Lack of collaboration
b. Validation and calibration
c. Temporal and spatial scale issues
d. Institutional support
e. Funding and resources.
114. Are enough funds available for fisheries management (stock assessment, monitoring and
surveillance) and towards users groups such as FFAW for sentinel fishery?
lIS. Any suggestions and ideas on how knowledge sharing and integration could be done
more effectively to promote recovery?
Section G: Governing mechanisms and policy initiatives for recovery (for all key informants)
116. What policy measures and actions are, in your opinion, key to recovery of the cod stocks
on the west coast cod fisheries? Choose all that apply
a. Laws and regulations
b. Economic incentives
c. Participatory approaches
d. Information measures
e. Intemationalinstrument
f. Voluntary schemes
g. Other Reasons/comments. _
117. What types of institutional and management approaches, in your opinion, are the greatest
potential for recovery? Prompt:
a. Top-down central authority
b. Consultative arrangements
c. Co-management
d. Self-governance (e.g. Community management or transferable quotas)
118. In your opinion, what types, if any, of public involvement methods and participatory
approaches are valuable for recovery? Choose all that apply
a. Openpublicmeetings
b. Taskforceteams
c. Regular consultations
d. Partnership arrangements
e. Unsolicited inputs
f. Advisory committees
g. Ad hoc committees
e. Other Reason/comments? _
119. What makes recovery policies socially acceptable? Choose all that apply
a. Rules and procedures for all resource users
b. Decentralized policies
c. Absence of special interests
d. Accountability and transparency
e. Freedom of information
f. Other _
g. Comments/remarks _
120. In the event ofa long and unsuccessful recovery, who would lose in the short and long
term?
a. Short term _
b. Long term _
c. Comments/reasons _
121. What are the most common types of conflicts evident in current recovery efforts?
Choose all that apply
a. Diverseinterests
b. Short term benefits and long term cost
c. Equity&socialjustice
d. Mistrust and unresolved issues
e. Ineffective communication
f. Noncompliance
g. Knowledge gaps and uncertainties
h.Other _
i. Reason/cornment _
122. What are the best ways to deal with these conflicts
123. How would you assess the current decision-making process for recovery? Prompt:
a. Collaborative and broad-based
b. Contains conflict resolution mechanisms
c. Includes trust building approaches
d. Presence of lobbyist and special interest group(s)
e. Too slow and technical
124. What could resource users do differently in recovery efforts?
125. What about community groups and environmental organizations?
126. What could policy makers do differently in recovery efforts?
127. Do you think the policies for recovery from the federal and provincial governments are
well interlinked?
128. How could the regional development boards further contribute to community
development during recovery transition?
129. Are you satisfied with the overall recovery efforts, if no, what could be done differently?
Appendix II: Interview consentforms
My name is Ahmed Khan; I am a PhD candidate at Memorial University and a member of the
Community University Research for Recovery Alliance (CURRA) Project. The CURRA project
is funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and its main focus
is working with west coast communities to find ways to support recovery of the Northern Gulf
fisheries and fishing communities.
As part of the research for my Ph.D., I am interviewing harvesters, processors, scientists,
managers, marketers and others. The purpose of these interviews is to help me compare the
operation of what researchers are calling the 'cod fish chain' (i.e. movement of cod from the
ocean to the plate) as it existed in the 1980s (prior to the collapse of the Northern Gulf cod stock
and fishery closure) with the cod fish chain operating today. This research is part of a larger
project that uses existing documents, statistical information, scientific research and key
informant interviews to help develop a better understanding of potential opportunities and
barriers to the recovery of the Northern Gulf cod industry in the near and more distant future. [
am particularly interested in knowing about things that might help to promote recovery of the
Northern Gulf cod stocks and related fishery in the future, what a strongly recovered industry
might look like from the point of view of different stakeholders and insights into potential
barriers to recovery along the fish chain identified by stakeholders. These opportunities and
barriers might be located at the level of the resource, in the harvesting sector, processing sector,
in markets, government policy or elsewhere.
[ am contacting you today to see if you would be willing to participate in one of the key
informant interviews for my research. Key informants are people like you who are very
knowledgeable about some aspect of the Northern Gulf cod fishery pre- and post-collapse. My
key informants include harvesters, processors, processing workers, representatives from seafood
processing associations, unions, resource scientists and managers, policy makers, and marketing
representatives with a long-standing association with the Northern Gulf cod fisheries. The list of
people we are calling about these interviews is based on background research [ have done on the
Northern Gulf cod fishery past and present, as well as suggestions from other participants in the
CURRA Project research.
Before asking you if you would be willing to participate, I need to explain more fully
what [ will be asking you to do if you agree to participate, and any risks or benefits you might
experience if you participate. If you agree to participate, the interview will take about 1-2 hours
of your time. The schedule will focus on seven main areas: (i) the status and prospects of
restored fisheries ecosystems for Northern Gulf cod, (ii) scientific information and management
efforts, (iii) socio-economic and livelihood concerns, (iv) organizational decision-making, (v)
documenting attitude and stewardship towards recovery, (vi) information needs necessary for
recovery, and (vii) governing mechanisms and policy initiatives for recovery. With your
permission, [ would like to tape the interview to permit me to concentrate on asking the right
questions and to ensure that none of the information you provide gets lost. If you agree to be
taped, [ will send you a copy of the tape and you will be able to decide what happens to the
original and the typed summary of the information on the tape at the end of the project.
[ think the risks to you of participating in the project are minimal. The risk to you is when
your opinion or a particular quote is associated to you or your organization, which is unlikely as
all necessary steps will be taken for anonymity and confidentiality through coding and non-use
of names or places. The potential benefits to you are limited to the opportunity you will have to
influence the findings from this research.There are potential collective benefits associated with
documenting knowledge for recovery efforts as well as exploring options for livelihood and
coping mechanism. Collective benefits also lie in improving compliance and stewardship
opportunities, as well as addressing spatial governance concerns through management initiatives,
institutional arrangements and policy reforms when considering options.
You are free to participate or not participate, you may decline to answer any question put
to you, and you are under no obligation to explain or justify your decision. You can withdraw
from the study at any time. If you consent to the use of your name in reports, publications and
presentations, you can indicate what information you would like to be on the record and what
information should be treated as off the record. I intend to present preliminary results from this
research at a public meetings and community events. This will give people like you an
opportunity to comment on the research and to identify any gaps or incorrect information in the
report. Should you wish to contact my supervisors for any reason (Ratana Chuenpagdee and
Barb Neis); they can be reached bye-mail atratanac@mun.ca. or bncis@mun.ca or by phone at
737-3157, 737- 7244, respectively. My contact information is as follows, email ahmedk@mun.ca
or phone 743 2413.
The information provided in the recorded interview and digital recordings is potentially a
very valuable resource for other researchers. If you are willing to have a copy of these archived
at the Folklore Archive at Memorial University for use by future researchers for approved
research purposes, please indicate this below. Digital recordings and transcripts will be retained
by the researchers in a secure location for at least 10 years. Should they choose to have your
digital recording deposited at the Folklore Archives, a copy of the master list of names will be
deposited with the head archivist who will keep it confidential subject as required the conditions
listed below. Please check the option(s) you would prefer below. r hereby authorize:
OPTION I: _Retention of digital recordings and interview transcripts only by the research team.
OPTION 2: _Placement of tape and transcript in the Folklore Archive, Memorial University.
OPTION 3: _ In addition to the options above, I wish to have a copy of the tape sent to me.
OPTION 4: _Destruction of the tape after completion of the research.
We are very grateful if you would participate and share with us your experience and
knowledge about the Northern Gulf cod fisheries in order to explore recovery options. You are
aware of the potential risks and benefits associated with your participation in this interview, and
you have been given the opportunity to ask questions about and to offer opinions about those
risks and benefits. If you are willing to participate please sign and date this form.
I hereby agree to participate in a recorded interview with the researcher named below,
subject to the conditions listed below.
Name Signature,-------Date
Researcher (MUN) Name (print) _Ahmed Khan Signature__Date
I would/would not like a copy of the audio recording/text of this interview
If yes, mailing address: _
The proposal for this research has been reviewed by the Interdisciplinary Committee on
Ethics in Human Research and found to be in compliance with Memorial University's ethic
policy. If you have ethical concerns about the research (such as the way you have been treated
or your rights as a participant), you may contact the Chairperson of the ICEHR at icehr{{t)mun.ca
or by telephone at 737-8368.
Appendix III: Ethics approval letter
ICEHR No. 2009/IO-OIl-AR
Mr. Ahmed Khan
DepaI1mentofGeogmphy
MemorialUniversilyofNewfoundland
Although approval h." becngmnted, the Commince would like to remind you that MemorialUnivc"ity's
st:atementonlntegrityonScholarlyReseurchlhttp://wwv.".mun.calnolicyhile!policy.php7id-13Q\SectionJ.3,
whichourBOatd follows,mtesthatprimasydata(mwdata)colleclcdduringrese,rchinvolvinghumllll
subjects must be kept securely I1nd consistent with procedures that ensurc confidentidilyand privacyfora
pcriodorfive~arsfromthedaleofcomplelionoflheresearchexceptwheresuchaccesscooldviolatethe
aoonymityofsubjetrsor the confidentiaJityoflhedata.
Ifyou intend 10 mal:echanges during t.be course of the project which m3ygiverise toethical concerns. please
~:~=~:s~;:"~~.hangestOtheICEHRC<Hlnlinalor.Mrs.EleanorBUtler.at~for
The TCPS requires thalyOtJ submil an annual stalusrepononyourprojecl to ICEHR. srouldthe rescarchcany
onbeyondOclober20JO. Also.tocomplywilhlheTCPS.pleasenotifyusuponcompletionofyourprojecL
cc: Supcrvisor-Dr. RatlUH1Chuenpagdee. DepartmenlofGeogrnphy
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Appendix IV: Author agreement (Khan and Neis, 20/0)
[ declare that this manuscript is original, has not been published before and is not currently being
considered for publication elsewhere.
[ confirm that the manuscript has been read and approved by my co-author. I further
confirm that the order of authors listed in the manuscript has been approved by the two of us.
Both of us understand that [ am the sole contact for the editorial process. [ am responsible for
communicating on behalf of my co-author about progress, submissions of revisions and final
approval of proofs.
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